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Abstract
This dissertation argues that the history of anti-communism in English Canada
between 1945 and 1967 is more diverse and complicated than traditionally
acknowledged. Often dispersed throughout the scholarship as elements of other Cold
War topics, including espionage, state surveillance, and policing, anti-communism is the
central subject of this investigation. A series of case studies are used to analyze
individual encounters with the state and civic engagement with the domestic threat of
communism. The unique politico-cultural approach of this dissertation will bolster
Canada’s Cold War historiography by investigating both public and private
manifestations of anti-communism.
The intersections of public safety, the arts, and national identity all contribute to
the multifaceted and complex nature of anti-communism in English Canada.
Communism was consistently viewed as a public safety concern that produced a
governmental response with contrasting political and policing priorities. Additionally,
educational campaigns were initiated by business associations such as the Canadian
Chamber of Commerce, and stark public safety warnings were issued by activists
Marjorie Lamb, Ron Gostick, and Patrick Walsh. This study stresses the importance of
the arts for interpreting and engaging with the perceived domestic threat of communism.
Whether through the politics of a Paul Robeson musical performance, the writing of Ted
Allan, a radio drama penned by Reuben Ship, or the nationalist emphasis of the
National Film Board or Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, communities of cultural
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influence explored the boundaries of ideological exploration and depicted the
consequences of suspected subversion.
Notably, this research also reveals a nuanced expression of Canadian national
identity influenced by perceptions of anti-communism. Subtle Canadian anticommunism was overshadowed by the conspicuous imagery of aggressive American
communist witch-hunts, reckless accusations, and a pervasive security apparatus. The
absence of a visible Canadian version of “McCarthyism” enabled the development of a
narrative that Canadian anti-communism was less punitive than in the United States.
The validity of this idea, with respect to actual American policies, is not debated here.
Rather, it is the existence of this perception, observable through different interactions
with American anti-communism, that has significant influence on the constructed notion
of a unique Canadian national identity. Recognizing and examining these particular
intersecting patterns contributes a unique politico-cultural analysis of anti-communism in
Canada that further advances existing historiography.
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Introduction
On September 5, 1945, Igor Gouzenko left the Soviet embassy in Ottawa with
documents substantiating the existence of espionage in Canada. Indicative of the
intensifying global Cold War, the Gouzenko revelations incited widespread fear of
communist subversion that subsequently shaped personal attitudes and state action.
With a much different emphasis, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) signed
a two-year comprehensive cultural exchange agreement with the Soviet Union designed
to improve cooperation in radio and television broadcasting on April 26, 1967. The
intervening period provides no singular explanation for how Canadians responded to the
domestic threat of communism. This dissertation argues that the history of anticommunism in English Canada between 1945 and 1967 is more diverse and
complicated than traditionally acknowledged. Often dispersed throughout the
scholarship as elements of other Cold War topics, anti-communism is the central
subject of this investigation. A case study approach analyzes individual encounters with
the state and civic engagement with the domestic threat of communism. These
interactions reiterate the consistency of public safety concerns, but also stress the
importance of the arts for interpreting and engaging with communism. Notably, this
research also reveals a nuanced expression of Canadian national identity influenced by
perceptions of anti-communism during the Cold War era. Identifying and examining
these particular intersecting patterns contributes a unique politico-cultural analysis of
anti-communism in Canada that further advances existing historiography.
Public safety concerns included a collection of fears related to national security,
the spread of the communist ideology, and the growing hegemony of the Soviet Union.
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The espionage revealed by Gouzenko forced Canadians to confront the domestic
implications of the global Cold War. This dissertation acknowledges the centrality of
public safety concerns and the dominant historiographical focus on state anticommunist initiatives. Yet, the complexity of Canadian anti-communism is further
revealed by placing more emphasis on inconsistent state interpretations of the
ideological threat. Following the well-publicized investigations of the 1946 KellockTaschereau Royal Commission,1 the political priorities of Prime Minister Louis St.
Laurent’s government are juxtaposed with the operational priorities of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). An amalgamation of accounts from those civil
servants, diplomats, and artists investigated or persecuted by the state for suspected
communist beliefs stresses history from the “bottom up.” Presented together, these
stories enhance an understanding of the personal repercussions of state-directed public
safety measures intended to mitigate the influence of communism.
As a direct reaction to public safety concerns, anti-communism also included
educational campaigns and citizen activism. Unaware of the extent of punitive state
action, civic engagement amongst politically engaged Canadians became largely
concentrated on the outward ideological threat to public safety personified by the Soviet
Union. This included Marjorie Lamb’s work with the mainstream charitable initiative the
Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire (IODE), and radical publications like Ron
Gostick’s The Intelligence Service. Gostick, Lamb, and fellow activist Patrick Walsh

Full title: Royal Commission To Investigate the Facts Relating to the Circumstances, By Public Officials
and Other Persons in Positions of Trust of Secret and Confidential Information to Agents of a Foreign
Power.
1
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provoked discussion within government, the labour movement, and broader public
discourse with varying degrees of legitimacy. In addition to espionage, fears included
the indoctrination of children, communist propaganda disseminated by the Canadian
media, and sabotage. Education campaigns concentrated on public safety, raising
awareness of the ideological threat, and emphasizing the need to identify subversives.
This dissertation argues that global Cold War pressures and domestic public
safety concerns combined to influence national perceptions. Canada entered the Cold
War balancing the pursuit of national sovereignty with the need for multilateral alliances
to counteract the growing power of a communist Soviet Union. The shift of Canada’s
dominant alliance relationship from Britain to the United States prompted concerns
about economic integration and military dependence. Canadian national identity, both
state initiated and individually imagined, served to counteract longstanding fears of
political, economic, and cultural assimilation.2 Cultural institutions like the National Film
Board (NFB) and the CBC were established in part to further the idea of the nation by
connecting a disparate Canadian population spread over a vast geography. Despite this
emphasis the NFB and the CBC became targets of anti-communist suspicion precisely
because of this ability to shape the national conscious and fears they were complicit in
the spread of communist propaganda.

This study uses the term “identity” to encompass the closely related concepts of “national character,”
“national image,” and “national culture.” When necessary, these specific terms are incorporated into the
analysis to describe and explain more nuanced interpretations. “Identity” is purposefully broad and allows
for a consistent descriptor to reference the different traits and qualities perceived to encompass a
promoted vision of Canada.
2
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A link between anti-communism and national identity also manifested itself in
Canadians’ attitudes regarding the state’s approach to the domestic ideological threat.
During the early Cold War period, it was not uncommon for Canadians to believe their
government approached the domestic threat of communism much differently than the
United States. The validity of this idea, with respect to actual American policies, is not
debated here. Rather, it is the existence of this perception, observable through different
interactions with American anti-communism, that has significant bearing on the
constructed notion of a unique Canadian national identity. The absence of a visible
Canadian version of “McCarthyism” enabled the development of a narrative that
Canadian anti-communism was less punitive than in the United States. Subtle Canadian
anti-communism was overshadowed by the conspicuous imagery of aggressive
American communist witch-hunts, reckless accusations, and a pervasive security
apparatus. For example, public reaction to the suicide of diplomat Herbert Norman, after
repeated congressional investigations in the United States, stoked the type of antiAmericanism in Canada that contributed to this perception. Regardless of the legitimacy
of these beliefs, this perception of Canadian anti-communism reinforced an appealing
vision of national identity that resisted American influence and promoted Canadian
sovereignty.
Lastly, this dissertation argues that the arts helped to interpret the domestic
threat of communism in Canada. Whether through musical performance, writing, film, or
radio, communities of cultural influence explored the boundaries of ideological
exploration, depicted the consequences of suspected subversion, and contributed to
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Cold War era national identity debates. Both the production and consumption of arts
and culture provided opportunities for individual Canadians to confront the public safety
concerns that characterized the domestic threat of communism. Cold War themes were
explored on the radio, with the CBC airing programs such as The Intrigue at Mill Centre
(1947), and Red is for Danger (1953). Comedy and drama productions depicted the
need for citizen loyalty, misplaced suspicion, and the obligation to identify public
communist threats. Rueben Ship’s The Investigator (1954) satirized American
McCarthyism in such an effective manner that it reinforced the favourable assumption
that such a “witch-hunt” could never occur in Canada. The attempts of several artists
and musicians to visit Canada, including Paul Robeson throughout the late 1940s and
1950s, and Maurice Chevalier in 1951, illustrates how differing immigration decisions
obfuscated the government’s anti-communism policy. The intertwined personal
experiences of casual observers, attentive citizens, writers, performers, journalists, civil
servants, and politicians provides a valuable perspective through which to better
understand the intersections between anti-communism and the arts.

Canadian Cold War Historiography

Canada’s Cold War historiography was initially confined to foreign policy
debates, with national identity connected to questions of political, military, and
diplomatic involvement in global affairs. The Art of the Possible, a foundational work by
political scientist and journalist James Eayrs, describes how institutions, agencies, and
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government actors designed and executed early Canadian foreign policy.3 This analysis
highlights the constant struggle to define Canada’s role in international affairs and the
transition of foreign policy decision-making control from Britain to the Government of
Canada with the passage of the 1931 Statute of Westminster. A significant
historiographical theme of this debate is the competing political, economic, and cultural
influences of Britain and the United States. In The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957,
historian Donald Creighton argues that the postwar governing Liberal Party of Canada
sacrificed economic self-sufficiency and sovereignty for military dependence on the
United States.4 It is important to note here that certain historiographical contributions
were purposefully informing Canadian national identity debates. The Forked Road was
a volume of the Canadian Centenary Series, an officially commissioned history in
celebration of Canada’s 1967 centennial celebrations. Creighton served as an advisory
editor for the series, which was an intentional nation building effort attempting to author
an authoritative and comprehensive account of Canada’s “national” history.
C. P. Stacey’s Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External
Policies, Volume 2: 1921-1948, The Mackenzie King Era is another contribution to the
canon of early Canadian international histories.5 Utilizing the diaries of William Lyon
Mackenzie King, Stacey concentrates on the role of the prime minister in foreign policy
development from the interwar period to the early years of the Cold War. This study

James Eayrs, The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1961).
4 Donald Creighton, The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976).
5 C. P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies, Volume 2: 19211948, The Mackenzie King Era (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981).
3
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typifies the “great-man” approach to the study of history, which emphasizes personal
biography and was often employed by historians concerned with political and foreign
policy decision-making. J. L. Granatstein similarly concentrates on the political and
diplomatic activities of the John Diefenbaker and Lester Pearson governments in
Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation.6 Another volume of the
Canadian Centenary Series, Granatstein somewhat differentiates this study through a
discussion of the Canada Council, a Crown corporation established in 1957 to foster
and promote the arts in Canada. Yet Granatstein’s analysis focuses on a limited
definition of culture and primarily concentrates on the top-down bureaucratic design of
the Canada Council.
Creighton, Stacey, and Granatstein all deliver broad national histories that
emphasize Canada’s emerging foreign policy. The Cold War provides the background
context, but each historian addresses the dialogues and debates that faced policymakers. Written two years after Granatstein’s contribution to the Canadian Centenary
Series, Denis Smith’s Diplomacy of Fear: Canada and the Cold War, 1941-1948 more
directly emphasizes the bipolar struggle between capitalism and communism.7 As the
perceived “fear” of communism came to dominate the Cold War in Canada, it also
influenced the positioning of Canadian foreign policy. Smith argues that despite Prime
Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King’s growing suspicion of American economic and
strategic strength, the domestic communist threat revealed by the defection of Igor

J. L. Granatstein, Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation (Toronto: McClelland
and Stewart, 1986).
7 Denis Smith, Diplomacy of Fear: Canada and the Cold War, 1941-1948 (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1988).
6
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Gouzenko initially overrode and mitigated concerns in Canada about encroaching
American power. By maintaining and broadening alliances with other middle and small
powers of the Commonwealth, and through active participation in the United Nations
and its agencies, it was believed that Canada could play a substantive Cold War role.8
While the Gouzenko Affair solidified the necessity for strong bilateral defence
agreements with the United States and affirmed the global threat posed by the Soviet
Union, it also intensified the perceived domestic threat posed by communism.
Before examining the place of anti-communism within the historiography, it’s
necessary to briefly introduce one important theme related to Canada’s transnational
relations with the United States.9 Throughout this dissertation anti-Americanism
influences different interpretations of anti-communism and perceptions of the United

Ibid., 204.
When analyzing the interaction between Canada and the United States, this study attempts to move
beyond a traditional binational understanding of nation-to-nation relations. While “binational” is often
understood as concerning or consisting of two nations, “transnational” places emphasis on extending
relations beyond the national or subnational level. For example, this approach recognizes the CanadianAmerican relationship extends across, or in spite of, national boundaries. A transnational analysis allows
for the inclusion of disparate elements, including interaction that takes place outside of state control, or in
a more informal or unintentional fashion.
Embracing a transnational perspective is particularly relevant for a study of anti-communism, as the
spread of the communist ideology was not limited to the designs of state policy. In an article for
Intelligence and National Security, Thomas Maguire speaks of communism in terms of interconnected
domestic and foreign transnational subversive activities [Thomas Maguire, “Counter-Subversion in Early
Cold War Britain: The Official Committee on Communism (Home), the Information Research Department,
and ‘State-Private Networks’” Intelligence and National Security Vol. 30 No. 5 (2015), 642]. Maguire
focuses on “state-private networks” and the interaction between governmental and non-governmental
forms of propaganda, psychological operations, and broader cultural influence.
The emphasis on transnational interpretations of networks is studied in greater depth in Giles ScottSmith’s work on the International Documentation and Information Centre, a Western European initiative of
individuals and institutes organized around anti-communist goals. Scott-Smith’s Western AntiCommunism and the Interdoc Network is part of the Palgrave MacMillan Transnational History Series,
which emphasizes the methodological approach of studying the interactions of non-state actors and their
communities, a focus often less emphasized by traditional geopolitical studies [Giles Scott-Smith,
Western Anti-Communism and the Interdoc Network (Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave MacMillan,
2012)]. A transnational lens for this dissertation will allow for a robust integration of the dispersed sociocultural and political influences of anti-communism on the Canadian Cold War climate.
8
9
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States. J.L. Granatstein argues the anti-communist “witch hunts” of the McCarthy era
reinvigorated anti-American sentiments in Canada.10 Granatstein’s Yankee Go Home?:
Canadians and Anti-Americanism suggests government officials, academia, and the
public at large held widespread concern over perceived violations of civil liberties, and
the proliferation of broad communist allegations levelled at Canadians by American anticommunists.11 Related to the rise of anti-Americanism were perceptions Canada
approached anti-communism much differently than the United States. Amy Knight’s
How the Cold War Began: The Igor Gouzenko Affair and the Hunt for Soviet Spies
discusses the different approaches of the two governments to the communist “threat” as
part of a larger analysis of espionage.12 Knight argues that with the exception of the
initial response to the Gouzenko allegations, the Liberal governments of the early Cold
War avoided the harsh tactics of American anti-communist measures.13 While Knight’s
argument is disputed below, this dissertation will explore the nationalist impulse behind
the perception held by certain politically engaged citizens that Canadian anticommunism was not as punitive as the United States.
While growing, Canada’s distinct Cold War historiography lacks the same focus
on the anti-communist movement available in the United States, where Senator Joseph
McCarthy and the communist blacklist garner considerable attention.14 The study of

J. L. Granatstein, Yankee Go Home?: Canadians and Anti-Americanism (Toronto: Harper Collins,
1997), 110-111.
11 Ibid., 110-111, 117.
12 Amy Knight, How the Cold War Began: The Igor Gouzenko Affair and the Hunt for Soviet Spies (New
York: Carroll & Graff Publishers, 2007).
13 Ibid., 210.
14 Examples of the historiographical studies which examine McCarthyism, anti-communism, and the
intersection between anti-communism and cultural and socio-cultural issues, include: Seymour Martin
Lipset, The Politics of Unreason (1970); David Caute, The Great Fear (1978); Thomas Reeves, The Life
10
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Canadian anti-communism has rarely been an isolated topic and is most often
incorporated into broader analysis. For example, it is common to include analysis of
anti-communism as part of the state’s response to the fear of communism, and the
historiography has generally focused on espionage, state surveillance, and policing.
Granatstein and David Stafford’s Spy Wars: Espionage and Canada from Gouzenko to
Glasnost is a broad ranging survey of national security threats, surveillance activities,
and intelligence partnerships.15 With a more defined focus, Steve Hewitt’s Spying 101:
The RCMP’s Secret Activities at Canadian Universities, 1917-1997 traces the
connection between the perceived threat, and proactive surveillance, of potential
subversives and suspect tendencies or behaviours.16 More recently, Reg Whitaker,
Gregory Kealey, and Andrew Parnaby have conducted a wide-ranging survey of political
policing in Canada. Secret Service: Political Policing in Canada from the Fenians to
Fortress America includes a concentration on the intensive surveillance apparatus
conducted by the state during the Cold War period.17 In an article for The Canadian
Historical Review, Dennis Molinaro similarly examines the RCMP’s secretive “PICNIC”

and Times of Joe McCarthy (1982); Richard Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of
McCarthyism (1985); Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound (1988); Richard Fried, Nightmare in Red
(1990); Stephen Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (1991); Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights
(2000); Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line (2001); Jean Rouverol, Refugees from
Hollywood (2000); Paul Buhle and Dave Wagner, Hide in Plain Sight (2003); Michael Ybarra, Washington
Gone crazy (2004); Haynes Johnson, The Age of Anxiety (2005); Gerald Horne, The Final Victim of the
Blacklist (2006); John Joseph Gladchuk, Hollywood and Anticommunism (2007); Reynold Humphries,
Hollywood’s Blacklists (2008).
15 J. L. Granatstein and David Stafford, Spy Wars: Espionage and Canada, From Gouzenko to Glasnost
(Toronto: Key Porter Books Limited, 1990).
16 Steve Hewitt, Spying 101: The RCMP’s Secret Activities at Canadian Universities, 1917-1997 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2002).
17 Reg Whitaker, Gregory Kealey, and Andrew Parnaby, Secret Service: Political Policing in Canada
From the Fenians to Fortress America (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012).
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counter-intelligence program of covert phone-tapping, which began in the early 1950s.18
While these studies examine the activities of the Canadian security state, there are also
important historiographical contributions that examine how Cold War policies attempted
the regulation of morality.
The state’s attempts to define “subversive” resulted in directed attempts to
regulate behaviour and a consistent questioning of citizen loyalty. Larry Hannant’s The
Infernal Machine: Investigating the Loyalty of Canada’s Citizens provides important
context for understanding how the surveillance and screening of Canadian citizens was
justified as a means to identify “subversives.”19 Mark Kristmanson’s Plateaus of
Freedom: Nationality, Culture, and State Security, 1940-1960 makes important early
connections between culture and state security by examining the extent to which a
security imperative conditioned cultural policies in Canada, during and after the Second
World War.20 Kristmanson promotes the concept of a “censorship-intelligencepropaganda complex,” where national culture is utilized to manage what is considered
unfamiliar, or “foreign.” Understood as a component of the broader geopolitical social
system, “nationality” is shaped by cultural experts within the security state apparatus to
advance specific Cold War protocols, often through the regulation of behaviour.21 Gary
Kinsman and Patriza Gentile’s The Canadian War on Queers: National Security as

Dennis Molinaro, “’In the Field of Espionage, There’s No Such Thing as Peacetime’: The Official
Secrets Act and the PICNIC Wiretapping Program,” The Canadian Historical Review Vol. 98 No. 3
(September 2017): 457-482.
19 Larry Hannant, The Infernal Machine: Investigating the Loyalty of Canada’s Citizens (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1995).
20 Mark Kristmanson, Plateaus of Freedom: Nationality, Culture, and State Security in Canada, 19401960 (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2003).
21 Ibid., xi; xiv.
18
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Sexual Regulation examines the regulation of same-gender desire and the organization
of Cold War national security campaigns against lesbians and gay men, as one
prominent example of the imposition of moral regulation.22 Under the guise of national
security and protecting Canadians from communism, certain individuals were identified
as a “threat” to society.
Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse’s Cold War Canada: The Making of a National
Insecurity State, 1945-1957 is a fundamental contribution that broadens the scope of
the historiography to include a more wide-ranging investigation of the Cold War in
Canadian society.23 Two specific events are used to bookend this early period of Cold
War history. Similar to Smith and Knight, Whitaker and Marcuse emphasize the
importance of the Gouzenko affair. To accentuate the growing significance of anticommunism, the authors conclude by discussing the suicide of Canada’s ambassador
to Egypt, Herbert Norman, after persistent charges of disloyalty and communist
espionage by an American congressional committee. In stark contrast to Smith and the
earlier works of Canadian “international” history, Cold War Canada significantly
addresses the home front. Specific points of emphasis include anti-communist
legislation, the role of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, attempts to identify
Communists associated with the National Film Board of Canada, and the Communist
purges of organized labour.

Gary Kinsman, and Patrizia Gentile, The Canadian War on Queers: National Security as Sexual
Regulation (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010).
23 Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 19451957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 14.
22
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Whitaker and Marcuse argue that the “fear” of communism was the direct result
of two types of general insecurity. Economic insecurity originated from the still recent
memory of the Great Depression, and international insecurity was embodied by the
geopolitical threat of the Soviet Union. Cold War Canada’s discussion of international
security threats once again returns to the recurring theme of Canada’s bilateral and
multilateral alliance relationships. Whitaker and Marcuse refute the interpretation
provided by Creighton and Smith that Canadian foreign policy-makers were ultimately
forced to accept the direction and integrated support of the United States. It was instead
feared, before the declaration of the Truman Doctrine and the announcement of the
Marshall Plan for recovery in Europe in 1947, that the United States would slip into the
isolationist position they occupied following the First World War.24 Cold War Canada
argues that Canada was in fact quite active diplomatically in promoting international
cooperation, albeit along ideological lines. Whitaker and Marcuse state that “far from
being a victim of American bullying, Canada was at Britain’s side in encouraging greater
American participation and leadership in blocking Soviet ambitions (or what were
believed to be Soviet ambitions) and thus in shaping what was to become a powerful
Western alliance.”25 In this interpretation, Canadian officials play a role that still
prominently features both Britain and the United States, though more independence is
attributed to Canadian foreign policy-makers.
Whitaker and Marcuse’s analysis represents a comprehensive political history
that bridges the international scope of the Cold War with the tangible domestic fears

24
25

Ibid., 114.
Ibid., 114-115.
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motivating the domestic anti-communism movement. Cold War Canada suggests there
was nothing comparable to McCarthyism in Canada and, specifically, no equivalent
“House Un-Canadian Activities Committee.” While anti-communist activities did exist,
they were generally sanctioned by the state and “contained within the ‘legitimate’
boundaries of state-sponsored activity.”26 Whitaker and Marcuse agree there is
evidence Canada approached anti-communism differently, but unlike Knight, they argue
this variation is exaggerated. Cold War Canada focuses on determining the extent and
impact of the state-sponsored reaction to the perceived threat of communism in
Canada. This dissertation adopts Whitaker and Marcuse’s interpretation, but is not
directly engaged in further explaining this distinction. Instead, this work in part examines
how perceptions of the difference between the Canadian and American approaches,
influenced by anti-Americanism, contributed to the conceptualization of national identity.
By incorporating labour history, the arts, the security service, and the peace
movement, Cold War Canada demonstrates the historiographical significance of
discussing, in combination, the socio-cultural and political issues of the period, albeit
largely still from the perspective of the state. While political and economic factors
remain crucial to the history of Canadian foreign policy, there is a need to further
incorporate the vantage point of individuals and groups not holding traditional positions
of power and authority. This approach, often referred to as “new” international history, or
the “cultural turn” in international history, is a historiographical development stressing

26

Ibid., 282.
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the impact of the social constructs of gender, class, race, and ethnicity on foreign policy
decision-making.
Several more recent works by Canadian historians demonstrate the continuation
of this trend. Richard Cavell’s edited volume Love, Hate and Fear in Canada’s Cold War
examines the intersection of the personal and the political, and in particular the attempts
of the state to regulate sexuality.27 Franca Iacovetta’s Gatekeepers: Reshaping
Immigrant Lives in Cold War Canada analyzes the politics of citizenship by
emphasizing the connections between the political, social, gender, sexual, and
immigrant histories of Canada during this period.28 Robert Teigrob’s Warming Up to the
Cold War: Canada and the United States’ Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to
Korea, traces the role culture and public opinion played in shaping the response of
Canadian foreign policy-makers to international affairs.29 In Cold War Comforts:
Canadian Women, Child Safety, and Global Insecurity, Tarah Brookfield draws attention
away from the traditional focus on diplomatic maneuvering and military conflicts to
concentrate on understanding how the Cold War influences our understanding of
gender, the role of women, family, and child welfare.30
This dissertation endorses the central thesis of Cold War Canada and builds on
its findings to provide an even more concentrated and nuanced analysis of anti-
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29 Robert Teigrob, Warming Up to the Cold War: Canada and the United States’ Coalition of the Willing,
from Hiroshima to Korea (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).
30 Tarah Brookfield, Cold War Comforts: Canadian Women, Child Safety, and Global Insecurity (Waterloo:
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communism. While several key Cold War episodes and characters are revisited,
including the investigations of the Kellock-Taschereau Royal Commission and the
Herbert Norman controversy, new analysis is reoriented around further emphasizing
individual perspectives and understanding how anti-communism was culturally
interpreted. The unique politico-cultural approach of this dissertation will bolster
Canada’s Cold War historiography by investigating both public and private
manifestations of Canadian anti-communism. The amalgamation of significant anticommunism topics in this study focuses on several consequential patterns. Communism
was consistently viewed as a public safety concern, and the arts provide an important
vantage point to understand how Canadians engaged with this threat. Additionally,
perceptions of Canadian anti-communism were often nationalistic and culturally
influenced. The intersections of public safety, the arts, and national identity all contribute
to the multifaceted and complex nature of anti-communism in English Canada.
This work pursues the “cultural turn” by emphasizing how arts and entertainment
communities served as active interpreters of the domestic communist threat. Radio
dramas, plays, and musical performance are used to identify anti-communism themes
consumed by the public and to explore how ideological content was approached. The
experiences of arts and culture professionals, anti-communist advocates, and civil
servants are woven through overlapping narratives to further punctuate the
individualized perspectives of Canadian anti-communism. Studies of the regulation of
behavior and sexuality are incorporated into an assessment of the punitive anticommunism that existed in Canada. Situated within the Canadian Cold War context, this
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unique variety of individual perspectives and biographies are presented alongside each
other to provide a more nuanced understanding of the perceived ideological threat, the
consequences of anti-communism, and national identity narratives.

National Identity

This dissertation identifies a connection between perceptions of anti-communism
and national identity. This nuanced pattern reveals an unsubstantiated belief often
based in a limited observation of anti-communism in Canada. A thorough and
interdisciplinary discussion of Canadian national identity and nationalism is needed
before this dissertation can legitimately argue the ways in which it intersects with anticommunism. As part of defining the intangible parameters of the country beyond
borders and citizenship, “identity” serves to articulate the popularly recognized or
aspirational characteristics of the nation. Put simply, what do Canadians think of
themselves and their country?31 The political act of Confederation did not
simultaneously create a uniform Canadian identity, and the development of consensus
remains contested. Poet, political activist, and ardent opponent of American
imperialism, Robin Mathews argues:
Canadian identity lives in a process of tension and argument, a conflict of
opposites which often stalemate, often are forced to submit to compromise, but

Jack Bumsted, “Visions of Canada: A Brief History of Writing on the Canadian Character and the
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which – so far in our history – have not ended in final resolution. As a result our
identity isn’t as easy to pin down as we Canadians, and others, would like.32
University of Toronto English Professor Germaine Warkentin further articulates the
conflict behind the Canadian struggle to recognize a collective national identity.
Warkentin argues:
Searchers for a Canadian identity have failed to realize that you can only have an
identification with something you can see or recognize. You need, if nothing else,
an image in a mirror. No other country cares enough about us to give us back an
image of ourselves that we can even resent. And apparently we can’t do it for
ourselves, because so far our attempts to do so have resembled those of the
three blind men trying to describe the elephant. Some of the descriptions have
been worth something, but what they add up to is fragmented, indecipherable.
With what are we to identify ourselves?33
In the absence of this self-reflection, identity debates often defaulted to national
divisions and fears of subsuming external influences. As this dissertation examines,
anti-communism had implications for both perceptions of Canadian identity and fears
associated with the pervasive influence of the United States.
The attempts to develop a Canadian sense of identity were challenged by the
tensions of French and English Canada. Historic differences featured prominently
during the Confederation Debates of the 1860s and have continued through the Louis
Riel controversy of the 1880s, the conscription crises of both World Wars, and
culminated with the separation referendums of the late twentieth century. Different
interpretations of national identity separated French and English-speaking Canadians

Robin Mathews, Canadian Identity: Major forces shaping the life of a people (Ottawa: Steel Rail
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Guide to Canadian Literature (Toronto: Anansi, 1972), 9.
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and suggested the division of the country was a distinct possibility.34 There are,
however, visions of Canada that embrace this discordance in attempts to cultivate
notions of national identity.
Historian W. L. Morton describes the character of Canadian identity in a manner
consistent with the “revolutionary origins” thesis of American sociologist Seymour
Lipset.35 Both argue that while revolution was the origin of the American rise to
independence, British North America gradually transitioned from a position of colonial
dependence to self-government, and a national union characterized by French and
English cultural duality.36 Further, Morton suggests:
Not life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, but peace, order, and good
government are what the national government of Canada guarantees. Under
these, it is assumed, life, liberty, and happiness may be achieved, but by each
according to his taste. For the society of allegiance admits of a diversity the
society of compact does not, and one of the blessings of Canadian life is that
there is no Canadian way of life, much less two, but a unity under the Crown
admitting of a thousand diversities.37
This argument is similar to the “limited identities” thesis articulated by both Ramsay
Cook and J. M. S. Careless.
In 1967, Cook suggested the variety of regional, ethnic, and class identities in
Canada should be viewed together, as an inclusive and functional national identity
already accepted by many Canadians. Addressing this notion specifically in 1969,
Careless argues the difficulty with “nation-building” in Canada was that the goal of a
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36 W. L. Morton, The Canadian Identity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 31.
37 Ibid., 111.
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strong and united “identity” was too often compared to the American example. 38 As a
result, Careless argues this “limited identities” interpretation could be utilized to create a
more congruent countrywide characterization of the Canadian “nation.” By embracing
these various “identities,” individual Canadians could envision their national identity.
Canada’s regional divisions created space for the acceptance of a cooperative,
collective, and aspirational identity recognizing and promoting certain diversities.39 The
“limited identities” thesis presents an argument for a distinct Canadian national identity
that balances the competing visions of the country’s ancestral heritage, diverse cultural
values, and defined language differences.40
Historian John Conway connects the debate surrounding Canada’s national
identity to the Cold War context. Conway suggests that if Canadian identity truly was
representative of a multitude of identities, it would be unlikely for there to ever be a
national investigation into “un-Canadian activities” comparable to the hearings of the
American House Un-American Activities Committee, or the sessions instigated by
Senator McCarthy. Conway argues the very existence of a Canadian nation-state rested
upon the agreement and understanding that many different versions of Canadian
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identity existed, and no one version should be advocated to the exclusion of others.41
This interpretation relies on several historical instances when the Canadian government
resisted banning the Communist Party and attempted to keep Canadian communist
elements visible.
Nationalism, like identity, is a contentious idea with contrasting definitions.
American political scientist Karl W. Deutsch described nationalism as a state of mind
where “national” messages or symbols were prioritized in communications and decisionmaking.42 Sociologist and historian Eugen Lemberg focuses more on nationalism as a
system of ideas, values, and an image of the world that helps large social groups locate
a sense of belonging. The cohesive characteristics include shared language, origins,
and culture. Historian Theodor Schieder adapted Lemberg’s interpretation and argues
that nationalism is a specific integrative ideology, one which emphasizes the “nation”
broadly and not to a specific social or religious affiliated group in isolation.43
Extrapolating on this literature, historian Peter Alter argues nationalism is both an
ideology and a political movement. Since the American and French Revolutions,
nationalism has held:
the nation and the sovereign nation-state to be crucial indwelling values, and
which manages to mobilize the political will of a people or a large section of a
population. Nationalism is hence taken to be a largely dynamic principle capable
of engendering hopes, emotions and action; it is a vehicle for activating human
beings and creating a political solidarity amongst them for the purposes of
achieving a common goal.44
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In studying the “nation” and nationalism, historian Eric Hobsbawm stresses analysis of
political, technical, administrative, and economic conditions. Hobsbawm argues that
nationalism needs to be studied both from above and from below to be properly
understood. The perspective of government, political leaders, and others in positions of
power must be complemented by the insights of citizens. An opinion or insight does not
need national authority to be nationalist in nature.45 This study subscribes to
Hobsbawm’s approach and analyzes anti-communism both from the traditional political
view and with emphasis on socio-cultural issues, while emphasizing nationalism in the
context of an ideological and political movement.
The examination of nationalism in this study specifically relates to anticommunism and attempts to differentiate Canada from the United States. This direction
ultimately necessitates a concentration on English Canada. In the postwar years, a
developing French-Canadian nationalism, the Quiet Revolution in Québec, and the
emergence of a Québécois identity dictated an inward focus. A lower birth rate for urban
Québécois families, decreasing emigration of English Canadians from the province, and
increased immigration served as evident threats to the very existence of French
Canada. The societal stresses of industrialization and urbanization emboldened FrenchCanadian nationalism, and the determination for two equal nations to be recognized in
Canada.46 While Québec and certain English and French Canadians are included, this
analysis remains Anglo-centric.
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This interdisciplinary discussion of national identity and nationalism establishes
the contested nature of these topics. Examining several of these key debates provides a
basis for exploring a specific perception of Canadian anti-communism. It is important to
note that this dissertation does not engage in a comparative analysis of Canadian and
American anti-communism policies but is focused on a nuanced understanding of how
nationalism influenced personal perspectives. The complex manifestations of anticommunism in Canada allowed for the emergence of an assumed belief that the United
States was far more punitive in dealing with the domestic ideological threat. This
complimentary interpretation of state policy was appealing to certain Canadians
because it reinforced an aspirational national identity.

Methodology and Approach

Embracing the new international history approach produces certain challenges,
particularly with respect to chronology and a balance between the political and cultural
realms. The analysis that follows progresses sequentially when possible, but also relies
on a layered chronology between 1945 and 1967. This broad time frame is used to
capture the early years of the Cold War, a time period when many Canadians
confronted the domestic communist threat and the growing geopolitical influence of the
Soviet Union. Not all topics span the entirety of these years, but the politico-cultural
focus of this dissertation precludes a tidy period of study. Cultural interpretation and
social interaction did not always occur simultaneous to seminal events and
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consequential policy-making. Chapters overlay one another, with necessary detours into
the past to provide crucial historical context. Partial biographical profiles of civil
servants, activists, writers, and musicians also necessitate a degree of overlap, to
weave their experiences and interpretations of the communist threat together with an
articulation of nationwide fears and government initiatives. Chapter sub-headings are
used throughout for the purposes of clarity.
It is also important to clarify the use of the term “public” in this dissertation.
Although the public sector, including all three levels of government, the RCMP, and
other affiliated crown corporations are featured prominently, “public” is primarily used in
reference to members of the general public. Groups of individual Canadians engaged in
broad civic discussion and debate about government policies, anti-communism
activism, and cultural interpretations of the Cold War. This dialogue involved interaction
between different public spheres and was directed towards diverse public audiences.
While there is a recognition public debate occurs in many forms, there is a clear
distinction between matters on the public record and the private confidential matters
discussed internally by governments and security services.
This study concentrates on the practice of anti-communism but purposefully
avoids establishing an overarching definition of what constitutes a Canadian communist.
The characteristics of suspected communists were often as complex as the various
manifestations of anti-communism in Canada. Reflective of the intensifying global Cold
War, very direct fears of the Soviet Union were heightened after the defection of Igor
Gouzenko in 1945. While there is discussion in this study of both the Communist Party

24

Introduction
and the Labour Progressive Party, anti-communist action targeted a broad range of
Canadians. The characteristics of a “communist” often varied depending on the goals
and perspective of the anti-communist.
In the civil service, counter-espionage justified prolonged investigations and
standardized security screenings. Beyond simply identifying communist adherents, the
government used this threat to mitigate the perceived security risks associated with
behaviours and habits deemed socially unacceptable. Much anti-communist hysteria
coalesced around new immigrants to Canada, especially those from Soviet countries.
The RCMP monitored foreign language newspapers to mitigate concerns about
infiltration and ideological subversion. Anti-communism was also used to propagate
anti-Semitism and other prejudicial philosophies. Activists Ron Gostick and Patrick
Walsh, for example, continually blurred the distinction between anti-communism and
outright bigotry. In the arts and entertainment sector, the CBC was routinely suspected
of communist sympathies, a fear that persisted because of the social influence of
popular culture. Whether through career positioning, identity, or social capital, possible
“communists” lurked in many areas of the lives of Canadians. The fear of communism
was consistent, even if the characteristics of this ideological foe evolved to fit the
priorities of the anti-communist.
It must be emphasized that this is not a comparative study of Canadian and
American anti-communism. Certain Canadians, both civilians and politicians, at times
observed the practices of the United States negatively. A broad outline of American
anti-communism is provided to analyze this pattern. These perceptions, exaggerated by
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periods of anti-Americanism, help to explain how and why some Canadians continued
to define their own national approach in opposition to the proliferating American style.
Canadian government action was executed with far less publicity, and the absence of
these details allowed representatives and citizens alike to make politically expedient
assertions about anti-communism in Canada. The lack of public accusations was
misconstrued as the absence of punitive Canadian anti-communism.
The interpretations of anti-communism surveyed in this dissertation represent an
English-Canadian perspective. Important aspects of the domestic Cold War in Québec
are briefly acknowledged, but the concentration remains on English-Canadian notions of
anti-communism. The decision to broadly frame a developing Cold War identity
influenced by anti-communism as “Canadian” is based on the generalizations common
within English Canada during this period. As mentioned earlier, French-Canadian
nationalism, the Quiet Revolution in Québec, and the emergence of a Québécois
identity were largely introspective. While French-Canada focused on what differentiated
their communities as a nation within a nation, English Canadians professed to be
anything that was not the United States. The urgency to develop a visible Canadian
national identity can be directly connected to fear of American assimilation or
dominance. For these reasons, the attitudes of English Canada are purposefully
generalized to depict a national perspective that generally disregarded Québec.
The holdings of Library and Archives Canada were of critical importance for this
research. The Department of External Affairs fonds, and especially the documents
attained through an access to information request, feature prominently alongside the
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records of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and Prime Minister Louis St.
Laurent. Documents from the Canadian Labour Congress and a collection of Ron
Gostick’s publications found in the papers of journalist Peter Worthington complement a
series of other smaller collections integral to this analysis. Other notable contributions
include radio drama scripts from the Archives of the Centre for Broadcasting Studies at
Concordia University, material concerning Paul Robeson from the Schomburg Center
for Research in Black Culture at the New York Public Library, and information about the
entertainment blacklist from the Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor
Archives at New York University. Contemporary newspaper stories were critical to help
to shape narratives and further contextualize the perspectives found in confidential
Canadian government documents.

Chapter Overview

Allegations of espionage revealed by Soviet defector Igor Gouzenko in 1945
prompted public safety concerns in Canada related to the domestic threat of
communism. The first chapter of this dissertation examines a tension within the state’s
interpretation of ideological subversion from the mid 1940s until the early 1950s.
Convinced of the public safety risks, the RCMP planned for the detainment and
internment of suspected communists. Comprehensive security service monitoring
included tracking communist “front” groups and the ongoing suspicion of new
Canadians. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent acknowledged the threat of domestic
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communism but articulated a nuanced and politically motivated strategy to address
public concerns. Emphasis was placed on the individual responsibility of Canadians to
discourage communism. A series of speeches articulate what Reg Whitaker and Gary
Marcuse in Cold War Canada label “democratic anti-communism.” Community volunteer
service groups like Civitan International illustrated the type of non-state anti-communist
initiatives St. Laurent envisioned. This proliferation of anti-communism beyond the state
indicates the complexity of efforts to combat the subversive ideology. This chapter
enhances the historiographical understanding of Canadian anti-communism by further
identifying the divide between the security and political assessments of this ideological
threat.
Chapter two concentrates on personal experiences within the Canadian civil
service to accentuate the retributive realities of Canadian anti-communism. From the
very public investigations and trials of the Kellock-Taschereau Royal Commission
between 1946 and 1949, to the confidential internal government coordination and action
that followed, harsh repercussions were imposed on suspected communists in the civil
service. Scientists Israel Halperin and David Shugar, and economist Agatha Chapman
were ensnared by the Kellock-Taschereau Royal Commission in a series of relentless
but ultimately unsubstantiated investigations that damaged their careers. The fear of
subversion was used to justify strict civil service screening and ongoing attempts by the
federal government to shape idealized gender roles and purge bureaucrats with
perceived “character defects.” Gay men were transferred or lost their jobs because it
was feared their sexuality would result in espionage coerced through Soviet blackmail.
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This systematic framework of state-led anti-communism occurred largely outside of
public scrutiny. The determination of individual trustworthiness and loyalty in the public
service led to some of the more punitive examples of state-led anti-communism in
Canada. This compilation of personal accounts provides a critical perspective from the
victims of state action that are often absent, or presented with less depth, in broader
political and diplomatic studies of the domestic Cold War in Canada.
Many Canadians were oblivious to the government’s sustained anti-communism
efforts discussed in the first two chapters of this dissertation. Subtle state-led initiatives,
however, did not dissuade private citizens and community organizations from pursuing
their own anti-communist agendas. Chapter three examines the efforts of politically
engaged citizens and business associations like the Canadian Chamber of Commerce
to educate Canadians about the public safety threat posed by communism. Prime
Minister Louis St. Laurent received numerous public pleas for government action,
though consensus was elusive. Several notable public activists, including Marjorie
Lamb, Ron Gostick, and Pat Walsh further illustrate the vast spectrum of anticommunism that existed in Canada in the 1950s and 1960s. While Lamb leveraged her
association with the Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire (IODE) to gain an
audience, Gostick and Walsh’s notoriety stemmed from their far right and anti-Semitic
ideology. All three individuals managed recurrent engagement with political leaders and
the media. Public safety concerns were a consistent motivation of educational
campaigns, individual political appeals, and activism. This chapter argues that the
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contributions of non-state actors and fringe ideologues must be recognized as part of
the multifaceted manifestations of anti-communism in Canada.
By the early 1950s, an increasing number of Canadians observed the aggressive
anti-communism of Senator Joseph McCarthy and the American Congress with
contempt. Chapter four examines a connection between American anti-communism and
Canadians’ perceptions of their government’s own approach to the domestic ideological
threat. Relevant case studies include broad opposition to a proposed visit by McCarthy
to Toronto in 1954, and the repeated accusations of the United States Senate Internal
Security Subcommittee (SISS) directed at Canadian diplomat Herbert Norman. Highly
publicized SISS hearings in 1951 and 1957 galvanized Canadian opposition to foreign
anti-communism overreach and reinvigorated latent anti-Americanism. Norman’s
untimely death is discussed here with new emphasis placed on the public response of
individual Canadians, faith community leaders, civil liberties advocates, and the arts.
The anti-Americanism of this period directed criticism of anti-communism onto the
government of a foreign power, contributing to inaccurate perceptions of the Canadian
state’s own initiatives. As chapter two demonstrates, harsh repercussions for suspected
communists was very much part of the Canadian experience. Still, the belief that
Canadian anti-communism was far less punitive than the United States continued to
reappear because it was an attractive nationalist image. Canadian national identity
thrived on the idea that there were understandable characteristics that differentiated the
two countries.
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Chapter five examines how the arts and entertainment sector interpreted the
perceived threat of communism and provided important forums for ideological
exploration. This specific public interaction with communism as depicted in the arts
complements the civic engagement with the domestic ideological threat discussed in
chapter three. Several radio dramas broadcast on the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation (CBC) illustrate how English Canadians culturally engaged with the Cold
War. In different ways, Episode in Red (1944), The Intrigue at Mill Centre (1947), and
Red is for Danger (1953) all addressed the identification of communist public safety
threats, citizen loyalty, and misplaced suspicion. Other artistic venues and cultural
exchanges, including formal broadcasting agreements between the CBC and the Soviet
Union, further informed the spectrum of Canadian Cold War perspectives. The broad
nationalistic emphasis of cultural institutions like the National Film Board (NFB) and the
CBC represented a state commitment to publicly funded film, radio, and television. This
need was born out of the perceived necessity to protect against the encroaching cultural
influence of the United States, a fear contributing to the anti-Americanism discussed in
chapter four. Counter to this emphasis was a persistent concern that communists could
pervert popular culture with subversive messaging, and as a result both the NFB and
the CBC were also frequently accused of harbouring subversives and distributing
propaganda. These institutions were forced to confront their internal threats, and many
cultural producers were subsequently subject to consequential anti-communist
measures. This study of significant cultural depictions of anti-communism introduces
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important new analysis of how Canadians were educated about specific Cold War
threats.
As discussed in chapter four, a misleading perception existed that Canadian anticommunism was considerably less punitive than the United States. The link between
this impression and national identity was further amplified by the notable experiences of
specific artists, writers, and entertainers. Chapter five established the nationalist
influence of cultural institutions like the CBC and NFB and argues that some Canadians
used the arts to explore the communist ideology and its associated public safety
concerns. Chapter six further connects the arts to the national identify conversation
through original analysis of circumstances that fostered inaccurate perceptions about
the severity of Canadian anti-communism. For example, certain mediums of cultural
expression in Canada at times lacked the comprehensive and McCarthyist-style
restrictions more common in the United States. Despite the communist background of
writer Ted Allan, he held an artistic platform in Canada that enabled work critical of the
United States. Blacklisted writer Reuben Ship similarly wrote a successful radio drama
satirizing American anti-communism for the CBC after being deported from the United
States. While their careers in Canada were often limited, certain writers did directly
implicate American attitudes and institutions as the root of extreme anti-communism.
The Canadian government’s systematic but inconspicuous process for assessing
communist threats influenced the plausibility of this narrative. This subtlety can be
observed in the immigration cases of singer Paul Robeson and writer Arkady Fielder. In
Robeson’s case especially, a combination of popular support and American anti-
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communism overshadowed the Canadian government’s own attempts to limit the
singer’s entry. Broad generalizations and misguided assumptions contributed to the
presumption that Canadian anti-communism was less punitive than the United States.
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Recognizing the complexity of anti-communism in Canada requires an
acknowledgement that the state’s interpretation of this public safety threat often varied.
State power was exerted in a variety of ways, including in an investigatory and
enforcement capacity, and through legislative influence. This chapter explores the
divergence between police and political understandings of the threat of communism.
The potential for seditious communist elements to wreak wartime havoc in Canada
motivated substantial inter-departmental planning beginning during the early years of
the Second World War. By the early 1950s, the RCMP-Army Committee on Vital Points
planned for rapid orders of internment and the detainment of suspected communists.
The RCMP’s Prominent Communist Functionaries file continued a pattern of proactively
identifying and labeling certain Canadians as potential communist threats. RCMP
Superintendent Clifford Harvison spoke to the specific danger of the communist
ideology and the risk posed by “front” organizations, such as the Sudbury Ladies
Auxiliary of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers. A series of
RCMP internal documents, memorandums, and briefs focused on the suspicions of new
Canadians and ethnic publications. The RCMP appeared confident that subversive
communism was a clear and pressing threat to the safety and security of Canada.
The Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent evaluated domestic communism
with a distinctly political emphasis. The Prime Minister did not dismiss the existence of
the communist threat but adopted a strategic emphasis on individual agency within free
and democratic countries. While other motives likely contributed to St. Laurent’s political
calculus, this chapter uses a series of speeches to isolate and identify this policy goal. It
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was argued that attempts to diminish the influence of communists could be instigated by
Canadians themselves, an interpretation described by Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse
in Cold War Canada as “democratic anti-communism.” This chapter further analyzes
Marcuse and Whitaker’s concept and presents it as part of a nuanced political
calculation that significantly contrasted the dire warnings presented by the RCMP. St.
Laurent’s public speeches highlight this individual anti-communist imperative, especially
in the context of the self-regulation of organized labour. Community volunteer service
groups like Civitan International used a similar approach by adopting their own anticommunist initiatives. The successive attempts to pass or introduce anti-communist
legislation by Wilfrid Lecroix and Opposition Leader George Drew compelled the Prime
Minister to consider different public opinions. For example, lobbying by the Canadian
Peace Congress prompted a more subdued response than interactions with Labour
Progressive Party (LPP) leader Tim Buck.
It is important to recognize that there was no identifiable state consensus. A
closer look at the perspective of the RCMP alongside political calculations reiterates the
variety of public safety concerns and stakeholder priorities influencing policy-making. By
publicly deflecting the responsibility for anti-communist action away from the state and
onto the individual, St. Laurent moderated the government’s role. Whether intentional or
not, by obscuring its own nuanced policies the government made it more difficult for the
public to identify ongoing state anti-communist action. Further analysis, in this chapter,
of the divide between the security and political assessments of this ideological threat in
enhances the historiographical understanding of Canadian anti-communism.
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Background Context: Internment Planning, Watch Lists, and Québec

To properly analyze the state and security service understanding of the domestic
threat of communism in Canada, it is imperative to step backwards chronologically and
briefly establish the legacy of the Second World War and the Igor Gouzenko espionage
revelations. Gouzenko, a cipher clerk at the Soviet legation in Ottawa, defected to
Canada in 1945 with documents alleging the existence of Soviet espionage activities in
the country. Tasked with investigating these allegations, the Kellock-Taschereau Royal
Commission1 reported definitively in 1946 that public officials and other individuals in
positions of trust had communicated to agents of a foreign power, either directly or
indirectly, secret and confidential information that compromised the safety and interests
of Canada.2 A list of names was provided to substantiate the assertion that a “Fifth
Column” organized and directed by Soviet agents was coordinating a series of spy rings
in Canada. The report explained that there was a specific clandestine organization
enabling the activities of this Fifth Column, including providing fake Canadian passports

1Full

name: Royal Commission to Investigate the Facts Relating to and the Circumstances Surrounding
the Communication, by Public Officials and Other Persons in Positions of Trust of Secret and Confidential
Information to Agents of a Foreign Power.
2 Canada, Royal Commission to Investigate the Facts Relating to and the Circumstances Surrounding the
Communication, by Public Officials and Other Persons in Positions of Trust of Secret and Confidential
Information to Agents of a Foreign Power. Report of the Royal Commission to Investigate the Facts
Relating to and the Circumstances Surrounding the Communication, by Public Officials and Other
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and other citizenship documents.3 Communist sympathies or membership in communist
organizations were believed to motivate such seditious actions.
The type of espionage acknowledged by the Kellock-Taschereau Commission
contributed to a heightened environment of suspicion in Canada. The claim that several
of the spy suspects admitted allegiance to the Soviet Union created a new urgency
about the internal threat of communist infiltration.4 Canadian New York Times writer P.
J. Phillip wrote of the threat to Canada’s safety and national interests exposed by the
Gouzenko documents, with specific concerns about the transmission of atomic energy
secrets. Philip argued that Canadian national identity was still raw and developing, and
these instances of loyalty to a political doctrine antithetical to Canadian liberty were
alarming.5 While Phillip raised concerns about “alien loyalty” in Canada through his
public voice as a correspondent for the New York Times, the Canadian government
pursued security measures to track and potentially detain suspected communist agents.
Following the Kellock-Taschereau Commission’s investigations of the Gouzenko
espionage allegations, the fear of the domestic “subversive” superseded the fear of the
foreign “spy.” Canada’s federal police force, the RCMP, and its specialized CounterSubversion Section (Anti-Communism Section) worked to identify and address the
domestic threat of subversion. An advisory Security Panel was created in 1946 by the
government to enhance security screenings performed by the RCMP. Focused on
domestic security issues, the Security Panel’s use of Cabinet Directive 4A (1948) and
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Cabinet Directive 24 (1952) to define loyalty and keep members of the Communist Party
and other fascist organizations out of the civil service will be discussed in greater detail
in chapter four.6 Consistent across these efforts was the imperative to identify, track,
and plan for the potential future wartime internment of communists or other subversive
elements.
This type of preparation predated even the Second World War, when the
Canadian Department of National Defence provided instructions to District Commanding
Officers outlining the treatment of potential enemy aliens. These provisional directions
stipulated that enemy aliens who remained peaceful would continue to be afforded the
respect and consideration of law abiding citizens, after first signing a register provided
by one of the Registrars of Enemy Aliens.7 If uncooperative, the RCMP was authorized
to arrest and detain any enemy aliens providing or attempting to assist the enemy in any
form. While release after arrest was possible, detainment in internment camps was
mandated for individuals who remained a threat.8 Specific instructions were also
provided for the selection of internment camps. To avoid attracting attention, sites were
to be located well away from central transportation routes, including road, rail, and
water. Security was to be enhanced by selecting camps with defensible terrain and
locations far from the international border.9 By early 1950, the Canadian government’s
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wartime security infrastructure had been adapted to address the specific threats of the
Cold War.
The RCMP-Canadian Army Committee on Vital Points and Internment
Operations (RCMP-Army Committee) resolved to learn from the experiences of both
World Wars and further professionalize domestic operations. Canadian fears of the
Soviet Union included a commonly held concern the Communist Party would facilitate
subversion, organized sabotage, and industrial unrest.10 RCMP Commissioner Stuart
Taylor Wood articulated the challenges of dealing with the perceived domestic threat of
subversion during one committee meeting. The RCMP was working feverishly to
compile files and information on communists and “fellow travelers,” to enable quick
submission to the Minister of Justice for rapid orders of internment.11 In the event of a
domestic emergency, the RCMP was concerned they did not have adequate personnel
or equipment capacity. Partnership with the Army alleviated these worries, with a
commitment to guard and provide provisions and maintenance for all vital points and
internment camps, freeing up the RCMP to concentrate on the significant task of
detaining suspected communists.12 This type of interdepartmental cooperation was a
key component of both the Canadian government’s contingency planning and its
preemptive anti-communist activities.
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The RCMP’s tracking of communists in Canada increased in sophistication. The
Anti-Communism Section began compiling a secretive Prominent Communist
Functionaries’ file (commonly referred to as PROFUNC) in the early 1950s that
identified individuals who, in an outright domestic conflict, would be targeted for
censorship or internment because of the likelihood they represented a “Fifth column” of
international communism in Canada. In Secret Service: Political Policing in Canada
from the Fenians to Fortress America, Reg Whitaker, Gregory Kealey, and Andrew
Parnaby explain that by 1954 the inter-departmental internment committee had placed
2,200 communists and suspected subversives on a top-priority internment list, and 500
were categorized with lower urgency. This represented a fraction of the 6,500 names
forwarded by the Anti-Communism Section for approval.13 While the names identified by
the Anti-Communism Section continued to number in the thousands into the early
1960s, the total approved by the committee remained limited. Often, names repeatedly
rejected by the committee for lack of evidence were instead placed on an alternative
internal RCMP list for contingency planning and investigation. After 1958, a complete
set of PROFUNC documents, including photo identification, a Censorship Watch List,
and the Special Advisory Committee on Internment file, were stored at the
“Diefenbunker,” a secret emergency government facility located near Ottawa, Ontario.14
Emphasis on the list as an anti-communist strategy was minimized by the mid 1960s,
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but PROFUNC remained in a state of dormant existence until it was finally eliminated in
the early 1980s.
While this study focuses on English Canada, it remains useful to provide some
brief context of anti-communism in Québec where perhaps the most notorious anticommunism legislation in Canada was passed. There was a longstanding aversion to
communism in Québec, rooted in imperatives to preserve a distinct identity and an
ideological incompatibility with the province’s Catholic traditions. In 1937, Québec
Premier Maurice Duplessis introduced “An Act to Protect the Province against
Communistic Propaganda (1937),” commonly referred to as the “Padlock Law.” This
legislation prohibited the distribution of communist literature and gave powers to the
Attorney-General of Québec to “padlock” any premises suspected of being used for the
advancement of communist ideals or initiatives. In the first six months following the
enactment of the legislation, 124 raids were conducted, and 532 printed or published
communist items were collected.15 The Québec Liberals’ electoral victory in 1939
downplayed the law’s importance for a time; however, the return of Duplessis to power
in 1944 reinvigorated its application.
A 1948 raid on the French-language office of the LPP demonstrated a willingness
in Québec to again use the legislation to address concerns about communism.
Organized labour, and the LPP specifically, remained a consistent target. In a 1954
letter to Minister of Justice Stuart Garson, leader of the Québec provincial committee of
the LPP Gui Caron requested federal intervention into what he described as arbitrary
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police action taken against one of his members.16 In an attached affidavit, an LPP
member17 described an altercation with the police. After refusing to accompany a police
officer who could not produce a warrant, the LPP member was subsequently accosted
by an “anti-subversive squad” and physically taken by police car to a local detachment.
The LPP member described an abusive interrogation about political opinions and
activities, all the while being refused access to a lawyer.18 Caron argued to Garson that
this illegal action was detrimental to the peace, order, and good government of Canada.
It was requested that Garson raise this incident with the Attorney-General of Québec
and commit to a full inquiry.19 Ultimately, in 1957, the Padlock Law would be deemed
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada. In Switzman v. Elbling the court ruled
that the Québec legislation infringed on the federal jurisdiction of criminal law by legally
restricting the propagation of communism.20

The RCMP Mindset and the Fear of Communism

The RCMP was confident of the veracity of the domestic communist threat in
Canada. This perspective is significant because the security services policed this threat
and provided substantive intelligence to the government. The RCMP’s assessment of
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espionage, infiltration, and ideological subversion was a crucial aspect of Canada’s anticommunist activities. Clifford Harvison, a RCMP officer with a long history with the
Criminal Investigation Branch, articulated his concerns about communism to the force in
a series of speeches in the early 1950s. Harvison had been posted to the Gouzenko
investigations between 1945 and 1946 and then became a Superintendent in 1949.
Beginning in 1953 he served as Assistant Commissioner, including a two-year role as
Director of Security and Intelligence, before ultimately serving as Commissioner of the
RCMP for three years beginning in 1960. In his memoirs, Harvison stressed the
importance of protecting the secrets held by the Canadian government, especially with
respect to multilateral alliances like NATO. Harvison warned of the sophistication of the
Soviet intelligence service and highlighted its efforts to aid communist sympathizers.
Local communist parties were purportedly used to create the type of chaos that would
ultimately allow communist activists to seize power.21 A November 1951 speech by
Harvison provides a more specific understanding of the lens through which members of
the security services viewed communists and their sympathizers in Canada.
With direct reference to the Communist Party of Canada, and its successor the
LPP, Harvison argued both were the “outgrowth of a movement started by three Soviet
agents in order to further the interests of the U.S.S.R. and [were] still working directly
and solely toward furtherance of the aims of the U.S.S.R.”22 This rhetoric purposefully
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perpetuated the interpretation of a foreign instigated revolutionary communist threat in
Canada. The aim of the Soviet-directed Canadian communist, according to Harvison,
was to transform Canada into a Soviet state.23 He insisted “front” groups significantly
facilitated, fostered, and encouraged communist activity in Canada. Labour, farm, and
“house-wife” organizations, through which communist support and sympathies were
developed, and from which a greater percentage of the population could be controlled,
were cited as examples.24 These organizations and associations promised support for
several pressing social needs. Harvison listed better housing, improved wages, higher
agricultural yields, and stronger pensions as examples of the causes these fronts
consistently championed.25 It is clear Harvison was particularly concerned the popular
appeal of such fundamental needs would contribute to the recruitment of new party
members. He argued this level of manipulation was the exact reason why communists
should be treated “as though they were the Plague - they are a plague - a plague that
has spread to every country throughout the world.”26 Concerns about front organizations
reinforced the Cold War narrative that a foreign-influenced movement was actively
working to challenge the Canadian democratic system.
In response to this threat, the RCMP intensified its comprehensive surveillance of
individuals and groups. Suspected fronts were monitored because of the perceived
beliefs of their parent organizations. The International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter
Workers (Mine, Mill), for example, was one of two unions removed from the Canadian
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Congress of Labour because of accusations they adhered to communist policies.27 This
followed a number of instances when Mine, Mill officials or organizers had been
removed or deported from Canada because of their communist affiliations. In 1948, as
part of the Canadian Congress of Labour’s communist purges, five Mine, Mill organizers
believed to be members of the Communist Party in the United States were voluntarily
removed by the union.28 George Knott, also a Mine, Mill organizer suspected of
communist ties, was deported by the Canadian government for violating immigration
laws. Specifically, Knott was accused of entering the country under false pretenses and
advocating for the forceful overthrow of the government.29 These observed communist
affiliations provided the RCMP with the justification to categorize the union’s Sudbury
Ladies Auxiliary a suspected front organization. The Ladies Auxiliary identified as
ideologically progressive, but their most extreme activity consisted of organizing
politically contentious public entertainment events. There was no evidence it facilitated
any unlawful or suspicious activity.30 Government officials, including representatives of
the Prime Minister’s Office, though, remained suspicious of communist influence within
Mine, Mill.31 In this regard, surveillance programs and monitoring of suspected front
organizations continued as part of the RCMP’s contingency planning for a possible
future war with the Soviet Union.
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Surveillance of suspected subversives was heavily influenced by fears directed
at immigrants who came to Canada following the Second World War. Many of these
new Canadians emigrated from countries within the Soviet sphere of influence and,
consequently, were assumed to be ideologically sympathetic to communism. The
RCMP routinely updated the government with a list of “Communist Controlled
Organizations and Publications.” A 1952 version of this list, sent by the RCMP to the
Department of External Affairs, illustrates the degree to which the publications and
social groups of new immigrants were a focus of communist suspicions. Organizations
such as the Lithuanian Literary Society, the Federation of Yugoslav Canadians, the
Polish Mutual Benefit and Friendly Society, and the Association of United Ukrainian
Canadians were monitored for membership size and locations of operation.32 Attempts
were made to isolate the roles each group played within the international communist
system. The Canadian Slav Committee, for example, was described by the RCMP as
the Canadian counterpart of the All-Slav Committee, responsible for coordinating the
activities of all Communist-Slav groups in Canada.33 The RCMP also identified the
publications or newspapers operated by each suspected front organization.
Ethnic, or new immigrant, newspapers and publications were continuously
monitored to track political trends and opinions. By the late 1950s, the Canadian
Department of Citizenship employed approximately a dozen multilingual men and
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women to read more than 130 newspapers in more than twenty-five languages.34 While
many of the foreign and ethnic newspapers were judged to be non-threatening, others
were categorized as “left-wing” or pro-communist. Newspapers sympathetic to
communism were feared for their perceived ability to attract and indoctrinate susceptible
non-communist readers. Prominent Canadian journalist Peter Newman suggested
Moscow-backed ethnic newspapers provided readers with an optimistic and misleading
description of life in communist countries and, as a result, reading such publications
encouraged a distorted understanding of Canadian society.35 One example of this type
of public persuasion can be found in Novo Vreme (New Times), a Bulgarian newspaper
with roots in that country’s Communist Party. This publication claimed Canadian
business leaders mistreated their Slavic workers by subjecting them to deteriorating
work conditions and discouraged trade with the Soviet Union and China.36 Anticommunists feared this type of propaganda would disparage Canada and lead to
indoctrination.
Similarly concerning was the fear that communists or their sympathizers were
already firmly embedded within Canadian society. In 1950, former Canadian communist
T.G. McManus penned a provocative article for Maclean’s detailing an insider’s account
of communist contingency “underground” war planning. Before he left the communist
movement, McManus recounted how he was provided with the location of a wartime

Franca Iacovetta, Gatekeepers: Reshaping Immigrant Lives in Cold War Canada (Toronto: Between
the Lines, 2006), 110.
35 Ibid., 109, 113.
36 Ibid., 113.
34

47

Chapter 1 – Divergent Perspectives: The RCMP and St. Laurent’s Political Calculus
hideout, assigned a codename, and given instructions for specific sabotage targets.37
The asserted legitimacy of these claims stemmed from McManus’ former position as a
member of the Communist Central Committee for Canada. The communist blueprint for
treason in the event of war between Canada and the Soviet Union included the
mobilization of an underground army to disrupt military and industrial production lines,
and to create havoc within the Canadian armed forces. Further, McManus explained:
My role in the next war’s Communist underground - which, I repeat, is already
carefully organized and ready for action on hour’s notice - would have been to
hinder war production in any way possible - through sabotage, slow downs or
strikes.38
This sensationalist account brought further public awareness of the potential threat
posed by “hidden” communists to the pages of Maclean’s Magazine.
Fears of domestic communism in Canada were regularly influenced by national
reporting, often featuring self-identified former communists. A 1954 story in The Globe
and Mail claimed the emergence of approximately 500 communist or fringe
organizations in Toronto.39 The more diffused the communist presence, the greater the
public perception of comprehensive infiltration. This same story also referred to twelve
“Progressive” schools now operating in Ontario, with curriculums focused in varying
degrees on the fundamentals and teachings of Marxism, Leninism, socialism, and
communism. In addition, it was argued the National Federation of Labour Youth actively
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trained young Marxists, and youth were encouraged to join the LPP.40 The potential
indoctrination of children and youth was particularly worrisome for many Canadians.
Analysis in chapter three will outline the advocacy work of anti-communist activist
Marjorie Lamb, who argued that children and youth were deemed particularly
susceptible to communist propaganda. It was feared that often innocuous activities like
sports or study groups could be coopted for subversive purposes.
In the Ottawa Citizen, retired RCMP Superintendent John Leopold made similar
accusations about the growing and established communist presence in Canada. From
his experience as a former head of the RCMP’s intelligence division, Leopold asserted
the presence of more than 50,000 communists, communist sympathizers, “pinkos” and
other similarly affiliated individuals in Canada.41 This number was said to be in addition
to self-identified and registered members of the Communist Party. Leopold personally
maintained that most of the 50,000 were “potential saboteurs” who, already hidden from
public view, would pose a real threat to Canada’s industrial and defence programs in
the event of war with the Soviet Union.42 The re-occurring fear that “traitors” were
hidden throughout Canada aggravated concerns over openly communist Canadian
citizens.
The LPP was a constant target of suspicion and surveillance. From the mid1930s onwards Canadian communists had made inroads into electoral politics. John
Penner was elected to Winnipeg City Council in 1933, and several communists were
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elected to the legislatures of Ontario and Manitoba in the early 1940s. The Second
World War interrupted this pattern, however, as the Communist Party failed to commit to
early support for the war against Germany and was effectively banned. The political
activities of Canadian communists were replaced by the LPP, which quickly established
a clear position in support of the Allied war effort. The Labour-Progressives elected Fred
Rose as the first Communist Member of Parliament in Canada in 1943, and again in
1945. This electoral success can be partially explained by softened attitudes towards
communists internationally. While the Bolshevik Russian Revolution initiated fears of the
spread of foreign communism, historians J.L. Granatstein and David Stafford argue that
the Soviet Union’s resistance to the aggression of Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany altered
public perceptions in Canada.43 Communist politicians, such as LPP Ontario Members
of Provincial Parliament J. B. Salsberg and A. A. Macleod, gained electoral support from
Eastern European immigrant communities.44 While limited wartime tolerance of the
Soviet Union contributed to minor communist electoral achievements, the RCMP
continued to view communism as a domestic ideological threat.
A 1952 memo directed to External Affairs from the RCMP summarized the LPP
National Executive Committee’s electoral strategy. In addition to running candidates in
up to 80 federal constituencies, the LPP strived to build a national party infrastructure.
This plan aligned with other communist parties in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
France, and India, and aimed ultimately to control parliament through a “People’s
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Democracy” in Canada.45 This desired outcome was not altogether surprising; however,
the positioning of the party with respect to the United States is noteworthy. Gallup polls
were cited by the LPP to indicate growing Canadian resentment of American political
domination. A “leader member” of the LPP executive argued that broad Canadian
opposition to the United States was growing and could be politicized in their favour
because there was not an effectively organized opposition movement.46 Appealing to
Canadian nationalism was perceived to be a useful strategy to garner greater support.
A 1954 RCMP brief on the Canadian communist movement reiterated why
otherwise routine political organizing was monitored so closely. Since 1943 the LPP
operated as a legal political entity, and publicly disavowed the use of force and violence
to bring about change. The party and its affiliated front groups adhered to the political
doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, and members proclaimed themselves “[heirs] to the
revolutionary traditions of the Canadian working-class movement.”47 It was thus
important for the RCMP to track new tactics used by Canadian communists to advance
their organizational and propaganda objectives. For example, the LPP continued its
attempts to capitalize on existing Canadian anti-Americanism by emphasizing American
culpability for increased global armament, restrictions on individual freedom, and
economic distress in Canada. By this point, the LPP strategy had evolved and was
intended to create dissension and alienate the United States from its allies. While
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denigrating the United States, the Soviet Union was simultaneously elevated as a global
leader advancing peaceful co-existence, the development of world trade, and the
preservation of human rights.48 The RCMP monitored these tactics as an important
aspect of identifying and combating pro-communist propaganda.

The Political Calculus

There was a divergence between the threat assessment of the RCMP and the
political response deemed necessary. To channel public awareness of the domestic
threat of communism that emerged from the report of the Kellock-Taschereau Royal
Commission, the Liberal government stressed an individual imperative to prevent the
spread of domestic communism. As already noted, Whitaker and Marcuse have
characterized this as the “democratic anti-communist argument,” which posited that
Canadians, particularly those in union leadership, were best situated to combat
communist influences.49 For example, during a March 1949 speech in Windsor, Ontario,
Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent argued against imposing “subversive influences laws,”
like the Taft-Hartley Act in the United States, which amongst other provisions required
unions to disavow communism. Instead, St. Laurent emphasized that with greater
freedom came an enhanced sense of responsibility for unions to prevent subversive
influences.50 Putting the onus on the individual, and other non-governmental institutions,
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shifted attention away from the need for overt state-directed anti-communism. St.
Laurent acknowledged the need to both check Soviet aggression and curb any
domestic communist influence but objected to any law that prohibited communism.
Speaking on this point, St. Laurent argued, “…we should not turn prosecution into
persecution, and we should be very careful not to lose our freedom trying to save it.
Those who commit overt acts contrary to our criminal code will be punished according
to the code.”51 The anti-communism beliefs of Canadians would continue to factor into
political decision-making.
In Cold War Canada, Whitaker and Marcuse broadly assess public opinion
concerning communism. Analyzing data from the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion,
Whitaker and Marcuse explain that in April 1949, 68 percent of those polled approved of
criminalizing “largely Communistic” organizations. This consensus was moderated by
the fact that only 56 percent believed such communist groups existed. In 1950, 70
percent of Canadians polled favoured a law that required communists to register with
the Department of Justice in Ottawa. The following year, 83 percent approved of a law
banning communists from holding public office, and 58 percent were in favour of
criminalizing participation in affiliated groups. By 1954, two-thirds of Canadians
surveyed still approved of outlawing communist organizations.52 This type of national
opinion polling is significant to note because of its relevance during policy-making. Anticommunist perspectives were weighed in conjunction with the public appeals received
by St. Laurent that challenged the opinions conveyed in this polling. As a result, there
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were notable internal political debates about how to best approach the domestic threat
of communism legislatively.
Between 1948 and 1950 there were several legislative attempts to address
communist activities directly. Wilfrid Lacroix, who sat as an “Independent Liberal” during
the 20th Canadian Parliament (1945-1949), introduced anti-communist legislation three
times. After time shortages ended his first two attempts, Lacroix again introduced a bill
in January 1949. This legislation sought to criminalize membership in, or support of, any
foreign totalitarian movement. The Communist Party of Canada53 and the LPP were
directly named as groups that would be deemed illegal as a result.54 The language used
was reminiscent of restrictions imposed in Section 98 of the Criminal Code of Canada, a
controversial aspect of the government’s response to the 1919 Winnipeg General
Strike. Until its removal in 1936, Section 98 declared that any organized group who
intended to bring about any governmental, industrial, or economic change within
Canada through the use or threat of force, violence, terrorism, or physical injury to
others or property, would be deemed an unlawful association.55
St. Laurent’s political response to this legislative agenda was nuanced and
included consideration of public opinion. The extent and variety of feedback opposing
Lacroix’s 1949 anti-communism bill received by the prime minister will be discussed in
chapter three. Writing to Minister of Justice Stuart Garson, St. Laurent suggested there
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were many people, including their own supporters, who desired some type of restriction
on communist activity. The Prime Minister acknowledged the flaws of the Lacroix Bill but
maintained it should nonetheless receive consideration. Garson was instructed to
evaluate the legislation for any elements the government could sponsor, apart from
reinstating repealed segments of Criminal Code Section 98.56 Any support of the
Lacroix Bill would need to reinforce the government’s existing strategy, which included
the secretive April 1948 Cabinet Directive 4A, which prevented communists from
serving in government positions requiring trust or confidentiality.57 Additionally, efforts to
encourage labour leaders to address communism in their own unions remained a
focus.58 The latter was still perceived to be an effective strategy, as St. Laurent doubted
the government’s ability to successfully impose an effective anti-communist policy on
labour unions.59 The lack of a broad legislated prohibition allowed influential leaders
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within sectors vulnerable to communist infiltration to mitigate this threat with minimal
state intervention. This self-determination did not eliminate fears, and the labour
movement would remain the target of accusations of communist sympathies and
subversion.
This type of political calculation reflected a broader pattern within St. Laurent’s
governing style. Senior advisor Jack Pickersgill argues that throughout his career the
Prime Minister balanced his personal perspectives against public opinion or demand.
For example, in 1949 the government was also debating whether or not to introduce
legislation that would provide federal financial support for the construction of the TransCanada Highway. Pickersgill explains that St. Laurent was not a strong supporter of the
project when it was endorsed at the 1948 National Liberal Convention but recognized
the popularity of the highway within his party and across the country. According to
Pickersgill, St. Laurent believed that “when a government could not conscientiously do
what the public wanted, it should give way to one which would.”60 In the Trans-Canada
Highway scenario the federal government chose to take action. As this chapter
explores, when pushed to consider anti-communist legislation St. Laurent at times
deferred to non-governmental initiatives.
The ambiguity of this approach presented specific political challenges for the
governing Liberals. St. Laurent reported to Garson that he believed public opinion was
indeed becoming more concerned about communism. He mentioned that Opposition
Leader George Drew was trying to gain support in Québec by taking a strong anti-
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communist approach.61 There was some documented approval for Lacroix’s legislation
in Québec. For example, Jean Paul Dupre, the secretary of the League of the Sacred
Heart parish association in Sherbrooke, Québec, wrote to St. Laurent in February 1949
to convey support for the adoption of the Lacroix Bill.62 Québec was an important part of
the Liberal Party’s electoral strategy, but a province with a history of supporting more
stringent anti-communist policies. As a result, the perception the government was not
taking direct action was politically risky. In addition to reviewing the Lecroix legislation,
St. Laurent requested that Garson evaluate further anti-communist restrictions in the
civil service and strategies to challenge existing public communist propaganda.63 The
governing Liberals sought to preempt the aggressive prohibitions presented by Lecroix
without creating a broad public perception that all communist activity was permissible.
Despite Lecroix’s Bill again failing to receive a vote, the public remained politically
engaged in the debate surrounding the acceptable parameters of communist activity. It
is important to note that the formal ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949
likely would have contributed to this awareness. Civic organizations contemplated
communism in public spaces and to a certain degree embraced the kind of “democratic
anti-communist” strategy promoted by the Liberals. For example, in June 1949, Civitan
International, a worldwide organization of community service clubs, adopted a formal
resolution that addressed communism during their Twenty-Ninth Annual Convention in
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Washington, D.C. Civitan International pledged to uphold and preserve democratic
governments in Canada and the United States.64 The resolution stated that communists
were prohibited from joining any of their affiliated clubs, and any existing member who
identified as a communist would be dismissed. The resolution asserted that through its
membership and the efforts of its clubs, Civitan International would be instrumental in
opposing communists and “stamping out these agencies of evil.”65 Civic leaders and
community members often believed the domestic threat of communism was a personal
responsibility. The generally dispersed nature of subversive activity necessitated many
people to be “on guard.” With its transnational reach, Civitan International is an
interesting example of how the anti-communist movement existed in a variety of forms,
and often without explicit direction from the security state or foreign affairs decisionmakers.
The Associated Boards of Trade of Central British Columbia similarly passed its
own anti-communism resolution in August 1949. At their annual convention held in
Smithers, British Columbia, the association proclaimed that the spread of communism
throughout Europe had brought disaster and the loss of individual freedoms that
represented a system of servitude closely resembling slavery. The resolution petitioned
the Prime Minister and the government to take appropriate and effective steps to
restrain communist activities in Canada, and reaffirm its commitment to freedom, liberty,
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and personal security.66 In this case, the Associated Boards of Trade of Central British
Columbia used their independent anti-communist declaration to lobby the government.
By addressing the threat of domestic subversion directly at annual meetings and
conventions, civil associations acknowledged that communism could have direct and
personal impacts. The ideological struggles of the Cold War were not confined to the
realm of foreign affairs.
A calculated response was often required from the Prime Minister in choosing
when, or how, to engage in the contrasting public debates surrounding communism.
This was particularly relevant for organizations perceived to be sympathetic to
communism. In October 1949, the Canadian Peace Congress contacted St. Laurent
about an anti-war “Ban the Bomb” campaign. Executive Secretary Mary Jennison
explained that the Canadian Peace Congress was concerned about nuclear weaponry
and asserted this concern was common for many Canadians. Jennison asked St.
Laurent to assist with the circulation of a petition and was primarily interested in
targeting members of the Liberal Party.67 The Canadian Peace Congress was widely
understood to have communist affiliations. At its first gathering in May 1949, delegates
spoke of the Soviet Union as an ally and as the individual country making the greatest
contribution towards peace. While there were self-described communists in attendance,
delegates maintained the Canadian Peace Congress was not itself communist.68
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Chairman Dr. James Endicott had also developed a reputation for being, at the very
least, a communist sympathizer. Despite being a vocal supporter of the Chinese
Communist Party, arguing NATO was merely an instrument to suppress people’s
revolts, and suggesting anti-communist measures interfered with civil rights, Endicott
maintained he was a Christian missionary and not a communist.69 In the end, the Prime
Minister’s Office recommended against any involvement with the “Ban the Bomb”
petition. Senior advisor Jack Pickersgill advised St. Laurent in a memo not to send any
reply to Jennison’s request. Anticipating that the petition would be circulated to
Parliament regardless, Pickersgill suggested to the Prime Minister that he advise his
caucus to similarly avoid any involvement with this Canadian Peace Congress
initiative.70
The government was less circumspect in their public dealings with Tim Buck, an
avowed communist and leader of the LPP. The party routinely petitioned the
government to act on certain priority issues. Similar to the Canadian Peace Congress,
the LPP was distressed by the further development of nuclear weaponry by the United
States, a decision they believed jeopardized world peace. In a telegram to St. Laurent
that Buck publicly released, he declared that the government was putting Canadians in
peril by not preventing nuclear stockpiling in the United States.71 In a tersely worded
and equally publicized reply, the Prime Minister’s Office suggested that most Canadians
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believed it would have been more appropriate for the LPP to urge the Soviet Union to
support international controls on nuclear weaponry. The assertion was clearly made that
it was the Soviet Union that hindered global stability and peace.72 While St. Laurent was
willing to publicly criticize the overt communist sympathies of the LPP, the nuclear
nonproliferation advocacy of the Canadian Peace Congress produced a more restrained
reaction from the government.
St. Laurent consistently pursued a nuanced “democratic anti-communist” strategy.
During a March 1950 speech at the Canada Club in Toronto, the Prime Minister spoke
directly about the implications of the Cold War in Canada. He characterized the Cold
War as a struggle between totalitarianism and freedom, with implications not only for
government but for every citizen.73 St. Laurent was convinced that most Canadians did
not believe they could avoid the consequences of world events, making it critical to
promote a strong, healthy, and free society in Canada. The state needed to be a
servant of the people, rather than their master.74 St. Laurent outlined a series of
important civic institutions that contributed to Canada’s freedom. Voluntary associations
of citizens, the education system, organized religion, and private enterprise are all cited
as hallmarks of a free society. Canadians needed to be free to learn, to question, to
worship, and to pursue enterprise.75 It was argued that a thriving free society would be
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an effective deterrent to totalitarianism. Subversive communism and the existence of a
“5th column,” however, were deemed to be a threat to the nation’s freedom.
St. Laurent explained that if a military confrontation were to take place, Canadians
would need to worry about enemy agents in their midst, capable of inflicting serious
damage. As a result, free nations had to take necessary but reasonable precautions,
which most often required directed police activity. St. Laurent acknowledged that police
action carried risk, specifically the abuse of power associated with totalitarian states.
While he admitted that publicity often benefited police activity, it was considered
detrimental for tracking and exposing subversive elements. This influenced St. Laurent’s
desire to keep the tactics of the security services discreet and prevent the proliferation
of covert subversion.76 The potential for individual Canadians to dissuade communists
and their sympathizers continued to be promoted by St. Laurent. Obvious and punitive
state anti-communist action diminished the attractive virtues of democracy and
disproportionately emphasized baseless accusations.
When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, the first major military conflict of
the Cold War forced the government to explain how the perceived threat of the
communist ideology influenced foreign policy decision-making. During a lengthy debate
in the House of Commons, Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson
acknowledged that defeating communism by armed force in Korea was perceived to be
Canada’s main objective and justification for joining the United Nations mission.77
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Pearson argued this was a point of confusion, and that as a dogma, communism could
not be destroyed in Korea or anywhere else by military means. What Canadians were
fighting in Korea was “armed opinions”78 asserted through military power. As such,
Pearson explained the United Nations objective was not to fight communism as an idea,
but to fight the manifestation of communist aggression.79 This calculated distinction
further demonstrated the government’s purposeful but complex way of evaluating and
publicly addressing the communist threat. Theoretically, there was space left for the
existence of a diverse set of personal ideologies, but aggression and militancy would
not be tolerated. In the domestic context, security services combated what they feared
would eventually manifest into “armed opinions.” In Asia, over 26,000 Canadian military
personnel served in the Korean War in both combat and peacekeeping roles as part of
a United Nations force between 1950 and 1957, with 516 lives lost.80
As the Liberal government continued to balance its anti-communism priorities, the
opposition advocated different legislative proposals. On May 2, 1950, Progressive
Conservative Leader of the Opposition George Drew introduced an ultimately
unsuccessful motion that “appropriate legislation should be introduced so that
communist and similar activities in Canada may be made an offence punishable under
the Criminal Code.”81 For context, he argued that the government had failed to properly
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execute the recommendations of the Kellock-Taschereau Commission. Drew criticized
the Department of Justice’s oversight of foreign-language newspapers and the issuance
of Canadian passports to individuals traveling to communist regions. He argued a
concerning number of people acted as delegates for communist front organizations
established in Canada, traveled behind the “Iron Curtain” to provide critical information
about Canadian vulnerabilities and then returned as ambassadors of the virtues of
communism.82 In response, Liberal Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent reiterated his belief
that the Canadian public was fully aware of the ideological threat posed by communism
and the military and nuclear threat posed by the Soviet Union. Using his preferred
example of communist influence in the labour union movement, St. Laurent maintained
the need for flexibility. St. Laurent remarked, “…we relied on the good sense, good
judgement, patriotism and Christian traditions of the labouring people themselves to see
that they got rid of these obnoxious influences.” He added, “they did a much better job
than could have been done by the police attempting to enforce any laws adopted by this
parliament in that regard.”83 As discussed earlier, the Prime Minister attempted to
convey the possibility that the communist threat could, at times, be handled without
direct state intervention.
St. Laurent went on to reference anti-communist measures adopted in other
countries. While Australia, South Africa, Panama, and India were named, the Prime
Minister spoke directly about the United States. St. Laurent remarked:
There are other things being practised across the border, a sort of witch-hunt.
Committees are being set up charging the department of state with being overrun
82
83
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with communists or communist sympathizers. People are saying, “I assert that
there are communists in department of state, and until you put the F.B.I. files at my
disposal I am not in a position to prove it, but I will still assert it.” I do not think that
has created a very favourable impression on our Canadian public.84
Similar to St. Laurent’s March 1949 address in Windsor where he voiced his opposition
to American “subversive influence laws,” embedded in these remarks was the idea that
Canadians approached the domestic threat of communism differently than Americans.
St. Laurent does acknowledge that there were certainly Canadians who believed an
aggressive approach was the most appropriate method to handle subversion.85 Despite
this impulse amongst some, the Prime Minister asserted that the government’s existing
strategy coincided with a decrease in communist activity. Reiterating a theme from his
March 1950 speech at the Canada Club in Toronto, St. Laurent again argued that “the
antidote to the spread of communism was to make our free institutions really work, and
work in a manner that would give satisfaction to all sections of the population.”86
While addressing Drew’s motion, St. Laurent purposefully generalized Canadian
opposition to American anti-communism, neglecting the civic support for more
aggressive measures encouraged by certain grassroots anti-communists activists. The
propagation of a benevolent Canadian approach to the perceived domestic threat of
communism did resonate with certain citizens. In a letter directed to Prime Minister St.
Laurent just days after his remarks in Parliament, one Canadian expressed gratitude for
the Liberal Party’s opposition to Drew’s anti-communism and for resisting the
“undemocratic antics of the United States politicians,” which they believed made it
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difficult to differentiate between a Soviet purge and an American “red-witch hunt.”87 This
individual, self-identified as a member of the Co-Operative Commonwealth Federation
(CCF), argued that because communism was a weak ideological force in Canada,
repression would only strengthen the movement. In comparison, the preservation of
“freedom” in the United States was increasingly used to justify witch-hunts, racial
discrimination, and the Un-American Activities Committee.88 The more guarded anticommunist approach employed by St. Laurent after the Kellock-Taschereau
Commission, reinforced a popular narrative in Canada that often relied on comparisons
with the United States.
A recurring theme throughout the early Cold War in Canada was that elements of
American anti-communism were viewed unfavourably in Canada. In this instance, St.
Laurent used the politically charged language of “witch hunt” to describe American
practices, while also asserting the existence of a popular Canadian opinion critical of the
United States. Simultaneously, he also argued Canada was successfully mitigating the
domestic communist threat. Regardless of the validity of that claim, the ambiguity of
Canadian anti-communism allowed for the assertion of bilateral difference. The RCMP
provided stark warnings about communism, but the government resisted aggressive
legislative change. The only consistent message delivered by St. Laurent was the need
to uphold free institutions and a democratic society. There was even difficulty defining
the policy goals of opposition parties. The magazine Saturday Night argued the
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Progressive Conservatives were more concerned with being able to criticize the
government’s lack of communist prosecution than working to solve the broader concern.
The editorial further maintained the Progressive Conservatives made no attempt to
provide a workable definition for the communist activities they wished to criminalize.89
So, while the fear of communist infiltration remained, it became easier to define
Canadian policy by what it wasn’t, than what it was.
Following the failed legislative changes proposed by Lacroix and Drew, the
governing Liberals did strengthen laws dealing with treason and sedition, and revised
immigration policies. The penalty for sedition was increased, and “sabotage” was added
as an offence under the Criminal Code of Canada in 1951. The offence of “treason” was
also expanded to include assisting armed forces in opposition to Canada during
conflicts entered into without a formal war declaration, such as the Korean War. 90
Further, the 1951 Emergency Powers Act allowed the government to claim expanded
authority during an international emergency that threatened Canadian security.91 These
measures attempted to weave a comprehensive web of security precautions to match
the diffuse threats of the emerging Cold War. This action was designed to satisfy the
demand for enhanced legal measures without hindering Canadian fundamental
freedoms critical to St. Laurent’s “democratic anti-communist” strategy.
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Conclusion

The RCMP and the St. Laurent government had differing interpretations of how
to mitigate the domestic threat of communism. The national police force was convinced
of the destructive potential of communists, planned for the possible internment of
subversives, and established a Prominent Communist Functionaries file. The monitoring
of communists was extended to suspected front groups, including the Sudbury Ladies
Auxiliary of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers. In contrast, the
St. Laurent government articulated the responsibility of the individual to combat the
encroachment of a foreign ideology. While certain anti-communist action within the
labour movement was specifically praised by the Prime Minister, community volunteer
service groups like Civitan International also embraced the emphasis on public action.
Anti-communist legislation introduced by Wilfrid Lacroix in 1949, and proposed by
Opposition Leader George Drew in 1950, prompted political decision-making that
balanced the vast range of public anti-communist positions.
St. Laurent’s focus on the value of individually directed anti-communist action
downplayed the frequency and intensity of state-directed initiatives. The next chapter
examines how, despite the political messaging of the late 1940s, state-led anticommunism programs in Canada remained punitive. While the Liberal government
stressed the preservation of freedom and remained wary of specific anti-communist
legislation, laws were strengthened, civil service screening continued, and the state
actively judged individual trustworthiness and loyalty. It was, however, challenging to
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confront this state-led anti-communist persecution when it was largely absent from
public dialogue. The focus remained on what Canadians should be doing themselves to
confront ideological subversion. This contrast between political emphasis and individual
reality highlights the complexity of anti-communism in Canada.
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State-led anti-communism exerted real consequences on public servants during
the Cold War in Canada. The threat of subversion at times prompted high profile
inquiries, while in other instances necessitated the subtle but intentional screening of
civil servants. As the previous chapter outlined, there was not always consistency in the
state’s approach to this public safety threat. For this reason, there is great
historiographical value in assembling personal encounters with the contrasting
manifestations of punitive Canadian anti-communism. The Kellock-Taschereau Royal
Commission conducted a series of publicized investigations between 1946 and 1949
intended to address the threat of domestic communist subversion exposed by Igor
Gouzenko. This vigorous inquiry blurred the line between suspicion and guilt, ensnaring
civil servants like scientists Israel Halperin and David Shugar, and economist Agatha
Chapman. Advocacy organizations including the Ottawa Civil Liberties Association and
the Toronto-based Emergency Committee for Civil Rights, pressured the government to
address the abuses of the Royal Commission. The elevated public awareness of the
Kellock-Taschereau Royal Commission represented a high point of civic engagement
with state-led anti-communist activities.
Despite the Liberal government of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent publicly
downplaying the state’s active role after the Kellock-Taschereau investigations,
consequential anti-communism practices continued. In the years that followed, the
importance of individual trustworthiness became directly connected to internal attempts
to establish boundaries of acceptable behaviour, with specific emphasis placed on
idealized gender identities. Individual trustworthiness in particular will emerge as a
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consistent theme in different cultural interpretations of anti-communism studied in the
later chapters of this dissertation. Canadian women, such as Glee Jessee, increasingly
staffed the civil service but were encouraged to concentrate on specific narrow roles
within broader Cold War defence priorities. The regulation of sexuality was justified as
part of the government’s effort to detect and eliminate potentially subversive civil
servants. Anti-communist activity conducted through internal and concealed
government processes reduced transparency. Secrecy hid the scope of civil service
purges, enabled experimental scientific testing, and reinforced an emerging perception
that Canadians enjoyed more ideological freedom than existed in the United States.
Canadian anti-communism exceeded the benign program of initiatives continually
proclaimed by the government. This chapter brings together an important collection of
personalized accounts and individual experiences that reiterates the critical scholarship
of Patrizia Gentile, Gary Kinsman, Larry Hannant, Reginald Whitaker, and Gary
Marcuse. Additional archival research, including personal accounts from the KellockTaschereau investigations, and a compilation of insightful contemporary media
accounts further emphasizes the broad scope of destructive anti-communism in the
Canadian public service from the critical perspective of the accused.

Investigations of the Kellock-Taschereau Royal Commission

On February 15, 1946, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King appointed
the Kellock-Taschereau Royal Commission to probe the validity of the Igor Gouzenko
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espionage revelations. In a related statement, King outlined that the Canadian
government had “information of undoubted authenticity” establishing the unlawful
disclosure of secret and confidential information to unauthorized persons, including
members of a foreign mission in Ottawa. King explained that the Commissioners would
apply to the Minister of Justice for orders of interrogation and detention.1 Order in
Council P.C. 6444 of October 6, 1945, further authorized certain extraordinary
measures in accordance with the War Measures Act (1939). When deemed necessary
for the “security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada,” the Minister of Justice
could authorize and determine the detention of certain individuals. This included
preventing the communication of secret and confidential information to an agent of a
foreign power.2
The initial activity of the Kellock-Taschereau Commission was conducted in
relative secrecy. On February 15, 1946, twelve individuals were arrested and placed
into custody for passing secrets to the Soviet Union. The Globe and Mail reported an
early lack of public knowledge surrounding the nature of the accusations. With surprise,
one reporter wrote that for an interconnected capital city where people were too often
aware of each other’s business, “two days [had] gone by with little more than vague
rumour to suggest who may be implicated.”3 Even for those individuals most directly
impacted by the Commission’s investigation, a lack of information defined the
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experience. The spouse of one detained individual described her ordeal to The Globe
and Mail. Returning home from a trip out of town to visit family, the unidentified woman
discovered her home had been searched and her husband arrested. The accused was
refused information detailing the authorization of his arrest and for six days was limited
to a single letter of communication with his wife.4 Identities of the accused were not
publicly disclosed until the Kellock-Taschereau Commission released a series of reports
in early March 1946, which coincided with the additional arrest of Labor-Progressive
Member of Parliament Fred Rose and the naming of further suspects.
Civil liberties groups argued at the time that the Kellock-Taschereau Commission
was overstepping its mandate. Beyond identifying and reporting misconduct and
security breaches, the commissioners increasingly performed the role of grand jury or
magistrate. There were ongoing disagreements about the degree of powers the
government was empowered to assert during these investigations. Although led by two
Supreme Court Judges and the Council of Canadian bar associations president E. K.
Williams, advocates argued that the Kellock-Taschereau Commission interrogated
individuals without due consideration for their fundamental rights. The Ottawa Civil
Liberties Association maintained that if the Commission intended to assume this type of
judicial role, it had an obligation to follow the rules of the Canadian Evidence Act.5 The
Emergency Committee for Civil Rights in Toronto6 was similarly dismayed by the
Commission’s failure to inform suspects of their right to refuse questioning. Prominent
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executive members, including political scientist C. B. MacPherson, Group of Seven
painter A. Y. Jackson, and theoretical physicist Leopold Infeld, were convinced the
broad prosecutions were erroneously targeting certain individuals.7 Through
organization and publicity, the civil liberties movement in Canada attempted to prevent
the government from using the perceived threat of communism to justify extrajudicial
action.
A Toronto Daily Star editorial on February 26, 1946, decried what it perceived to
be an abuse of the War Measures Act. The Daily Star maintained the KellockTaschereau Commission’s prolonged detention of thirteen suspects arbitrarily deprived
them of the fundamental right to legal advice, setting a dangerous precedent for the
future use of arbitrary detention.8 The editorial argued such extreme remedies should
be reserved for military emergencies. The War Measures Act, employed to legitimize
detention for the Kellock-Taschereau Commission, was brought into force in the context
of the Second World War. The Daily Star maintained that “the legality of [the suspects’]
detention without access to legal advice, under a war measures act when war no longer
exists, does not excuse the departure from common democratic justice which such a
detention involves. A thing may be legally right but morally wrong…”9 The blunt
application of the emergency powers enabled by War Measures Act produced
increased public scrutiny of the Kellock-Taschereau Commission.
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The Canadian civil liberties movement was motivated to question the ethics of
anti-communism investigations but suffered from a lack of capacity. Civil liberties groups
were scattered across the country in a few small associations, lacked any consistent or
coordinated organizing, and relied on a few noteworthy proponents. McGill University
law professor Frank Scott, a prominent constitutional expert and chairman of the
national Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, and B. K. Sandwell, the editor of
Saturday Night magazine, were two such individuals. Other contributors included
federal bureaucrat and the first director of the School of Journalism at Carleton
University, Wilfrid Eggleston; the leading civil libertarian of the CCF, Alistair Stewart;
Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament John G. Diefenbaker; and influential
historian Arthur Lower.10 The Civil Liberties Association, led by Sandwell, cautiously
delayed holding public meetings or demonstrations until court proceedings concluded.
Sandwell did speak out in the pages of Saturday Night, raising significant concerns that
several of the thirteen individuals detained by the commission may be found guilty
because they were not afforded the necessary legal processes and protections. Further,
Sandwell argued the federal government was abusing the national security justification
for the actions of the Kellock-Taschereau Commission.11 In contrast, the Ottawa Civil
Liberties Association (OCLA) was more willing to undertake preemptive public action.
On July 8, 1946, the OCLA authored and sent a resolution to all Members of
Parliament protesting the Kellock-Taschereau Commission’s use of prolonged
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detention, the denial of access to legal counsel, its failure to communicate the
protections of the Canada Evidence Act, and other related civil liberty breaches. The
OCLA urged Parliament to take steps to immediately cease any such violations.12
Influenced by prominent member Arthur Lower, the Winnipeg Civil Liberties Association
(WCLA) was similarly active. The WCLA backed an amendment to the Citizenship Act,
introduced by Progressive Conservative MP Diefenbaker on May 2, 1946, which
focused on the addition of a Bill of Rights. Had it passed, this federal statute would have
established Parliament as the only body with the authority to suspend habeas corpus.13
The successes of efforts to rectify civil liberties abuses were challenged by the tensions
of the Cold War. Anti-communist pressures at times inhibited reform by connecting any
opposition to investigatory practices with sympathy for subversive activities.14
Ultimately, the consequences of these civil liberty breaches were personally
experienced by those caught up in the Kellock-Taschereau Commission.
The investigations that followed Gouzenko’s espionage revelations are
noteworthy because they indicate the punitive nature of Canadian anti-communism. The
repercussions faced by those suspected of communist sympathies impacted both
career and personal circumstances, but the full extent of these inquiries was not widely
recognized. Leopold Infeld, the physicist involved with the Emergency Committee for
Civil Rights (ECCR), was convinced of the innocence of two academics arrested by the
Commission. Infeld campaigned for the release of David Shugar, a physicist who
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conducted sonar research in the private sector, and Israel Halperin, a Queen’s
University mathematician. Supported by prominent academics, including Albert Einstein
and scientists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology as well as the Institute for
Advanced Study at Princeton, petitions were submitted to Prime Minister King with
hopes of intervention.15 Documents disclosed by Gouzenko had led the KellockTaschereau Commission to Halperin, who was accused of working with Canadian
Armed Forces Captain Gordon Lunan to pass secret information to the Soviet Union. A
Major in the Army by 1945, Halperin served with the Directorate of Artillery and was
privy to a variety of confidential projects. It was alleged Lunan reported his
conversations with Halperin about explosives, weaponry, and artillery innovation to the
Soviet Embassy. Disclosures reportedly included details about the Canadian Army
Research and Development Establishment, the Field Pilot Explosive Plant, a ballistics
laboratory, and other highly secretive explosives capabilities.16 At the time, Halperin did
not believe the information to be secret and even directed Lunan to speak with his
superior. When Lunan pressed Halperin for written documentation, the physicist
refused.17 Writing in his memoirs, Lunan confirms Halperin’s reluctance. Lunan
suggests Halperin mistakenly understood the secrecy surrounding scientific research to
be more of a bureaucratic requirement. Despite an assumption Halperin was
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predisposed to help the Soviets, Lunan recalls his realization that Halperin was in fact
an unwitting and unwilling participant.18 When Lunan refused to testify on two
successive occasions regarding this relationship, the case against Halperin fell apart.
Despite an acquittal, the report published by the Kellock-Taschereau
Commission in June 1946 significantly stigmatized Halperin. The Commission offered
no retractions or apologies. The stubborn suspicions that remained had detrimental
professional consequences for Halperin. On his return from leave to Queen’s University,
Halperin learned certain members of the Board of Trustees were opposed to the
presence of a “Communist fellow-traveller” on campus. The president of the university
went as far as to obtain a legal opinion justifying dismissal for impropriety. Halperin’s
position was only saved by the intervention of Chancellor Charles Dunning, who was
determined to prevent Queen’s from embracing communist witch hunts.19 The cloud of
suspicion that followed Halperin also infected the broader scientific community. In 1950,
the FBI requested a copy of the petition submitted by American academics on behalf of
Halperin from the RCMP, for use by the American Loyalty Review Board. For the anticommunist investigator, this act of support required scrutiny. Halperin’s acquittal did not
dissuade the RCMP from willingly sharing information of questionable relevance with
their American counterparts.20 The allegations attached to suspicions of communist
belief were difficult to eradicate.
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In a manner similar to Halperin, the Commission zealously prosecuted David
Shugar. A young biochemist, Shugar initially received attention as one of the organizers
of the Canadian Association of Scientific Workers (CAScW), a movement to unionize
technical workers and scientists. Created in 1945, the CAScW actively protested the
deportation of Japanese-Canadians and advocated for the protection of free speech,
effective international controls on atomic weapons, and better wages and improved
facilities at the national level.21 Prior to Gouzenko’s defection, there was a belief the
CAScW was a subversive organization. In response to these concerns, the RCMP
instigated a period of surveillance. The primary reasons for suspicion were the
CAScW’s advocacy for industry-wide unionization, and its affiliated scientists who
lobbied for international control of atomic weaponry. The RCMP, like the FBI, believed
this movement was Soviet-inspired.22 Along with his involvement with the CAScW, the
Kellock-Taschereau Commission probed Shugar’s connections to Sam Carr, the
prominent communist organizer of the Labor-Progressive Party. Shugar acknowledged
conversations with Carr about the military when he was in the navy but maintained the
discussions did not come close to broaching confidential material.23 The conditions of
Shugar’s arrest, detention, and interrogation by the Kellock-Taschereau Commission
influenced many of the complaints advanced by Canadian civil liberty organizations.
At his home in the early morning hours of February 15, 1946, Shugar recounts a
thumping of increasing intensity. He was greeted at his door by four insistent RCMP
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officers. Informed he was under arrest, the officers instructed Shugar to pack enough
clothing for a long absence.24 At the same time, Shugar’s belongings were searched
thoroughly. The RCMP officers were reportedly visibly excited to find a series of
pamphlets published by Oxford University Press in Shugar’s belongings, including one
titled “An Atlas of the USSR.”25 Shugar was denied information about his arrest and not
permitted to leave a note for his absent wife. During his first twenty-eight days in
custody at Rockcliffe Barracks outside of Ottawa, Shugar was not permitted to be out of
the eyesight of his RCMP guards, even to use the bathroom. At dusk a 200-watt lamp
illuminated Shugar’s cell until daybreak, inhibiting his ability to sleep. Consistent
complaints achieved modest but steady concessions and ultimately the substitution of a
reading lamp. Exercise was limited to fifteen minutes a day in a larger room, then twice
a day, and finally short walks outside during the final stage of his detainment. Shugar
recounted poor quality food and very limited intellectual stimulation.26 The conditions of
his detention and his consistent inability to consult with counsel prompted Shugar to
protest his circumstances from both inside and outside of custody.
While detained, Shugar’s wife launched a press campaign on his behalf, using
limited correspondence to publicly disclose details about his treatment. Defiant while
imprisoned, Shugar declared his proceedings erroneous, demanded a lawyer, and
spent eleven days on a hunger strike.27 Interrogators refused to identify themselves,
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attempted to use the existence of the Royal Commission to intimidate Shugar, and
explained that unless he was prepared to admit to all accusations, they did not have
time to waste on him. Shugar recounted “wondering repeatedly what it was all about
and, in particular, the special emphasis the police seemed to pay to secrecy.”28 In April
1946, Shugar became the first suspect arrested by the Commission to be acquitted.
Magistrate Glenn Strike maintained the Crown failed to introduce sufficient evidence to
warrant a committal to trial.29 Despite this apparent vindication, Shugar remained a
person of interest for the Kellock-Taschereau Commission.
The report of the Royal Commission cast further aspersions on Shugar. Only a
few months after his acquittal, Shugar was dismissed from his position with the
Department of Health and Welfare. Brooke Claxton, the Minister of Health and Welfare,
suggested the interim report of the Kellock-Taschereau Commission differed
significantly from the final version. Despite the decision of the Magistrate’s Court,
Claxton relied on the final report’s conclusion that Shugar had communicated
confidential information to the Soviet Union.30 It was difficult for Shugar to challenge his
firing because the information that formed the basis of the report was not public. Then
Minister of Justice Louis St. Laurent stated in the House of Commons that it was not in
the best interest of the Canadian public for the evidence against Shugar to be made
public because it would divulge secret information related to submarine detection
technology. While accepting the government’s position, opposition Member of
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Parliament John Diefenbaker did remark that it was “most improper” that the KellockTaschereau Commission asserted this highest degree of investigatory autonomy.31
Despite his initial acquittal, Shugar continued to be treated as a subversive threat. The
secrecy of the Kellock-Taschereau Commission’s investigations and hearings was used
to shield confirmation, or rebuttal, of its reported findings. Individuals caught up in the
anti-communist investigations had few options to preserve their rights or to profess their
believed innocence.
In September 1946, Shugar was informed he would again stand trial on a
conspiracy charge. The final report of the Kellock-Taschereau Commission was
presented as the sufficient new evidence to justify another charge. Dr. F. E. H.
Beamish, a former supervisor, testified that during the war he was motivated by certain
suspicions to place restrictions on the laboratories Shugar could access. One of
Beamish’s assistants, Dr. J. E. Currah, similarly mistrusted Shugar and purposefully
obstructed his access to certain chemicals.32 Further evidence introduced involved the
earlier established associations with Sam Carr and accusations Shugar breached the
Official Secrets Act. A Russian Embassy document purported to outline Shugar’s
commitment to work on behalf of the Soviet Union.33 Despite the submission of this new
evidence, and the matter proceeding to trial, Shugar was found not guilty of conspiring
to communicate secret and confidential information to the Soviet Union and cleared of
involvement in the Canadian espionage ring. Shugar categorically denied he gave, or
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agreed to give, any information to the Soviets.34 As with the fallout from his initial arrest,
the second round of accusations further undermined Shugar’s career and ultimately his
citizenship.
After being cleared of his second espionage charge, Shugar applied to be
reinstated as a physicist with the Department of Health and Welfare. A significant delay
processing his application prompted accusations the government did not intend to rehire
Shugar. In response to reports immigration officials were preparing to admit former
German scientists, the United Electrical Workers Union charged the government was
more willing to permit the entry to Canada of Nazi-indoctrinated workers than hire those
individuals falsely prosecuted by the Kellock-Taschereau Commission.35 Shugar
remained out of work despite his strong qualifications and a widely-reported shortage of
scientists in Canada. Notwithstanding that he was a former naval anti-submarine expert,
Shugar was unable to secure the veterans’ out-of-work allowances he was entitled to
collect.36 Shugar used a pseudonym to write articles for a popular science journal before
ultimately leaving Canada in 1948 for a research position at the Pasteur Institute in
Paris. A two-year teaching stint at the Sorbonne was followed by a research job at the
University of Brussels, in Belgium. In 1952 Leopold Infeld offered Shugar a position at
the University of Warsaw in his native Poland, a country he left at the age of three.37
Shugar’s anti-communist persecution did not end with his emigration. Reports in June
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1957 indicated the Canadian government had initiated action to revoke Shugar’s
citizenship. While a naturalized citizen in Canada since 1927, officials maintained
Shugar had lived for more than two years in a foreign country where he was formerly a
national, and by not maintaining “substantial connections,” his Canadian citizenship
would be revoked.38 The ramifications of being suspected to have communist
sympathies were nearly impossible to escape. Shugar’s two acquittals were not enough
to salvage his career, or to preserve his Canadian citizenship.
There has been a historiographical tendency to analyze state-led anticommunism primarily from the perspective of the policy-makers. The emphasis here is
to amalgamate individual stories of anti-communist prosecution in order to further
explore the patterns of these lived experiences. The cases of Halperin and Shugar
highlight the personal consequences faced by those individuals deemed subversive
public safety threats. Regardless of the accuracy of communist suspicions, careers
were tarnished, and lives were fundamentally altered. While elements of these
investigations were publicly scrutinized, the authority granted to the Royal Commission
generally legitimized its broad pursuit of communists. The complexity of Canadian anticommunism is further revealed through the perspectives of those civil servants targeted
for their ideological beliefs.
Suspects of the Kellock-Taschereau Commission faced a variety of personal
challenges. Eric George Adams, an economist who between 1940 and 1946 held
positions with the Bank of Canada, Wartime Requirements Board, Department of
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Finance, and Foreign Exchange Control Board, was charged under the Official Secrets
Act in October 1946. Despite being cleared of wrongdoing, Adams struggled to find
employment and, like Shugar, relocated to Poland in the early 1950s. In the immediate
aftermath of his involvement with the Kellock-Taschereau Commission, Adams battled
with the authorities to reclaim certain personal items taken by investigators as evidence.
Even when acquitted, Adams’ case remained entangled with the Kellock-Taschereau
Commission, and his belongings in 1947 remained in bureaucratic limbo.39 Adams
renewed his efforts when all trials associated with the Kellock-Taschereau Commission
were concluded.
Persistence was required to regain the seized belongings and court exhibits. In
late November 1947, the RCMP informed Adams that his property was now in the
custody of the Privy Council Office.40 After making a personal appeal to Prime Minister
Mackenzie King, Adams exchanged correspondence with the Department of Justice in
early 1948. While many items had been returned, Adams was adamant items seized
during the raid of his home and office remained in the possession of the Canadian
government.41 Adams’ compiled list of missing property items provides some insight into
the scope of suspicions that informed the Kellock-Taschereau Commission
investigations. Materials of note include several volumes of the selected works of
Vladimir Lenin, a manifesto of the Communist Party, and a journal containing “Notes on

LAC, Eric George Adams fonds, R8274-7-8-E, “Books and other material taken, Kellock-Taschereau
(Gouzenko) Commission,” Container 16, File 9, letter from Howard to Adams, 7 March 1947.
40 LAC, Eric George Adams fonds, R8274-7-8-E, “Books and other material taken, Kellock-Taschereau
(Gouzenko) Commission,” Container 16, File 9, letter from Adams to Howard, 20 December 1947.
41 LAC, Eric George Adams fonds, R8274-7-8-E, “Books and other material taken, Kellock-Taschereau
(Gouzenko) Commission,” Container 16, File 9, letter from Adams to Varcoe, 28 February 1948.
39

85

Chapter 2 – Personal Journeys Through State-Led Canadian Anti-Communism
Canadian War Production 1914-1918.”42 Any and all literature or material that created a
link between an individual and communist ideology was of considerable interest to
investigators. It is reasonable to assume the combination of communist literature with a
study of Canadian wartime planning also triggered closer examination. The discovery of
subversive elements in Canada lowered the threshold for establishing suspicion. It was
not until April 1948, more than two years after Adams’ arrest that this material was
ultimately returned.
The convergence of coincidental and seemingly incriminating evidence, in
combination with investigatory practices that ignored certain civil liberties, contributed to
the Kellock-Taschereau Commission increasingly resembling an anti-communist witchhunt. Agatha Chapman’s name was first mentioned as part of the Royal Commission
hearings when Kathleen Willsher testified about being invited to a wartime study group
attended by Chapman that discussed socialist and Marxist literature.43 At the time of her
arrest, Willsher was an employee of the High Commissioner’s Office for the United
Kingdom and a member of the LPP. Chapman, the granddaughter of former Prime
Minister Sir Charles Tupper, was a Bank of Canada economist.
Following the completion of a Master’s degree in 1935, Chapman moved to
Montreal for a position with Sun Life Insurance. While in Montreal, Chapman became
involved with the McGill chapter of the Student Christian Movement, a group that
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applied Christian activism to the deficits of the urban-industrial world. It was at one of
these meetings where Chapman first met Eric Adams.44 Chapman continued to
participate in these study groups upon her return to Ottawa, and during the war also
became a member of the Canadian-Soviet Friendship Society in recognition of the
importance of the Allied powers pact. Willsher attended meetings at Chapman’s
residence with Adams and LPP Member of Parliament and communist Fred Rose.45
The report of the Kellock-Taschereau Commission used this prior activity to publicly
amplify suspicions that Chapman was a communist sympathizer. By the early 1950s,
the RCMP routinely classified the Canadian-Soviet Friendship Society as a communistcontrolled organization.46
Chapman’s involvement with the Kellock-Taschereau Commission fit the pattern
experienced by Halperin, Shugar, and Adams. On July 15, 1946, Chapman was
informed by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics (DBS), where she had been seconded
from the Bank of Canada, that she should not report for work and had been placed on
paid leave.47 Following her arrest, Chapman’s trial on the charge of conspiracy to
communicate confidential information to Russia was held in late November 1946. After
hearing from three witnesses: Adams, Willsher, and Gouzenko, Judge A. G. McDougall
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maintained there was no evidence to substantiate a finding of guilt.48 Consistent with
other exonerated civil servants, Chapman struggled to regain her career following the
trial. According to her own account Chapman was passed over for a position back at
DBS, even though she was more qualified than the other applicants. The Bank of
Canada also refused to reinstate Chapman, leaving her to accept a research
appointment in the United Kingdom.49 Regardless of legal findings, the stigma
associated with the Kellock-Taschereau Commission investigations consistently
jeopardized careers and forced people out of Canada.
The investigations of the Kellock-Taschereau Royal Commission led to stark
consequences for those mistakenly accused. The personal experiences of Halperin,
Shugar, Adams, and Chapman demonstrate the contravention civil rights and excessive
prosecutions possible in Canada. While many details surrounding these cases were
kept secret, the Royal Commission was by its existence a more public manifestation of
state-led anti-communism. A surprise best seller, the Commission’s report gained
attention because it included sensational details of suspect interrogations, the first
public account of Gouzenko’s defection, and describes the clandestine methods and
subversive aims of the Soviet Union. The Literary Review of Canada has since labelled
the Kellock-Taschereau report one of Canada’s one hundred most important books,
citing its considerable impact shaping public attitudes toward the Soviet Union and
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influencing government policy throughout the Cold War.50 The popularity of the report is
significant because of the way the Kellock-Taschereau Commission explained the
domestic communist threat. The risk of further Soviet espionage in Canada was directly
connected to the internal threat of communist subversion. The government process for
handling suspected communists, however, would quickly became even more secretive.

The Complexities of Civil Service Screening

There was a discernible shift in the Canadian government’s anti-communist
activities following the highly-publicized arrests, trials, and report of the KellockTaschereau Commission. The notoriety of these anti-communist investigations
intensified fears of domestic communism, especially within the civil service. At this
juncture, the Canadian government appeared to pivot its communicated approach to
preventing further communist infiltration. In a statement issued on June 21, 1948,
Minister of Justice James Lorimer Ilsley maintained that certain administrative measures
had been taken to preserve the safety of the state. Ilsley remarked:
In the government’s view, loyalty is not susceptible to any precise series of tests.
Accordingly, after careful consideration, it was decided not to set up an
elaborate organization, as has been done elsewhere to determine and adjudicate
upon the loyalty of government employees. As was indicated to the House of
Commons by the Secretary of State for External Affairs on April 14th, 1947… an
interdepartmental Panel on Security, composed of officials from departments and
agencies of government was set up some time ago to advise on the co-ordination
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of the planning, organization and execution of security measures generally which
affect government departments.51
Another Royal Commission, or broad legislative investigation such as the House UnAmerican Activities in the United States, was not the publicized strategy of the Liberal
government moving forward. Instead, the government relied on the Security Panel to
execute a more discreet process.
In addition to the Security Panel, the government instituted specific measures to
protect the civil service from the perceived domestic threat of communism. In April
1948, Cabinet Directive 4A banned members of the Communist Party or fascist
organizations from employment in government positions requiring trust or
confidentiality.52 Cabinet Directive 24 (1952) created a further distinction between
“loyalty” and “reliability” for the purposes of civil servant screening. Membership in the
Communist Party, a belief in Marxism-Leninism, or affiliation with any other
revolutionary ideology qualified as “disloyalty.” “Unreliability” was classified as any
“defect” of character that might make an employee vulnerable to blackmail.53 As a
vague concept, character “defect” left space for an interpretation not explicitly
connected to a demonstrable ideological sympathy or association.
Liberal politicians presented a nuanced interpretation of the government’s
approach to anti-communism in order to reassure a public service still sensitive to the
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widespread suspicion produced by the Kellock-Taschereau Commission. Speaking to
the Professional Institute of the Civil Service of Canada in March 1950, Secretary of
State for External Affairs Lester Pearson discussed the relationship between the public
service and government. Pearson maintained the government had an obligation to
protect public servants against unfounded accusations or vicious insinuations. He
cautioned, “in our search for the hidden enemy of our way of life, we must also be
careful not to impose regulations or create prejudices which shackle the spirit of enquiry
by spreading the impression that anything unorthodox or enterprising or imaginative is
suspect.”54 A culture of suspicion was only deepened, Pearson argued, if innocuous
activities are labeled “red” or “dangerous.” Further, Pearson maintained that he:
[Hopes] that in this country we will never yield to hysterical clamour for a witchhunt; or accept mere association as proof of guilt; or exploit for selfish reasons
the genuine anxiety we all feel about our nation’s safety; I hope also we can
avoid loose and irresponsible talk about communists infesting government
departments…55
There are some indications Pearson’s comments were in part motivated by a rumoured
statement from Progressive Conservative MP Donald Fleming. The Winnipeg Free
Press reported on unsubstantiated claims Fleming made about the likelihood of
communists holding key positions in the government.56 With this speech, Pearson
attempted to further assert that the extremes or tactics of the emerging “McCarthyism”
in the United States were not welcome in Canada.
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The complicated task of determining the parameters of acceptable activity or
ideological beliefs made civil service security screening a contentious issue. Despite the
reassurances of government, the process remained intrusive and prone to exaggeration
and abuse. As early as 1949, rumours of the security checks were reported in
Maclean’s Magazine. Despite this public exposure, the practice remained vague and
secretive. A spokesperson for the Security Panel confirmed checks of civil servants
produced useful information but did not elaborate on the content or the implications of
such discoveries. The RCMP maintained that the public denunciation of any communistaffiliated organizations would unfairly implicate innocent people and potentially disrupt
the efforts of other anti-communist allies.57 The story detailed increased feelings of
discontent within the federal civil service. Deputy Ministers and department heads
described deep resentment at the intensity of the security checks. Civil servants who
prided themselves on political neutrality were described as furious to learn friends and
family members were subjected to intense RCMP meetings.58 Despite the displeasure
communicated by those civil servants interviewed, the article conceded the “field
checks” were likely to continue. The government wanted to be able to assure both
Parliament and its American allies that action was being taken to prevent communist
infiltration. Moderate officials did find comfort in the assertion that the “Red hunt in
Ottawa [hadn’t] reached the hysterical pitch of Washington’s.”59
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Civil service screenings were intended to judge individual trustworthiness,
measure any perceived risks to the state, and prevent the type of breaches exposed by
Gouzenko. As the Maclean’s article illustrates, there were Canadians who judged the
acceptability of these state-led measures by comparing their local context to the
notorious anti-communism of the United States. This bilateral contrast reinforced a more
positive narrative of Canadian anti-communism that hinged on disparaging American
tactics and a lack of awareness of the abuses occurring in Canada at the time. It’s
important to note that when dealing with perceptions, contemporary interpretations may
not necessarily reflect accurate truths. Regardless, it remains significant to identify what
people thought, even if their understanding was flawed.
Civil service security screenings were not executed consistently, and the anticommunist motivations for checks were inherently politicized. As the Security Panel
expanded the scope of civil service screening, the boundaries of acceptable behaviour
were also redefined. Tens of thousands of Canadians each year were subjected to
investigations, both inside and outside of the civil service. By fall 1950, the RCMP
reported to the Security Panel a four-hundred percent increase in processed file checks
over the previous two years, with 37,000 cases completed. Officials from the Privy
Council Office reported a further backlog of 67,000 cases in 1951.60 Security checks
covered personal history, relatives and casual associates, personal habits, and political
beliefs. In addition to civil servants, initial screenings expanded to workers in the
defence industries, commercial shipping, citizenship applicants, and immigrants and

60

Whitaker, and Marcuse, Cold War Canada, 171.

93

Chapter 2 – Personal Journeys Through State-Led Canadian Anti-Communism
refugees to Canada.61 Certain activities, while not overtly subversive, also became
suspect. In response to an April 1952 request by the Department of Finance to screen
several individuals, the RCMP flagged questionable behaviour that it admitted did not
indicate any “subversive tendencies.” One employee, having a competent employment
history, was described as inappropriately focused on supervising the work of his
colleagues and imposing his political beliefs on others.62 These security screenings
were conducted discretely and increasingly imposed on a wide breadth of individuals
believed to hold positions susceptible to subversive infiltration.
The assessment of trust was a crucial determinant for sensitive positions in the
civil service, armed forces, and defence industries.63 For example, in early 1952 it was
discovered that many of the District Treasury Office personnel in Ottawa did not hold
security clearances despite continued access to classified documents. Security checks
were only performed when a request or “adverse report” was received regarding a
specific employee.64 One civil servant continued to work at Treasury for 19 months
before his affiliation with a pro-communist organization was discovered. This employee
was dismissed, and the Chief Personnel Officer of the Office of the Comptroller of the
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Treasury acknowledged certain security concerns remained.65 The Secretary of the
Joint Security Committee, a position within the Department of National Defence Chiefs
of Staff Committee, first identified this department-wide vulnerability. Informed by
National Defence, the Security Panel worked to rectify the situation with the Comptroller
of the Treasury.66 Additional RCMP employee screenings were mandated to prevent
further security lapses.
In 1954, St. Laurent was pressed for details on civil service security screening in
the House of Commons by Opposition member Edmund Fulton. After questions
outlining general details about the nature and extent of the security program, the Prime
Minister was asked to provide the total number of government employees dismissed,
released from government positions, or transferred to less sensitive roles for security
reasons since January 1, 1947. St. Laurent clarified that in this context “security
reasons” meant loyalty, and then explained that reasons for transfer or removal were
primarily the result of indications of communist or fascist activities or associations, but
also identifiable character weaknesses, poor habits, and circumstances making an
individual susceptible to blackmail. A specific number was not provided because
dismissals and transfers were not tracked separately from other personnel issues. The
Prime Minister reassured the House of Commons that when screening identified an
individual of concern, the government acted as a “discreet employer” by avoiding any
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publicity that might do unnecessary harm. The government did not intend to determine
guilt but did have a responsibility to guarantee public safety. In each case the
government judged whether it was in the public interest to reveal a person’s identity
given the consequential nature of the accusation. When asked a follow-up question
about decision appeals that existed in the United Kingdom, St. Laurent explained that
no formal procedure had been established.67
Given the climate of privacy the government attempted to create around its anticommunist activities, the perspective of the civil service captured by Maclean’s
Magazine is rare. As St. Laurent alluded to with his reference to character weakness,
and as Cabinet Directive 24 officially established, the removal of certain employees
through the security screening process could be connected to the broader regulation of
behaviour and sexuality.68 With the dramatic increase in the surveillance of individuals
and organizations with suspected connections to communism, western security services
argued that the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) diversified the focus of their
espionage tactics. Entrapment and other surveillance schemes were speculated to rely
on exposing perceived character weaknesses, including those individuals who had not
publicly disclosed their sexual orientation.69 Civil servants with personal liabilities and
access to confidential information were said to be targeted for blackmail. Candidates for
this type of coercion included alcoholics, compulsive gamblers, individuals holding large
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debts, homosexuals, and a range of perceived sexual proclivities including extramarital
affairs, and the use of prostitutes.70 There was concern subversives would exploit, for
nefarious purposes, what were seen as societal indiscretions.

Regulating the Individual: Gender and Sexuality

The threat of communist subversion became deeply intertwined with the
regulation of gender and sexuality. Idealized gender norms in the Cold War context
were often linked to the importance of the family. In Homeward Bound: American
Families in the Cold War Era, historian Elaine Tyler May describes a domestic form of
containment where the family as a sphere of influence could diminish potentially
dangerous social forces. A home filled with children created feelings of warmth and
security that could counteract the disruption and alienation brought on by communism
and the threat of atomic war. For some, the vision of a traditionally constituted family
was argued to decrease fears of vulnerability.71 In Canada, the postwar expansion of
the modern bureaucratic state brought many women into government service but
created a tension between the desire for independence that drew many women to
Ottawa and a persistent emphasis on idealized domesticity. Historian Jennifer Stephen
examines this debate and broader issues of women’s access to the formal postwar
waged economy in ‘Pick One Intelligent Girl’: Employability, Domesticity, and the
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Gendering of Canada’s Welfare State, 1939-1947. Stephen uses the findings of the
federal Report on the Post-War Problems of Women, produced by a sub-committee of
the General Advisory Committee on Reconstruction, to contextualize the competing
priorities of domesticity and liberal equality. Respect for women as rational agents who
owned their own labour was contrasted with the assertion that a functioning democracy
relied on the survival of the home as the primary social unit, where the primary vocation
of women resided within the household.72
The Civil Service Commission quickly became the largest employer of women in
Canada, offering positions as stenographers, typists, and other largely administrative
roles. In 1953, it was reported that there were approximately 107,000 women in the civil
service, compared to 95,000 men.73 Maclean’s Magazine describes the experience of
Glee Jessee, a secretary at a Calgary oil company who moved to Ottawa to pursue civil
service work. The article frames this broader development as necessary but likely
counterproductive to the more admirable goal of raising a family. Despite the many
available jobs, career advancement opportunities remained limited for women, and
author Alan Phillips doubted Jessee would sacrifice marriage to remain with the civil
service. According to him, most government girls preferred home life.74 These
inequitable expectations were reinforced by gendered workplace dynamics. Jessee’s
superiors at the “Indian Affairs” welfare branch of the Citizenship and Immigration
Department often judged her job performance on her personality, energy, and ability to
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perform tasks with a smile. According to the article, few women made the transition from
clerical staff to officer class; half of those who left, did so to get married.75 The narrative
advanced by this 1953 Maclean’s profile was that the government depended on women
to staff its growing civil service, but only within defined parameters of participation, and
not to the detriment of family life.
This delicate balance between career and household was so pronounced
because, for many, national security depended on the traditional family structure.
Instability bred the potential for subversive activity. Canada’s civil defence programming
of the early Cold War era stressed the importance of specific women’s roles. The
Department of National Health and Welfare’s publicity campaign in the 1950s created
the idealized “Bea Alerte” character to help promote emergency response procedures.
Along with her male counterpart, “Justin Case,” the visualization of “Bea Alerte” as a
model citizen highlighted the importance of certain gendered expertise. As historian
Tarah Brookfield explores in Cold War Comforts, the aftermath of a hypothetical nuclear
attack would require nurturing attitudes and the skills associated with female dominated
occupations of nursing, social work, and teaching.76 Regardless of the effectiveness of
this campaign, both characters illustrate the state’s attempt to actively shape gender
roles in Cold War Canada.
As part of ongoing proactive measures, a series of government-sponsored
women’s beauty pageants attempted to shape the desired gender identity and

Ibid., 25; 38; 40.
Tarah Brookfield, Cold War Comforts: Canadian Women, Child Safety, and Global Insecurity (Waterloo:
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2012), 23-27.
75
76

99

Chapter 2 – Personal Journeys Through State-Led Canadian Anti-Communism
appropriate behaviour for the loyal and reliable female civil servant. Between 1951 and
1973 the federal bureaucracy ran the “Miss Civil Service” pageant. The official
ambassador of the “Ideal Government Girl,” the winner of this contest represented the
desired traits of femininity, beauty, and sexuality. Glee Jessee participated in the
pageant on behalf of Indian Affairs in 1952. Miss Civil Service was a valuable
communications tool and often the face of the bureaucracy’s Recreation Association
(RA). The RA newspaper played a key role in spreading feminine ideals. The height,
weight, and measurements of each Miss Civil Service were routinely published in the
RA newspaper, often accompanied by features on fashion, etiquette, and beauty tips.
This “women’s page” of the RA newspaper reinforced heteronormative dating activity by
describing how and where to find a boyfriend and future husband. In this case historian
Patrizia Gentile notes that a good personality, including charm and poise, were
stressed. Women’s administrative jobs in the civil service were described as temporary
in nature, with marriage, children, and motherhood identified as the ultimate and
preferred goal.77 This truncated career trajectory helped justify a woman’s role in a
traditionally male sector and endeavoured to quell certain fears about the risk of
subversion.
A “Mister Civil Service” pageant was similarly contemplated. In early 1957, the
RA newspaper published a series of opinions about the possibility of holding a men’s
competition. The idea received positive initial feedback, with ten of the twelve
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individuals surveyed supportive. Gentile suggests there was less agreement on which
qualities the men would be judged and how traits would be evaluated. Some civil
servants were not convinced male qualities of personality, appearance, and intelligence
could be accurately determined in the pageant format. It was implied that gawking at
men was inappropriate and embarrassing, a view not present during the Miss Civil
Service contests.78 Instead, the preference was to develop a format that included
demonstrations of strength and athletic ability. In addition to intelligence, men needed to
distinguish themselves from the women increasingly prevalent in the ranks of the civil
service by showcasing their “manly” masculinity.79 While the Mister Civil Service contest
idea was not realized, an idealized male archetype did exist.
An October 1962 issue of Maclean’s describes a unique character type it
identified as the “Ottawa Man.” This description indicated a highly-educated man:
Formal in manner, meticulous in speech. He’s a snob, but a nice snob, a gentle
man who nothing common does or mean (he never gossips). He is most like
himself when he unavoidably fetches up - at an airport, perhaps - next to a
Toronto Man, whom he regards as crass, vulgar, and probably in advertising.80
Civil servants were not automatically Ottawa Men, but they often worked in External
Affairs, Finance, or the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Maclean’s describes the
Ottawa Man as generally identifiable in a navy-blue suit, hair grown a bit longer than the
norm, and always in possession of a large brown briefcase. The Ottawa Man avoided
slang, never drove a big new car, and lived in a house with a log fireplace, study, and
comfortable leather chairs. He avoided bars, dined in restaurants, and only socialized

Ibid., 136.
Ibid., 137.
80 “How to spot the Ottawa Man: A concise guide,” Maclean’s Magazine (6 October 1962), 3.
78
79

101

Chapter 2 – Personal Journeys Through State-Led Canadian Anti-Communism
with other Ottawa Men.81 Similar to the parameters of appropriateness the Miss Civil
Service image cultivated, the Ottawa Man caricature reinforced a safe, predictable, and
desired male identity.82
At the same time, civil servants not matching these idealized gender norms
joined the ranks of those dismissed or relocated as part of state anti-communism
initiatives. The policing of heterosexuality rested on individual interpretations of sexual
orientation. As the Miss Civil Service and Ottawa Man examples indicate, specific and
safe boundaries of masculinity and femininity were purposefully established for the civil
service.83 Gay men and lesbian women, generally forced to conceal their sexuality at
this time, were perceived to be more susceptible to Soviet blackmail because of this
personal secret and often lost jobs as a result. For example, in 1952, a gay man holding
a middle-management position was discovered at Canada’s secretive Communications
Branch. While the individual’s loyalty was ultimately not questioned, he was still asked
to resign. Author John Sawatsky suggested there was a departmental fear that shared
intelligence programs would be cancelled if American allies uncovered this type of
“vulnerability.”84 The realization other gay men were employed at the Communications
Branch intensified paranoia, even with no evidence of subversion. In the late 1950s, a
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senior manager was transferred to a position dealing with non-classified tasks when his
sexual orientation was discovered. In 1963, internal informers exposed a group of gay
code clerks who arranged to work the same shift at the highly secretive communications
centre. This investigation resulted in both forced transfers and dismissals.85 The
consequences were steep for those civil servants who did not conform to identified
gender or sexual ideals.
The Security Panel continued to debate the parameters of security screening and
the analysis of sexuality. During a 1959 Security Panel discussion on sexual orientation,
Deputy Minister of Justice Wilber R. Jacket suggested that homosexuals were a
security risk, a concern for good administration and, consequently, not suitable for civil
service work.86 The RCMP and representatives from Justice and National Defence
advocated for broadening such investigations beyond the civil service. The deputy
minister of justice also questioned whether suspected homosexuals should be
employed in the civil service in any capacity. External Affairs and the Civil Service
Commission, on the other hand, believed investigations should be limited to the civil
service and the military, with homosexuals transferred or dismissed only from sensitive
security positions.87 When the character weakness argument was challenged, the
RCMP fell back on the Criminal Code of Canada. Regardless of the security threat
assessment, the RCMP maintained homosexuals should be fired from the civil service
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because homosexuality was itself illegal.88 Both interpretations were consistent in their
belief that homosexuality was a character weakness that threatened domestic security.
The pressure to adequately address this security risk led to the development of
“the Fruit Machine,” a device and series of psychological tests designed to scientifically
detect homosexuality. Carleton University psychologist Frank Robert Wake was
commissioned through a mandate from the Security Panel in 1963 to conduct research
to produce a detection test. Wake’s research was designed to overcome the subjective
challenges of identifying homosexuals by utilizing the scientific method.89 Highly
secretive, the research was conducted at National Defence Medical Centre, and
included a psychologist seconded from the Department of National Defence, along with
ongoing support from the Department of National Health and Welfare. External
consultants included psychiatrists and psychologists, and a group of experts who
assisted with the creation of a series of psychological tests. By monitoring as many
physiological variables as possible, including pulse rate, skin reflexes, breathing rate,
and pupal dilation in response to sexual stimulation, the research intended to develop a
reliable method for identifying homosexuality.90 This project, however, faced several
significant obstacles.
Wake struggled to find enough subjects to adequately conduct the research. The
derogatory nickname “fruit machine” originated from the reluctance of RCMP officers to
submit to tests and risk being labeled a “fruit.” Officers resisted participation and
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exposure to images of naked men for fear their reaction might not fit the desired
indicators of heteronormative masculinity.91 The study became narrowly focused on gay
men, despite an understood necessity to screen departments with large populations of
female civil servants. Wake and his researchers lacked contacts with lesbian women
and expressed uncertainty about the proper protocol for including heterosexual women
in the studies.92 The 1965-66 Directorate of Security and Intelligence Annual Report
stated that all tests continued to be inconclusive, and the main obstacle moving forward
was the lack of suitable subjects for testing. There were suggestions of progress, but
the research failed to substantiate a discernible difference based on sexual orientation
for stimulation and response studies.93 The “fruit machine” research was ultimately
abandoned in 1967 as a failed program.

Conclusion

This chapter emphasizes the punitive personal consequences of Canadian anticommunism from the perspective of those public servants accused. Immediately
following the Igor Gouzenko revelations, the Kellock-Taschereau Royal Commission
was responsible for a series of espionage investigations between 1946 and 1949. Civil
servants like Israel Halperin, David Shugar, Agatha Chapman, and Eric Adams had
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their reputations damaged, careers lost, and even citizenship sacrificed because of
inconclusive communist accusations. As the Cold War progressed, discreet civil service
security screening attempted to shape acceptable notions of behavior and gender. The
regulation of sexuality included the identification and dismissal of homosexual civil
servants and was often justified as in the best interests of public safety. At first a
necessary requirement following the domestic security breaches of the early Cold War,
anti-communism quickly became a bludgeon for political, social, and national
conformity. Considered alongside the political emphasis of the St. Laurent government,
it is clear that the realities of state action differed significantly from the publicly
communicated strategy. The elusiveness of government action at times obscured the
severity and complexity of Canadian anti-communism.
The collection of individual encounters with state action or government policy in
this chapter substantiates the existence of punitive anti-communism in the public
service. It is important to recognize that Canadians interacted with many different forms
of anti-communism. While civil servants were directly subjected to internal government
screening, individual Canadians developed their own interpretations of the perceived
threat of communism in a multitude of ways. With a similar emphasis on diversified
personal accounts, the next chapter shifts the focus from government employees to
civically engaged citizens and more organized activists. It’s important to assess how
individuals asserted their own anti-communist agendas and stimulated public debate
about the domestic Cold War.
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Educating Canadians about ideological subversion and a willingness to petition
the government about specific concerns were two dominant and reoccurring themes of
public interaction with communism between 1947 and 1967. This chapter argues that
understanding the complexity of Canadian anti-communism requires analysis of nonstate actors and fringe ideologues. With an established and organized advocacy
position, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce published The Communist Threat to
Canada in 1947, and How Communists Operate! in 1948. Both pamphlets addressed
public safety concerns by exposing the goals and infiltration tactics of communists in an
attempt to prevent ideological subversion. Personal appeals directed at lawmakers were
mixed; Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent’s correspondence, for example, reflects both
the public desire for government action and disapproval of the type of anti-communist
legislation proposed by Member of Parliament Wilfrid Lacroix. Opposition in English
Canada to Lacroix’s legislation proposing the criminalization of communism signaled the
boundaries of acceptable state action. Over the course of this period there were
consistent efforts to educate Canadians about the ideological threat and to advocate for
specific government action. There is a unique contrast between the anti-communist
emphasis of politically-engaged citizens and business associations like the Canadian
Chamber of Commerce, and fringe ideologues.
Three notable anti-communist activists, Marjorie Lamb, Ron Gostick, and Pat
Walsh, appear throughout the historical record but have not been studied in great depth.
Their contributions to public debate, even while representing fringe perspectives, are
important to consider when establishing the full complexity of Canadian anti-
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communism. Lamb’s educational emphasis, designed to protect children and youth, was
legitimized by her association with the Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire (IODE),
her Alert Service publication, and direct appeals to the Secretary of State for External
Affairs. In stark contrast, Gostick and Walsh gained notoriety for their far right and antiSemitic rhetoric. Their accusatory style resembled American anti-communist Joseph
McCarthy and targeted organized labour, civil servants, and journalists. The ongoing
partnership between Gostick and Walsh also demonstrates a significant degree of
organization within the extremist elements of the anti-communist movement. All three
activists engaged political leaders and the media with some regularity. This ongoing
dialogue indicates that even with limited influence, non-state actors were a noteworthy
component of Canadian anti-communism.

An Engaged Citizenry

A growing public awareness of the potential domestic threat of communism
followed the notoriety of the Gouzenko defection and the activities of the KellockTaschereau Commission. The Canadian Chamber of Commerce, an advocate for
businesses across the country, did its part to acknowledge the developing communist
presence in Canada. The organization had a history of connecting global politics to
national economic affairs, including problems encountered by Canadian businesses
during wartime. In 1942, for example, Chamber President D. G. McKenzie publicly
advocated for certain peace conditions and articulated ongoing concerns about the Axis
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powers.1 In 1947, the Chamber published The Communist Threat to Canada, which
addressed concerns related to the Kellock-Taschereau Commission’s finding that a
“Fifth Column” existed in Canada.2 The Chamber used this document to describe the
dangers associated with communism in Canada, expose infiltrated labour unions, name
certain Canadian communists, and establish a clear contrast between Canada and the
Soviet Union. This emphasis reflects a reoccurring theme in anti-communist literature to
disparage life under communist rule. The Chamber report suggested there was solid
evidence that Canadian communists were the revolutionary agents of a foreign state
committed to turning Canada into a communist state.3 The Chamber pursued wide
distribution of the pamphlet, sending approximately 1,200 copies to companies in
Canada with instructions to distribute them amongst their employees. Editors, members
of parliament, teachers, lawyers, and religious leaders similarly received free copies. It
was anticipated that at least 100,000 pamphlets would be distributed.4
The Chamber argued it was the responsibility of all Canadians to show that the
theory and practice of communism was incompatible with the Canadian way of life. The
Communist Threat to Canada attempted to provide Canadians with information not
widely available, but crucial for this important public dialogue.5 The Chamber was quick
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to explain that they were not offering an opinion on whether communism should be
outlawed in Canada and maintained that Canadians should have the right to express
themselves freely. It was clearly stated, though, that the ongoing attempts by the Soviet
Union to impose communism on Canada needed to be fully revealed to the Canadian
public.6 The intrusion of a foreign ideology could only be condemned if people could
identify the encroachment. It is a difficult task to quantify public awareness of the
subversive threat of domestic communism. As an organization with a defined audience,
the Chamber’s anti-communist publications held the potential to reach regional
chambers of commerce across Canada. The Chamber’s role as a prominent nongovernmental civic institution thus enabled a broader societal understanding of the
potential threat posed by domestic communism.
The Chamber continued its assumed role of public educator with a follow-up to
The Communist Threat to Canada. Published the following year, How Communists
Operate! endeavored to inform Canadians of the operational techniques of communists
in order to prevent further indoctrination and infiltration.7 The publication of both
booklets and the Chamber’s “vigorous opposition” to communism was covered in The
Globe and Mail.8 As part of the context for this discussion, the report argues the
Gouzenko affair was critical for creating public awareness of the communist threat.
According to the Chamber, prior to the revelation of espionage in Ottawa, Canadians
were indifferent to the existence of communists. “Average” Canadians were described

Ibid.
LAC, Canadian Labour Congress fonds, MG28-I103, “Communism-Canada. Canadian Chamber of
Commerce,” Volume 336, File number 3, “How Communists Operate,” 1948, page 1.
8 “Booklet Outlines Tactics of Reds in Labour Unions,” The Globe and Mail (30 April 1948), 4.
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as perceiving communists to be “an annoying group of fanatics,” or likely to rethink their
extremist theories with more life experience or after improving their socio-economic
status.9 It was unconceivable to think a communist might place loyalty to another
country above their loyalty to Canada, especially to the extent of treason. The Chamber
concluded that it was the confessions of convicted spies which made espionage
common knowledge and argued further that these revelations reinforced a better
understanding of the threat created by the proliferation of domestic communism.10
The Chamber attempted to illustrate how communists could infiltrate the daily lives
of Canadians. How Communists Operate! details the process by which communists
became celebrated labour leaders and organized functions designed to draw in
supporters. Cleverly advertised birthday parties, formal dinners, and other special
events brought together communists with unsuspecting Canadians in disarming social
settings, providing spies with the opportunity to identify favourable political leanings,
financial contributors, and potential “front” organizations.11 Study groups and cultural
clubs were also identified as platforms for communists to connect with individual
Canadians. Described as opportunities for communists to meet in locations where their
presence was not outwardly restricted, these small clubs organized to discuss music,
art, literature, science, or any other topic that might attract people. The Chamber argued
a screening process would identify and eliminate the presence of any anti-communists
before conversation proceeded to social questions. The feared outcome was

LAC, Canadian Labour Congress fonds, MG28-I103, “Communism-Canada. Canadian Chamber of
Commerce,” Volume 336, File number 3, “How Communists Operate,” 1948, page 3.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., 13.
9

111

Chapter 3 – Engaged Citizens: Education, Advocacy, and Fervent Anti-Communists
indoctrination and the spread of the communist ideology.12 With their anti-communist
campaigns, the Chamber purposefully engaged in a public dialogue designed to inform
Canadians of the domestic threat of communism.
Outside of this collective advocacy, there were engaged Canadians, who, following
the publicity of the Kellock-Taschereau Commission and the emerging communist
threat, took the initiative to engage the government directly. This at times took the form
of alerting the government of suspected communist-related materials or activity. In
February 1949 Gladstone Murray, acting on behalf of a private Toronto business, sent
Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent what he believed to be troubling communist
materials.13 That same month, Louis Domboresky of Briercrest, Saskatchewan
requested the government address what he perceived to be communist propaganda
broadcast by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC).14 Similarly, in March 1949,
Kitchener resident F. O. Ellis alerted St. Laurent to an advertisement sponsored by the
Labor-Progressive Party (LPP).15 Published in the Kitchener-Waterloo Record on March
5, 1949, the advertisement, paid for by the local LPP committee, advocated against
Canada’s participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
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14 LAC, Louis St. Laurent fonds, MG26-L, “Prime Minister’s Office Indexed Files,” Volume 40, File C-20,
“Communism 1948-1949,” Requesting Government to stop Communist propaganda programmes which
are broadcast over C.B.C., 24 February 1949.
15 LAC, Louis St. Laurent fonds, MG26-L, “Prime Minister’s Office Indexed Files,” Volume 40, File C-20,
“Communism – General – Mr. St. Laurent’s Signature,” letter from F. O. Ellis to Louis St. Laurent, 7 March
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In the advertisement, the Soviet Union is described sympathetically as engaged in
a long-term process of postwar rebuilding. While the United Nations was proclaimed to
be the alliance capable of preventing an American atomic attack on the Soviets, NATO
was argued to be a war pact leading to certain death given Canada’s perilous
geographic location between the two world powers.16 This advertisement was part of the
larger campaign intended to mobilize Canadian opposition to NATO in the month
leading up to the eventual signing of the Washington Treaty on April 4, 1949, which
formed the basis of the agreement. What’s noteworthy about this LPP advertisement is
its negative characterization of the United States and a direct appeal to national identity.
Canadians were urged to regain their independence by casting aside fears and “speak
straight from the shoulder to the Yankee Bully.” The local LPP committee argued a
rejection of NATO would “stop the war-planners in their tracks” and give notice that
Canadians would not die fighting “Wall Street’s war.”17 The thematic emphasis of this
advertisement was not missed by Ellis.
In the letter to the Prime Minister, Ellis described the advertisement as an obvious
attempt by the LPP to distribute communist propaganda. The Kitchener resident
suggested the message itself was a clear insult to the United States and the Canadian
government. Focusing on the perceived root of the problem, Ellis voiced frustration that
there were no laws that could prevent such “communistic attacks.” He further argues
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that the individuals behind this problem in Canada needed to be dealt with directly.18
Ellis’ reaction provides insight into how broader national fears about communism
became localized. This type of information campaign attempted to sow broad popular
dissent and fracture an important postwar bilateral relationship. NATO was also a
central component of Canada’s contribution to prevent the spread of communism
internationally. The reality that the advertisement section of a daily newspaper could be
co-opted to spread communist propaganda in opposition to national defence priorities
drove Ellis to contact the Prime Minister. Canadians like Gladstone Murray, Louis
Domboresky, and Ellis assumed personal responsibility for the identification and
reporting of possible domestic communist threats.
Citizens who proactively engaged in the national political dialogue were
subsequently more aware of the government’s efforts to address the perceived threat of
domestic communism. As outlined in chapter one, between 1948 and 1950, there were
several legislative attempts to address communist activities. MP Wilfrid Lacroix’s 1949
legislation sought to criminalize the membership or support of any foreign totalitarian
movement. During the months following the introduction of Lacroix’s bill, the Prime
Minister received numerous communications from individuals from across the country.
Disapproval of the proposed anti-communist legislation preserved in St. Laurent’s
records was recorded from: Nanaimo, Vancouver, and Victoria in British Columbia;
Edmonton and Hoadley in Alberta; Glenbush, Hyas, Kamsack, Melfort, Sturgis, and
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Swift Current in Saskatchewan; Brandon and Winnipeg in Manitoba; Kirkland Lake,
Timmons, Toronto, and Welland in Ontario; and Rouyn, Québec.19 Engagement with the
Lacroix bill originated from individual citizens and representatives of interested
organizations. A Victoria City Secretary for the LPP, the Edmonton Women’s Committee
for Peace, the Nanaimo Women’s Auxiliary of the Woodworker’s Industrial Union of
Canada, and Ladies Auxiliaries in Kirkland Lack, Timmons, and Rouyn all conveyed
messages on behalf of their collective associations.20 On the West Coast, citizens came
together to form the “British Columbia Committee to Defeat LaCroix Bill.” Jean Cole,
Secretary of the Woman’s International League for Peace and Freedom – British
Columbia, reported to the Prime Minister that the membership list for this advocacy
group contained approximately 520 names.21 The variety of feedback and types of
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organizing in response to the Lacroix Bill also suggest a substantive public discourse on
this issue took place.
A March 9, 1949 editorial in The Globe and Mail further outlined the parameters of
this debate. The fundamental question presented was how does Canada deal with the
communist threat? This problem was broken into two parts: mitigating the aggression of
the Soviet Union and restraining the domestic influence of communism. The editorial
asserts NATO was a suitable answer to the first element of the threat but managing
communism at home was a more challenging task. While democratic impulses
discouraged the banning of opinions or political parties, communists were committed to
an opposing and potentially destructive political ideology. The Globe settled on the side
of democratic freedoms and argued the consequence of a law outlawing communism
would be to drive the movement underground, where the ideological discussion would
lack critical dissent. For this reason, the Globe opposed the Lacroix Bill. Further, the
editorial argued enhanced governmental powers could lead to wiretapping, the
interception of personal mail, the investigation of private affairs, and other invasions of
privacy common in police states.22 The Globe editorial identified a central tension of the
domestic communist threat: how could foreign influence be mitigated without
encroaching on the democratic rights of all Canadians?

Gauging Public Awareness
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This chapter began by describing the public engagement with the domestic threat
of communism in the period following the Gouzenko espionage revelations and the
investigations of the Kellock-Taschereau Commission. In the early 1950s the public
remained concerned about the subversive nature of communism. It is a challenging task
to comprehensively determine public opinion; however, polling data contributes another
important perspective that further complements the direct engagement between citizens
and the government documented in St. Laurent’s records during the late 1940s.23 In
September 1954 Canadians were asked “What do you regard as the biggest issue or
problem facing Canada today?” The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion had asked the
very same question in Gallup polls in 1950 and 1951. According to the results of this
polling, over the course of the five years, concern about “Communism” rose from initially
not being recognized in 1950, to three percent in 1951, and then five percent by 1954.
By comparison, in 1954, immigration concerns also registered at five percent, the threat
of war at nine percent, and the most common response was unemployment at thirtythree percent.24 This upward trajectory is significant because it suggests a baseline of
overall concern in Canada that conceivably included individuals not proactively sharing
their opinions with the government. While these percentages are low in comparison to
other more tangible domestic concerns, the connections between foreign policy
awareness and communism should not be underestimated.

It is acknowledged that data from the Gallup Poll of Canada (Canadian Institute of Public Opinion) is
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Polling which addressed Canadians’ understanding of foreign affairs more
broadly also provides context for judging public perceptions. When asked in March
1954, eighty-nine percent of respondents answered that they were aware of Prime
Minister St. Laurent’s official international tour.25 In November 1954, Gallup asked
Canadians about peace prospects with Russia: “Do you think Britain and the Western
Countries can continue to live more or less peacefully with the Russians or do you think
there is bound to be a major war sooner or later?” Just under forty-four percent of
respondents indicated they anticipated a major war.26 Several years later, in January
1957, respondents were asked to choose from a selection of potential future newspaper
headlines. Amongst “World Peace,” “Lower Income Tax,” “Decrease in Cost of Living,”
and others, just over three and a half percent of Canadians selected “Communism
Wiped Out.”27 This varied collection of data indicates communism, as part of the
broader Cold War context, remained a part of Canada’s civic discourse. The threat of
war, prospects for world peace, and general personal anxieties were in many ways
connected to ongoing fears of communism. There were clearly other issues that at
times dominated the public consciousness, but communism remained a consistent
public concern.

“P.M.’s Global Tour,” Documentation for CIPO Poll 235, March 1954 [dataset] (Carleton University
Social Data Archives: Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, 1954). Retrieved from:
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Documentation for CIPO Poll 255, January 1957 [dataset] (Carleton University Social Data Archives:
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Fervent Anti-Communists: Lamb, Gostick, and Walsh

Unique amongst this general awareness and anxiety about the domestic threat of
communism were several private citizens who, either through larger organizational
affiliations or on their own personal initiative, expounded the evils of communism. In
1950, Marjorie Lamb began to write The Alert Service,28 an anti-communist newsletter
sponsored by the Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire (IODE). Originally founded in
1900, the IODE stressed core values of patriotism, loyalty and service. While promoting
British and Canadian traditions of democracy, the IODE’s anti-communist activism
sought to create a more informed female citizenry through participation in citizenship
campaigns and strategic voting against communist or “left-wing” candidates. The IODE
magazine, Echoes, reinforced a constructed image of the necessary role to be played
by the Canadian housewife in purging the country of domestic communist threats.29 In
February 1955 The Globe and Mail reported that IODE had up to 957 chapters across
Canada with over 32,000 members.30
A self-professed communism expert, Lamb sought to educate Canadians on the
risks associated with the international proliferation of the ideology. Lamb’s interest in the
anti-communist movement began during her studies at the Sorbonne in Paris, where
she claimed to have personally witnessed communist organizing. Like IODE, Lamb
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stressed the importance of women’s roles in the domestic Cold War, and explicitly
emphasized the responsibility to protect children and youth. Communist literature
detailed the value of recruiting students and youth to the revolutionary cause, and Lamb
was determined to prevent this group from being deceived into subversive activity.31
Lamb’s advocacy rested on the belief communism was more than a matter for
philosophical debate and foreign actors were actively infiltrating Canada to promote an
ideological revolution. In 1953, Lamb presented her interpretation of the domestic threat
communism posed to Canada.32 In Notes on Communism, she outlined the importance
of understanding communist philosophy and theory, the operational functioning of the
Communist Party, and her rationale for why communism as a social and governmental
system was bound to fail.
From Lamb’s perspective, communists were purposefully inserting their
subversive doctrine into all aspects of Canadian life. She wrote, “in Communist schools,
in Communist organisations, in front groups, Party cells and study groups they explain
their strange jargon to the ‘faithful’ and spread their doctrine far and wide.”33 In addition
to this subtle but constant infiltration, Lamb maintained the very existence of the LPP
was a tangible threat. Through its perceived legitimacy as a political party, the LPP
succeeded in converting and empowering the “unalerted and the uniformed.”34 Further
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penetration into Canada’s political and bureaucratic institutions intensified the
perception of this “threat.” Lamb pointed to the report of the Kellock-Taschereau
Commission, and its revelations that several public officials and other individuals
holding positions of trust had communicated secret and confidential information to the
agents of a foreign power. A “Fifth Column” of treasonous activity had been instigated
by multiple espionage networks and directed by Russian agents in Canada.35 To further
reinforce the seriousness of this foreign threat, Lamb examined the rhetoric of the 19th
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1952. In his address, Soviet
leader Joseph Stalin pledged more direct support for branches of the Communist Party
outside the Soviet sphere of control. Lamb argued Stalin’s speech was an
unprecedented attempt by the ruler of one country to publicly instruct followers across
the world to commit conspiracy and treason against their own governments.36 In
addition to this significant treatise on communism, Lamb’s continued educational efforts
took the form of a regularly published newsletter.
Lamb’s issues of concern reinforced a set of consistent themes within the
Canadian anti-communism movement. A sample of the newsletters reveals a focus on
exposing propaganda and “outing” front organizations, publications, and groups
favourable or sympathetic to the communist cause. Lamb’s focus on protecting children
and youth from the influence of communist ideology also remained a consistent focus.
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In late March 1955, Lamb succeeded in bringing the youth issue to the attention of the
Canadian government. In a letter addressed to Lester Pearson, then Secretary of State
for External Affairs, Lamb referenced an encounter between the two at a meeting of the
Canadian Institute of International Affairs at Hart House, University of Toronto. After
establishing this prior connection, Lamb stressed how susceptible youth, radio stations,
and the press were to Soviet propaganda.37
Included with the letter were samples of the communist material distributed to
youth organizations in Canada. For example, one pamphlet described the importance of
International Day of Struggle Against Colonialism and Solidarity with the Youth of
Colonial Countries. The publication was filled with photos of oppressed peoples across
the world and accompanied by an appeal to the youth of colonial nations to join this
struggle for freedom.38 While not stated outright in this document, opposition to the
world system of colonial oppression was an established position of Marxism-Leninism.39
Also provided were materials related to International Youth Day, which had a similar
anti-colonialism focus, and an appeal to attend the International Preparatory Committee
for the 5th World Festival of Youth and Students for Peace and Friendship, another
initiative controversial because of Soviet participation.40 The danger identified by Lamb
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was that youth would be enticed into seemingly virtuous movements without any
understanding of their communist underpinnings.
A memo prepared by Lamb that same month articulated her pressing concerns
with more specificity. To increase long-term membership in their central organizations,
Lamb argued communists prioritized youth propaganda. Clubs were said to be
organized at high schools and universities to cultivate interest and participation. In
Canada, the National Federation of Labour Youth (NFLY) operated across the country,
promoting social events, cultural celebrations, lecture and study groups, and sporting
events. Lamb maintained the focus on youth was intended to plant seeds of discontent
and to glorify the Soviet Union by disparaging the Canadian lifestyle.41 In response to
her letter, Pearson addressed Lamb’s concerns respectfully, but with little urgency. After
acknowledging the content of the propaganda material supplied by Lamb, Pearson
suggested he did not believe it would be effective. Pearson then reiterated that no law
banned communism in Canada, and foreign nations were allowed freedom of the press
if their messages were “not seditious or treasonable.”42 The letter concluded with a
proposed solution for combatting the propaganda targeting Canadian youth. Pearson
suggested providing youth organizations with an ample supply of government policy
statements to counteract communist narratives.43 While appreciative of the dialogue
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with Pearson, Lamb doubted government policy would mitigate the communist
propaganda, especially given the way these youth organizations appealed to the
interests of young people.44
It appears Lamb’s activities were periodically viewed with some legitimacy by the
government. A few months after her 1955 correspondence with Pearson, Pierre Trottier
of the Political Coordination Section at External Affairs sent Lamb a copy of a
confidential analysis of Soviet propaganda on behalf of the Under-Secretary. Trottier
requested that Lamb not disclose where she obtained the document, which dealt
specifically with disarmament and nuclear weapons propaganda. This specific
intelligence had been gathered from North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners.45
While the exact motives and ultimate outcome of this information sharing are unclear,
the government found some value in disseminating material critical of the Soviet Union
through non-governmental anti-communist channels.
A year after her correspondence with Pearson, Lamb published an Alert bulletin
detailing additional propaganda directed at young people. Lamb claimed that the NFLY,
in coordination with the World Federation of Democratic Youth, was instructing national
communist organizations to develop associations with other youth organizations. While
executed differently across the country, Lamb reiterated her longstanding argument that
communists sought favourable environments for youth to be exposed to their ideology.
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One NFLY youth sports campaign utilized the slogan, “Cut the Arms Budget - Build
Mass Sports Activities” to conflate communist-inspired anti-war messaging with
domestic recreational activities.46 The perception of this threat remained remarkably
consistent, and even a decade later Lamb continued to articulate her fears about
communist indoctrination of children and youth. She maintained that the majority of
communist recruits were between the ages of seventeen and twenty-five.47 University
students were said to be exposed to communism through Marxist faculty members and
the spread of communist literature on campus. Lamb vigorously argued, “it is naive to
believe that all Canadian young people are adequately equipped to meet the skillful,
deceptive methods of the highly trained ‘persuaders’ - the professional Communists.”48
Lamb’s commitment to publicizing the domestic communist risk facing children and
youth established her as a unique anti-communist voice. The perceived threat of
domestic communism tended to be more directly connected to espionage and the
infiltration of organized labour. Lamb’s consistent writings indicate there were also
Canadians deeply concerned about the potential for communism to negatively influence
their children and the youth of the nation.
In line with the findings of the Kellock-Taschereau Commission, and the analysis
of the RCMP, Lamb believed certain organizations constructed a public facade to
surreptitiously recruit communist sympathizers. In a 1963 report, Lamb noted how
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significant communist front organizations in Canada preserved formal relationships with
their international parent organizations. The Women’s International Democratic
Federation could be linked to the Congress of Canadian Women, and the World Council
of Peace was similarly connected to the Canadian Peace Congress.49 Lamb followed up
this list of “Communist fronts” with an Alert Service publication identifying other
organizations and publications that, in her opinion, were directly influenced by
communist forces. Not surprisingly, the Communist Party of Canada, Young Communist
League of Canada, Congress of Canadian Women, and the Canadian Peace Congress
are all featured prominently.50 Echoing reoccurring fears associated with immigrant and
ethnic communities, Lamb identified the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians, the
Association of Carpatho Russian Canadians, the Canadian Slav Committee, the
Lithuanian Literary Society, the Finnish Organization of Canada, and the Chinese
Canadian Welfare Association as several groups with communist connections.51 Lamb’s
entrenched anti-communism included an inherent suspicion of immigrants from
communist countries.
Of similar concern for Lamb was the propaganda produced by communist fronts.
A 1964 issue of ALERT described the increasing prevalence of communist propaganda.
With allusions to her longstanding concerns about Canadian youth, Lamb stated that
“avenues of dissemination are more numerous and content is more skillfully tailored to
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particular sections of the population.”52 Analysis by Frederick C. Barghoorn, a
suggested authority on communist propaganda, is cited to explain the implications of
this communications technique. While overtly persuasive propaganda played a decisive
role in the communist seizure of power during the Russian Revolution, the more
significant consequence in the Canadian context was the ability to create “benevolent
neutrality toward Soviet policies and designs.”53 For anti-communist activists like Lamb,
“benevolent neutrality” was a dangerously subversive position. Given their perception of
the ideological threat, anti-communists feared an impartial person would be easily
converted to the communist cause. Even subtle acceptance of communist ideals could
lead to this kind of systemic subversion, in their view.
Lamb’s public profile was enhanced by her association with IODE and her
involvement with the Toronto Altrusa Club, a community service organization where she
served as President during the early 1950s. Lamb’s activities were routinely
documented in the English-language press until the mid-1960s.54 There was a notable
gendered differentiation, however, as Lamb’s activity was often documented in the
society pages, even if an event was political in nature. It was also not unusual for a
certain skepticism to be associated with Lamb’s anti-communism. For example, the
Alert Service was referred to as a publication “which claims to expose Communist
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propaganda in Canada.”55 While much of her anti-communism focused on children and
youth, a relevant and appealing topic for many, Lamb did not completely avoid
controversy. A 1953 story in The Globe and Mail examined Lamb’s criticism of a peace
referendum initiated by the Toronto Peace Council. F. W. Park, the Toronto Peace
Council’s public relations officer, dismissed Lamb’s comments as “disturbing,” and
argued that her irresponsible professional association with the anti-communist
organization, Responsible Enterprises, further destroyed her credibility.56 Despite such
disputes, Lamb continued to leverage her relationship with the IODE to distribute the
Alert Service. At a 1964, semi-annual meeting of the Ontario chapter of IODE, the
literature was available free of charge for IODE delegates and circulation was
encouraged by the chapter’s world affairs secretary, R. J. Skippon.57
Marjorie Lamb was not the only private individual committed to the anticommunism movement. With a similar emphasis on self-published periodicals
addressing a variety of ideological concerns, Ron Gostick admonished Canadians for
not fully heeding the domestic threat of communism. Born in the United Kingdom to
Canadian parents in 1918, Gostick grew up on a farm in Alberta. His mother served as
a Member of the Legislative Assembly in William Aberhart’s Social Credit government
between 1935 and 1940.58 Following army service as a court reporter in Ottawa and
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Toronto, Gostick served as the national secretary of the Social Credit Party.59 In 1947,
Gostick briefly edited The Voice of the Electors, before beginning publication of The
Social Credit in 1949. This newsletter was designed to represent the views of Canada’s
grassroots conservative Social Credit movement but was not officially affiliated with any
Social Credit political party. Last appearing in 1950, The Social Credit provided Gostick
with a platform to promote his conspiratorial views on Zionism.60 Gostick and his family
moved to Flesherton, Ontario around 1950, where his wife gained employment as an
elementary school principal.61 From this small town Gostick launched Canadian
Intelligence Publications, which distributed the Canadian Intelligence Service for 54
years. In addition, Gostick operated a mail-order service for sparsely available and
extremist “right-wing” literature.62 The writing produced by Canadian Intelligence
Publications stressed the growing “threat” of foreign communist influences and aligned

Ron Csillag, “Ronald Gostick, Far-Right Publisher 1918-2005,” The Globe and Mail (6 August 2005),
S9.
60 David Bercuson and Douglas Wertheimer, A Trust Betrayed (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1985), 40.
61 Gostick lived in Flesherton for close to 40 years. Still notorious in the late 1980s for his virulent antiSemitism, a move back to Alberta prompted scrutiny of his time in Ontario. In Is God a Racist?: The Right
Wing in Canada, Stanley Barrett suggests that when Gostick first moved to Flesherton other residents
viewed him as ‘anything from a nut to a communist to a Nazi.’ With time these perceptions softened. An
Ontario Provincial Police Officer (who did not disclose his identity in an interview with the Calgary Herald)
maintained that Gostick would share his opinions if asked but did not impose them on his neighbours.
While his wife Jeanette was a highly respected elementary school principal, Gostick was a Kinsman, a
member of the Royal Canadian Legion, a popular hockey coach, and an effective community fundraiser.
The Canadian Intelligence Publications print shop was located next to the family home, where Gostick
employed between one and two employees. Scott Cameron, the principal of Grey Highland High School
in Flesherton who often had Gostick and “his political sidekick Patrick Walsh” speak to history students,
described the community as conservative and fundamentalist. The inference in these remarks is that
Gostick’s professional pursuits were to some degree tolerated in Flesherton. Cameron acknowledged that
he invited Gostick to the school when his classes were studying bias and slanted reporting. Gostick was
at the time accusing Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau of being a communist. Additional research, however,
is needed to fully determine the degree to which the local community engaged with Gostick’s political
beliefs. [Barrett, Is God a Racist?, 214; Joanne Ramondt, “League of Rights head didn’t worry police,”
Calgary Herald (25 October 1989), B2; Ron Csillag, “Ronald Gostick, Far-Right Publisher 1918-2005, The
Globe and Mail (6 August 2005), S9].
62 Barrett, Is God a Racist?, 205; Csillag, “Ronald Gostick, Far-Right Publisher 1918-2005.”
59

129

Chapter 3 – Engaged Citizens: Education, Advocacy, and Fervent Anti-Communists
closely with the anti-communist tone and strategy of American Senator Joseph
McCarthy.
A booklet edited and published by Gostick in 1951, The Architects Behind the
World Communist Conspiracy, articulated his view of a Marxist conspiracy threatening
Canada. While Bolshevism, the Russian Revolution, the Canadian espionage
revelations, and subversive activity in the United States were discussed in a manner
similar to Lamb’s Notes on Communism, Gostick’s anti-Semitic emphasis differentiates
the overall message of this essay. Providing unattributed statistics, Gostick suggested
the Jewish population in the United States produced a disproportionately high
percentage of communist leaders.63 This, he argued, was an international phenomenon,
with consequences in Canada. To substantiate the existence of this “Zionist-Communist
conspiracy,” the pamphlet detailed the leadership positions held by Jewish people in
Russia, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania.64 Gostick argued the West’s
support of political Zionism politically alienated strategically important petroleum
producing allies in the Middle East. According to Gostick’s interpretation, the Jewish
contribution to the spreading influence of communism, in conjunction with the perceived
economic and political implications of Zionism, represented an “Anti-Christ onslaught
upon Christendom.”65 Gostick also connected the “Zionist-Communist” conspiracy to the
suspected communist presence in Canada. In Gostick’s opinion, the atomic espionage
and subsequent subversive activities in North America that Igor Gouzenko revealed
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were enabled by Jewish elements in the Canadian and American governments.66 This
conspiratorial perspective was representative of the more radical anti-communist and
anti-Semitic audience to whom Gostick tailored his message.
To properly understand this emphasis, it is necessary to contextualize where
Gostick’s interpretation fits within the Canadian ideological spectrum. Conservative
perspectives underwent a significant transition following the Second World War. With
fascism reviled and more outright forms of racism discredited, extremism dissipated in
the immediate post-war years. Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse suggest, however, that
fanatical anti-Semites, neo-Nazis, and white supremacists remained on the fringe of
Canadian society. Whitaker and Marcuse argue that in this socio-political context anticommunism was co-opted as a “cloak” for other less acceptable forms of extremism.67
Gostick and his various publications were firmly situated at this fringe. By the 1960s,
other groups in Canada operating on the periphery of ideological extremism increased
in number. Canadian “right-wing” radical groups, connected in varying degrees to
themes of racism, anti-Semitism, and anti-communism, included the Social Credit Party
of Ontario (1935), John Birch Society (1958), Canadian Nazi Party (1965), and Western
Guard (1972).68 The Toronto-based Western Guard, a white supremacist group,
evolved directly out of the “right-wing” and anti-communist Edmund Burke Society,
which operated between 1967 and 1972. Gostick provided an early forum and
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publication venue for individuals fearful about the subversive influence of communism
but also harboring a variety of other radicalized ideological perspectives. This
significantly contrasts with Lamb’s emphasis on children and youth.
In an attempt to legitimize The Canadian Intelligence Service as a critical anticommunism resource, Gostick partnered with former communist Pat Walsh, a native of
Quebec who claimed a history of undercover work with the RCMP. Walsh very publicly
flaunted his alleged prior undercover role, though the RCMP did not provide any official
confirmation of the association. While the Canadian Minister of Justice, Stuart Garson,
made a subtle reference to cabinet colleagues about sources of intelligence within the
Canadian Communist Party in the early 1950s, Walsh was not specifically identified.69 In
Secret Service: Political Policing in Canada from the Fenians to Fortress America, Reg
Whitaker, Gregory S. Kealey, and Andrew Parnaby argue Walsh’s assertion held some
merit. Given the indications Canada had intelligence assets in place, it is plausible to
assume Walsh may have acted as an informant while simultaneously carrying out his
duties as a communist organizer.70 Walsh voluntarily testified before the House UnAmerican Activities Committee (HUAC) in July 1953. He recounted time spent as a
communist organizer during the Canadian Seaman’s Union strike in 1949 and also
claimed to be a former member of the Canadian Congress of Labor. Interestingly,
Walsh suggested that his ultimate decision to leave the Communist Party was prompted
by an order for all Canadian members to participate in the global drive for clemency for
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Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.71 The broader Canadian reaction to this American anticommunism case will be briefly discussed in the next chapter.
Gostick and Walsh would continue their partnership through to their 1968
founding of the Canadian League of Rights. This grass-roots organization was formed
to expose communism, oppose totalitarianism, and build a new society around the
principles of Christianity, social-credit economic policies, limited government, and “lightskinned citizens.”72 In addition to writing regular features in Gostick’s Canadian
Intelligence Publications platforms, Walsh also spent time editing the “Ottawa AntiCommunist Report,” a bulletin from his own initiative, the Canadian Anti-Communist
Secretariat.73 Walsh’s authority was predicated on his alleged prior undercover role,
despite a lack of any official or independent confirmation of this experience.
Walsh often referred to his time embedded in communist circles to expose
individuals he believed contributed to the infiltration of foreign subversives, or to detail
perceived communist threats. In 1953, the House Un-American Activities Committee in
the United States called Walsh to testify to his experience as a former Canadian
Seamens’ Union official. He suggested communists no longer had authority on the East
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coast, but the West Coast Seamens’ Union remained heavily influenced. Walsh’s
testimony described undercover communist meetings in Canada, detailing the infiltration
of maritime unions and attempts to interrupt Marshall Plan aid through strikes and other
job action.74 Walsh cultivated this personal history into a self-asserted expertise to
advance his anti-communist causes.
In a 1961 issue of The Canadian Intelligence Service, Walsh explained how
common it was for communists to infiltrate positions in the federal government. He
claimed to have evidence supporting an accusation civil servant Pierre Chalout utilized
his position to advance communist propaganda. While at the time of writing Chalout was
no longer employed by the government, Walsh alleged a history of allegiance and
partnerships with communists and suspected sympathizers including the National Film
Board’s John Grierson, journalists Jean Louis Gagnon and Philippe Vaillancourt, and
LPP General Secretary Tim Buck.75 Specifically, Walsh suggested Chalout’s early
experience with “radical” publications included exposure to a network of communists.
Walsh maintained Chalout’s subsequent roles in both the Québec and Canadian civil
service required investigation. Chalout’s time with the NFB, an institution Walsh
described as “riddled with Reds from top to bottom,” was presented as evidence of his
later subversive behaviour as an aide to the Solicitor-General and as a staffer in the
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Ministry of Transportation.76 Not unlike communist accusations in the United States,
Walsh’s “evidence” rested heavily on innuendo and presumed guilt by association.
In addition to his publishing efforts, Walsh personally took his anti-communism
campaign across the country on speaking tours.77 In 1959, Walsh spent three weeks in
Newfoundland launching branches of the Pan Canadian Anti-Communist League. As
part of this initiative, Walsh interviewed the crews of Portuguese fishing fleets to gather
information about Soviet submarine activity off the Grand Banks of Newfoundland and
other Soviet naval espionage reported throughout the commercial fishing industry.
Subsequent reports were then publicly released by the office of the Pan-American AntiCommunist League. This investigation followed earlier warnings about the espionage
threat posed by the Soviet fishing trawlers Sevastopol and Odessa, crewed not by
scientists conducting oceanographic surveys, Walsh argued, but by agents of the Soviet
Naval Intelligence service. These warnings were subsequently published by Canadian
and America newspapers.78 By the early 1970s, Walsh had turned his attention to a
regular speaking circuit. In February 1970, he addressed a crowd of reportedly close to
100 at the community centre in Trochu, Alberta. Speaking as Research Director of the
Canadian League of Rights, Walsh accused the federal government of employing a
small group of “Fabian Socialists” to develop its most recent policy on taxation. Walsh
explained that Fabian Socialists were Marxists aware of the futility of violent revolution;
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consequently, they resorted to infiltrating the civil service to bring about socialist
change.79 In a pattern consistent with the prior work of Walsh and Gostick, the issue of
The Canadian Intelligence Service detailing this event is organized around the central
theme of civil service infiltration and the perils of this economic policy.
Not surprisingly, Walsh and Gostick regularly found themselves defending the
accusations they disseminated. This was different than Lamb, who attempted to
maintain a sense of legitimacy through her connection to IODE. Walsh, in particular,
was challenged over the undercover experience he boasted of so often. From Gostick’s
perspective these attacks were understandable. The clandestine communist
revolutionaries he and Walsh were attempting to expose had every reason to discredit
their efforts. Gostick addressed the skepticism directed at Walsh’s undercover claims in
a November 1963 issue of The Canadian Intelligence Service. The newsletter describes
a “smear campaign” directed at Wash by “Reds, Leftists and helped along by the
‘liberal’ press.”80 Readers of The Canadian Intelligence Service asked Gostick to
provide details of Walsh’s background, and Gostick used this issue to publicize his
rebuttal.
Gostick explained that Walsh was first exposed to communism as a teenager in
the mining and lumber camps of Northwestern Québec, where he was the founder of
the Young Catholic Workers in the Senneterre-Cadillac area of Abitibi, a group resisting
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the spread of communism. Communists greatly influenced the mining and lumber
unions at the time, and Soviet propaganda films and publications circulated widely.
Despite a desire to leave the Brotherhood of Lumber Workers union of the Abitibi
district, Gostick described how an interaction between Walsh and an undercover
Provincial Police agent resulted in a decision to remain and cooperate with the RCMP
anti-subversive squad.81 Following his service in the Canadian Army during the Second
World War, Walsh took on the role of General Organizer of the Canadian Congress of
Labour-CIO for Québec. While Walsh’s initial relationship with the RCMP was described
as informal, his testimony before a 1962 Toronto libel case suggested he was officially
on the payroll of the Ministry of Justice between 1950 and 1953.82 The most substantive
issue of contention, however, revolved around Walsh’s rationale for leaving his position
as a confidential informant.
Skeptics questioned why Walsh left a position critical to Canada’s national
defence. In Gostick’s explanation, the departure rested on a directive Walsh received as
Secretary-Treasurer of the Canadian Union of Woodworkers (CUW). The head of the
CUW, Bruce Magnuson, was said to have provided Walsh and the rest of the executive
with instructions to be followed in the event of a war between the Soviet Union and the
West. They were told to be ready to explode and destroy Canadian hydro-electric power
plants and distribution centres. After Walsh submitted the report to his RCMP superiors,
he was ordered by them to terminate his activities because no undercover agent was
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permitted to engage in either espionage or sabotage.83 A full analysis of this issue of
The Canadian Intelligence Service presents an interpretation suggesting Walsh was
swayed by a more complex motivation. Walsh’s testimony during the 1962 libel case
indicates a personal disagreement with the official findings of the Kellock-Taschereau
Commission. Walsh testified he was one of the few Canadians familiar with material not
included in the official report. Specifically, Walsh argued the government needed to
protect certain Liberal Cabinet Ministers from the embarrassment of knowing friends
were implicated but omitted from the Royal Commission’s findings.84 The critical nature
of Walsh’s testimony suggests broader dissatisfaction with the government’s ability to
identify and isolate communist “threats.”
The controversy surrounding Walsh illustrates the polarizing nature of the anticommunist message disseminated by The Canadian Intelligence Service and both
activists. In particular, Gostick’s ideological extremism produced a consistently negative
reputation. Stanley R. Barrett described Gostick as a key and enduring figure of
Canada’s far-right ideological fringe in Is God a Racist?: The Right Wing in Canada.85 In
an obituary upon his death in 2005, Gostick’s more than 50-year career was described
as in the vanguard of “a kind of low-grade but unmistakable racism” on the far right in
Canada.86 Analysis of the fringe activism that Gostick and Walsh represented is relevant
because it existed, even if in a limited form. Anti-communism was not a unified
ideological rejection of a political theory. Understanding how far-right and anti-Semitic
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factions used anti-communism to advance their own world views contributes to a more
complete understanding of the domestic Cold War in Canada. As discussed above, anticommunism was often used to disguise and legitimize other more discriminatory beliefs.
Gostick’s ability to gain attention was directly linked to his existence as an activist and
provocateur in this fashion. Journalist Ron Csillag, who penned the Globe and Mail
obituary, likened Gostick’s public profile to that of notable Holocaust deniers Ernst
Zundel, Jim Keegstra, and Malcolm Ross.87 During the time period covered in this
dissertation, Gostick and Walsh’s notoriety routinely resulted in engagement with the
media, organized labour, civil rights organizations, and the government.
In the early 1950s, Gostick regularly participated in published written exchanges
with Globe and Mail columnist J. V. McAree, where his arguments earned him the title
of “McCarthy Admirer,” and his views were described as “distressing nonsense.”88 By
the late 1950s and early 1960s, the activities of both Gostick and Walsh were reported
on with some regularity in the pages of two major English-language Canadian
newspapers, The Globe and Mail and the Toronto Daily Star.89 This included reporting
of two eventually dismissed libel suits Gostick and Walsh filed against the CBC for
unknown slanderous comments allegedly made by New Democrat Member of
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Parliament Douglas Fisher during an August 8, 1963, episode of the program
Assignment.90 The Toronto Daily Star described Walsh as a “professional communist
hater,” but remained skeptical about his overall support. Walsh had claimed at this point
that part of his audience included some 100,000 new Canadians, immigrants from
behind the Iron Curtain.91 He also had an ongoing dialogue with Toronto Telegram
journalist Peter Worthington from approximately 1968 to 1970, largely concentrated on
the communist suspicions he had repeatedly directed at journalist turned civil servant
Jean-Louis Gagnon. Walsh offered up his experiences as a former undercover
operative, and Worthington sought information from him about Gagnon.92 In December
1964, Toronto Daily Star columnist Ron Haggart argued that Gostick had achieved
considerable notoriety as publisher of The Canadian Intelligence Service. Haggart
classified Gostick as distributing “the most famous of Canadian hate-sheets,” though
suggested his importance was most pronounced during the aftermath of the Gouzenko
espionage revelations.93 This recognition led to a type of infamy that elevated the public
profile of both Gostick and Walsh but did not necessarily provoke broad populist
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support. These examples do indicate that both men were consistently recognized for
their public attempts to advance anti-communist messaging.
Gostick’s reputation became intertwined with his anti-communist agenda in a way
that often hindered his engagement with different sectors. In July 1959, Jack Williams,
the public relations director of the Canadian Labour Congress, asked Murray Cotterill,
publicity director with the United Steelworkers of America, about anti-labour propaganda
produced by “The Intelligence Service” which was then circulating in Newfoundland.94
Cotterill confirmed for Williams that The Canadian Intelligence Service was distributed
by Ron Gostick, who he described as being known for fascist, pro-Nazi sympathies, and
for notoriously advocating the banning of “subversive” books from public libraries.95 In
1964, Social Credit Leader Robert Thompson’s previous support for the Christian Action
Movement, also led by Gostick, came under harsh criticism. After initially asserting the
right of any peaceful organization to exist, Thompson was forced to renounce any
support for Gostick. In addition to receiving approximately 20 protest letters about the
movement, Thompson reiterated that no connection existed between the Social Credit
Party and Gostick’s Canadian Intelligence Publications. A newsletter produced by the
Canadian Jewish Congress went ever further and listed Canadian Intelligence
Publications as a purveyor of hate literature because of its anti-Semitic positioning.96 It
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is clear Gostick’s extremist beliefs stoked public debate that while increasing his
notoriety, distracted from his anti-communism emphasis.
Despite ongoing controversy, the activities of both Gostick and Walsh did gain
some political traction. Gostick succeeded in attracting the attention of the Liberal Party
in 1968 by accusing Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau of communist sympathies. Gostick,
through the Canadian Intelligence Service, claimed to have distributed approximately
150,000 leaflets on the issue. This purported reach is significant given that, at the time,
Gostick claimed no major financial backing beyond his 10,000 regular subscribers.97
Reports in March 1969 suggested that at least one government cabinet minister also
received Canadian Intelligence Service bulletins.98 In April 1970, Walsh was able to fill
the Parliamentary Press Gallery with media and opposition members of parliament. The
two-hour press conference covered details of the communist accusations Walsh
directed at Jean-Louis Gagnon. The communist suspicions originated out of Gagnon’s
support, through favourable publicity, for the 1960 Chinese Peking Opera tour of
Canada, addressed more fully in chapter five.99 Even while on the periphery of
acceptability, it is evident that Walsh and Gostick participated in the public anticommunist debate. Though their extreme and often bigoted ideologies prompted
condemnation, this notoriety produced an audience for their message, even if a
sometimes limited one.
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Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that public engagement with the perceived
domestic threat of communism was comprehensive and varied between the late 1940s
and the mid 1960s. Both individually, and through representative bodies like the
Canadian Chamber of Commerce, efforts were made to explain how communists
spread their ideology. From strategic dinner parties to social clubs and recreational
sports, Canadians were told to be wary of communist sympathizers. There were limits to
the legal changes deemed necessary to combat the influence of communism. Citizens
concerned about Wilfrid Lacroix’s anti-communism legislation wrote to Prime Minster St.
Laurent from across the country to voice their opposition. The widespread disapproval
of Lacroix’s bill provided the government with some limited measure of collective public
opinion.
Individual perspectives and experiences are an indispensable perspective
through which to understand the domestic Cold War. Examining the activities of Lamb,
Gostick, and Walsh during the 1950s and 1960s results in a more complete
understanding of anti-communism in Canada. While the historiography has generally
concentrated on government action and the strategies of the police services, the
initiatives instigated by private citizens remain understudied. A lack of overwhelming
political influence should not discourage analysis of these efforts. By independently
publishing to defined audiences, Lamb, Gostick, and Walsh concentrated on their own
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educational and advocacy priorities. Just as chapter two demonstrated the use of public
safety concerns to purposefully construct idealized gender norms, it is similarly
important to recognize how anti-communism was at times used as a vehicle for
persistent bigotry and anti-Semitism. The next chapter will explore how the
encroachment of American anti-communism into Canada further influenced public
debates about this ideological threat. Broad opposition to McCarthyism aggravated antiAmericanism and contributed to a misleading perception that Canada’s approach to the
domestic threat of communism was considerably less punitive than the United States.
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The global bifurcation of the early Cold War period, which increased fears of
future conflict with the Soviet Union, thrust Canada further into alliance with the United
States. A variety of bilateral connections contributed to the fear of growing American
influence over Canada. Building on the existing cooperation of the Permanent Joint
Board on Defence (PJBD), established in 1940, Canada joined the United States and
ten other nations in founding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, the
first Canadian peacetime military alliance. In 1957 the North American Air Defence
Command (NORAD) further strengthened bilateral defence integration, representing a
clear response to the escalating threat of the Soviet Union. In the post-war period,
economic integration mirrored defence integration. While the wartime Hyde Park
Agreement (1941) prompted increased economic cooperation, the 1947 General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations and their provisions for reducing
trade barriers encouraged an even greater and more comprehensive trade relationship
between Canada and the United States. High levels of American foreign investment
stimulated the integration of the Canadian and American economies. American
multinational corporations dominated the ownership of Canadian manufacturing and
resource industries through branch plants and subsidiary companies.
The domestic threat posed by Soviet communism resulted in similar but
contrasting approaches to espionage and subversion in Canada and the United States.
The aggressive tactics of American Senator Joseph McCarthy, the FBI, the United
States Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, and the House Un-American Activities
Committee captivated public attention in both countries. This chapter examines
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Canadian awareness of “McCarthyism” and the public reaction to the death of diplomat
Herbert Norman. After the investigations of the Kellock-Taschereau Royal Commission,
the government of Canada’s nuanced, but generally secretive, anti-communist
positioning contributed to a general sense that suspected communists were treated with
more diligence and respect in Canada. A proposed visit by McCarthy to Toronto in 1954
was widely opposed, including by Members of Parliament from across the political
spectrum. Highly publicized communist accusations directed against Canadian diplomat
Herbert Norman, first in 1951 and then again in 1957, reinvigorated anti-Americanism in
Canada. For individual Canadians, faith community leaders, civil liberties advocates,
and government officials, the Norman case represented the unwanted and unwarranted
intrusion of American anti-communism. John Gray’s play Bright Sun at Midnight, loosely
based on Norman’s death, provided another venue for individuals to process their anger
about this formative Cold War episode.
Within these iterations of Anti-Americanism is an important link between anticommunism and Canadian national identity. Canadians projected their concerns about
abusive domestic state action back onto the American government. As chapter two
illustrated, Canadian anti-communism was itself both accusatory and consequential.
Muted and localized Canadian government anti-communist activity, combined with
widespread disapproval of American tactics, contributed to the counternarrative that
Canada approached the threat of communism in a markedly different fashion than the
United States. It is the perception of this divergence, more so than the realities of
bilateral difference, that reinforced assertions of national identity. To counteract the
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encroaching American defense, economic, and cultural influence, any belief of
Canadian uniqueness was useful to advance the nationalist ideal.

The American Context

It is important to consider the broad arc of American anti-communism and the
events which preceded the “red scare” of the early 1950s. The 1886-1887 Haymarket
Affair saw an anti-union reaction to the suspected anarchist bombing of a labour
demonstration in Chicago. When difficult economic conditions, including inflation and
unemployment, led to violent strikes after the First World War, the Department of
Justice carried out a series of raids to arrest foreign anarchists, communists, and radical
leftists. Known historically as the “Palmer Raids” (1919-1920), this action resulted in a
series of deportations. The United States House of Representatives established the
House Un-American Activities Committee in 1938,1 largely in response to intensifying
concerns about President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal. The significant shift in
domestic policy ushered in by the federal regulation and intervention of the New Deal
triggered concerns about the ideological underpinnings of the program. New Deal
agencies such as the National Labor Relations Board and the Federal Theater and
Writers Project were caricatured by Democrats and Republicans as overly pro-labour,

1

Also referred to as the “Dies Committee” at this early stage.
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and susceptible to communist views.2 After the Second World War, the predominant
control of HUAC would shift from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party.
Postwar legislation often reflected the themes and sentiment of these earlier
periods of anti-communism. In 1947 the Taft-Hartley Act amended earlier labour
legislation to require union leaders to file anti-communist statements, and the Truman
administration created the Loyalty-Security program, which required federal employees
to demonstrate both the absence of any communist risk and a discernibly positive
loyalty to the United States.3 As the Cold War threat deepened, Congress intensified its
efforts to protect the United States from communism, often through the persecution of
suspected individual communists. In August 1948, former Communist Party member
Whittaker Chambers testified before HUAC that Alger Hiss, a senior official in the State
Department, was a communist. Fellow former communist, Elizabeth Bentley,
corroborated Chambers’ claim that Hiss was one of a number of communists in the
Roosevelt administration. Though Hiss denied the accusations, the now Republicancontrolled HUAC was quick to label Democrats as treasonous, utilizing similar loyalty
cases to legitimize the charge. Historian M. J. Heale argues that it was the Hiss case
that first provided the Republicans an opportunity to implicate the Democrats in the
global communist conspiracy.4
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In February 1950, relatively obscure Wisconsin Republican Senator Joseph R.
McCarthy delivered a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, that incited further fear of
subversives within the government. McCarthy claimed there were 205 communists in
the State Department, a figure that became “207 bad risks” at a speech the next day in
Denver, and then “57 card-carrying members of the Communist Party” at an event in
Salt Lake City. 5 Historians generally agree McCarthy’s overall significance is
exaggerated, and his lists were never formally presented. Yet, the senator mastered the
ability to gain the spotlight and to keep disproportionate attention focused on himself.
American political sociologist Seymour Lipset describes the resulting “McCarthyism”
phenomenon not as a political movement, but more as an instrument to which the
senator lent his name. Lipset explains there were no members of McCarthyism, no
endorsed candidates or official electoral platform. As a Catholic, McCarthy embodied
the traditional anti-communism of that population; as a Wisconsinite, he was also able
to embrace the agrarian isolationism of the Midwest. Targeted at the menacing ideology
of communism, McCarthyism was a useful tool for attacking altered institutions, and
combatting the collectivism and internationalism seducing Americans into treason.6
While McCarthy’s colleagues in HUAC and other congressional committees produced
more tangible anti-communist outcomes, “McCarthyism” attempted to police behaviour
and reinforce a constructed version of Americanism.
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Another important anti-communism episode in the United States was the arrest,
trial, and execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. The couple were found guilty in 1951
of conspiracy to commit espionage for their role in disseminating atomic secrets from
British scientist Klaus Fuchs to the Soviet Union. While the historiography has generally
affirmed the conviction, some questionable evidence left many unconvinced of their guilt
at the time.7 Historian Lori Clune’s Executing the Rosenbergs: Death and Diplomacy in
a Cold War broadly examines the international protest the case produced, and how this
episode influenced global perceptions of the United States.
Clune includes discussion of the Canadian perspective; for example, twenty-two
Israeli rabbis in Toronto petitioned President Truman to commute the sentence.
Demonstrations were also regularly held in front of American consulates in Toronto and
Windsor. In January 1953, the Canadian National Committee to Save the Rosenbergs
(NCRS), with three hundred participants from Montreal, Toronto, and Welland, staged a
quiet morning vigil in front of the embassy in Ottawa that included the delivery of a
petition with more than five hundred signatures from nine cities protesting the death
sentence.8 The NCSR also conducted an information and publicity campaign, circulating
newsletters that included appeals for financial support.9 In March 1953, the Toronto
Committee to Secure Executive Clemency for Julius and Ethel Rosenberg sent appeals
to Canadian members of parliament. The form letter argued the case for clemency by
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asserting “grave doubts as to the guilt of the convicted couple,” and suggested that
there were problematic parallels to the Dreyfus Affair during the Third French
Republic.10 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Patrick Walsh maintained that his
decision to leave the Communist Party was motivated by the order for all Canadian
members to advocate for the Rosenberg’s clemency.
The thrust of American anti-communist legislation was passed in the early 1950s.
Enacted over President Truman’s veto, Democratic Senator Pat McCarran’s Internal
Security Act11 (1950) required communist organizations to register with the government,
and a new Subversive Activities Control Board was created to investigate suspected
communist infiltration. Truman provided a lengthy 5,500-word veto message to
Congress that argued the legislation damaged existing anti-communism operations,
contained ineffective detention provisions, made it easier for subversive “aliens” to
naturalize, gave government officials too much power, and antagonized friendly
governments, among other concerns.12 The 1952 McCarran-Walter Immigration Act
prohibited the immigration of former Communist Party members, and the Communist
Control Act of 1954 outlawed the Communist Party of the United States. With this
enhanced anti-communist legislative framework came increased reliance on the law
enforcement community, resulting in a heightened role for the director of the FBI, J.
Edgar Hoover.
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As the inaugural FBI director, Hoover oversaw the agency’s use of covert
surveillance and a variety of disruptive tactics employed against communists and other
radicals. In particular, the 1956 introduction of the counterintelligence program
COINTELPRO included controversial and often illegal infiltration tactics to discredit and
weaken communist organizations. FBI agents mailed members imaginary threats to
stoke paranoia, orchestrated false evidence of extramarital affairs, and failed in
attempts to instigate strife between the Communist Party and the Mafia. It is argued this
FBI action was fueled more by stark ideological entrenchment than the realities of the
national security threat.13 Historian Richard Fried suggests that during this early Cold
War period anti-communism was ingrained at the core of American political culture.
Critics of anti-communism risked persecution, and the committee work of Senators
McCarthy and McCarran demonstrate that both liberals and conservatives utilized the
public’s broad fear of communism to advance political agendas.14 American anticommunism on the domestic front also managed to transcend national borders.

McCarthyism and Canada

As to be expected, the Canadian government monitored the activities of the
American security services and congressional anti-communist committees. A
September 1948 dispatch from the Canadian Embassy in Washington D.C. commented
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on the political significance of the American spy hunt. Canadian Ambassador Hume
Wrong detailed longstanding investigations into the alleged existence of the wartime
espionage ring in the United States government that led HUAC to narrow their focus on
the communist conspiracy to infiltrate key positions of influence. From a political
standpoint, Wrong suggested the highly publicized investigations of the Republicancontrolled HUAC during this period included intentions to discredit the Truman
administration. Even unproven accusations weakened Truman’s claims that any
communist presence inside the government was a “red herring.”15 Of particular
significance are Wrong’s observations of how Canada’s own anti-communist action was
perceived in the United States.
HUAC’s struggle to successfully identify and prosecute suspected communists
resulted in the American press positively reporting on the investigations of the KellockTaschereau Commission. The criticism of HUAC was that it “displayed a constant
irresponsibility and a callous indifference towards injury to reputations of individuals,”
and acted more as a prosecutor than an investigator.16 Wrong described wide praise
from the American press for the Kellock-Taschereau Commission’s ability preserve the
rights of individuals pending conviction by a court of law. As particularly demonstrated in
the last chapter, this was a matter of some debate. The Kellock-Taschereau
Commission was set in contrast to the “quasi-unlimited” investigative powers of
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Congress in the United States, which Wrong explained were highly criticized.17 This
favourable interpretation of policy existed alongside an acknowledgement that the
governing legislation in Canada lacked an “intent” clause. Section 3(2) of An Act
Respecting Official Secrets (Official Secrets Act) stated that:
“…it shall not be necessary to show that the accused person was guilty of any
particular act tending to show a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of
the State, and, notwithstanding that no such act is proved against him, he may
be convicted if, from the circumstances of the case, or his conduct or his known
character as proved, it appears that his purpose was a purpose prejudicial to the
safety or interests of the State...18
This differed from the governing United States Espionage Act of 1917, which stated in
Section 1 that:
That (a) whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national
defense with intent or reason to believe that the information to be obtained is to
be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign
nation…shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000, or by
imprisonment for not more than two years, or both.19
There was a dichotomy within Canadian policy. While successful prosecutions were
ostensibly easier to achieve on matters related to the safety of the state, the rights of
those accused were believed to be better safeguarded than in the United States. It is
important to note that the contemporary understanding as observed by Wrong is the
important insight here, regardless of competing legal opinions. Wrong reiterated that
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some Americans believed the Canadian model of protecting the rights of the accused
could serve to improve the existing failings of congressional committees.20 There are
other examples of interaction between the anti-communist policies of Canada and the
United States that provide further insight into how the Canadian government and
individuals began to interpret the extent of bilateral differences.
In 1951, the Toronto Symphony Orchestra was invited to perform in Detroit,
Michigan, a visit which required a visa. To the surprise of many, six visa requests were
denied by American authorities without explanation. An official with the United States
Immigration Service went on record to claim the refusal was based on an assessment
that entry would be detrimental to the best interests of the country, a decision likely
made under the authority of the Internal Security Act.21 While American control of the
border was not surprising, the decision of Toronto Symphony Orchestra management to
fire all six members came as a shock. One of the fired musicians, Ruth Budd, recounted
a great deal of confusion about the visa refusal and the decision by the Orchestra not to
renew their contracts. Rumours of communist affiliation subsequently became common
and she was left feeling “serious doubts about [her] own country as it succumbed to
pressure from a foreign power.”22 All six musicians appealed their dismissal, but the
Executive Board of the Toronto Musical Protective Association unanimously upheld the
decision under the justification the visa refusals prevented the fulfilment of their

Hume Wrong, No. 2012, 5.
“Can’t Play Across Line: Symphony Drops Six Denied Entry By U.S.” The Globe and Mail (21 May
1952), 1.
22 Ruth Budd, “Notes of a Blacklisted Bassist,” in Len Scher, The Un-Canadians: True Stories of the
Blacklist Era (Toronto: Lester Pub., 1992), 29-31.
20
21

155

Chapter 4 – Anti-Americanism, Canadian Anti-Communism, and National Identity
contracts. The “Symphony Six” denied any communist affiliation and maintained they
were provided with no specific rationale for their visa denials.23 The lack of a
substantiated rationale for the firings contributed to perceptions the Toronto Symphony
Orchestra had submitted to the type of Cold War scapegoating synonymous with
McCarthyism.
In April 1954, Liberal Member of Parliament Charles J. Henry reported to Lester
Pearson that Republican Senator William Jenner believed Canadian anti-communist
measures to be superior to those of the United States. Jenner, a staunch anticommunist and ally of McCarthy, purportedly spoke favourably of the Canadian
approach to security and law enforcement used during the Kellock-Taschereau
Commission investigations. Henry’s source was a third-party account of this confidential
speech delivered at the Press Club in Indianapolis, Indiana.24 That same year
communist propagandists also elevated this perceived difference. In September 1954,
the Finnish Communist Party newspaper in Helsinki published an interview of five
Canadian communists on route to the Soviet Union. When asked whether American
anti-communism had crossed the border the five travelers acknowledged bilateral
pressure to align domestic policy but asserted that Canada was an independent country
willing to assert its sovereignty. A cancelled speech by McCarthy in Toronto was cited
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as evidence of this independence.25 The April 1954 speech was planned and organized
by anti-communist lecturer John Hladun.
This event was intended to be an opportunity for McCarthy to speak to
Canadians about his anti-communist investigations. Hladun was himself a former
communist and detailed his experience in a lengthy October 1947 three-part series in
Maclean’s Magazine. The Manitoba-raised Hladun was recruited to communism through
the youth section of the Ukrainian Labor Temple and spent approximately nine months
training with thousands of other young communists in the Soviet Union. An appealing
asset because of his connections to the Ukrainian social and labour movement, Hladun
was taught espionage tradecraft including cartography to assist with riots or
insurrections, and explosives training for sabotaging trains and bridges.26 While Hladun
describes his eventual disillusionment and departure from the communist cause, his
account reinforced two significant anti-communists concerns. This personal example
likely influenced worries about the recruitment of young people that Marjorie Lamb
championed and broader fears about the susceptibility of communism to flourish in
communities of new Canadians. Despite his positioning as a reformed anti-communist
activist, Hladun’s efforts to bring McCarthy to Toronto faced a significant backlash.
The event drew the ire of George Drew, despite his own efforts to persuade the
government to adopt more stringent legislation. He described the potential visit as
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“unfortunate” and asked in the House of Commons if the government would consider
reaching out to their American counterparts to discourage the event. Drew
acknowledged the peril of the Canadian government wading into the American political
debate about McCarthy’s anti-communist activities, but reiterated his concerns.27 The
Prime Minister maintained the Canadian government would not interfere with the
proposed visit and that there were no laws that prevented such a speaking
engagement, but did suggest the Senator would be well aware of the implications of
speaking “beyond what would be generally looked upon as reasonable bounds.”28 This
veiled warning was the main emphasis of St. Laurent’s deft comments addressing the
bilateral context of the McCarthy event. With similar restraint, Rabbi Abraham Feinberg
of Holy Blossom Temple in Toronto also advised ambivalence. Representing one
perspective of Canadian civil society, Feinberg suggested the best method to
discourage the spread of McCarthyism to Canada was to greet the Senator’s trip with
silence and courtesy, a repeated “cold shoulder” which would deflate McCarthy’s
bloated stature. Disrespecting McCarthy would only discredit Canadian hospitality and
establish him as an anti-communist martyr, Feinberg proclaimed in an address to the
Canadian Women’s Club.29 Circumstances suggest the appearance was likely
cancelled because of the preparations for, and commencement of, the American
Subcommittee on Investigations hearings (Army-McCarthy Hearings), struck to
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investigate conflicting accusations between the United States Army and Senator
McCarthy.30
As articulated earlier in this study, it’s challenging to assess public opinion on
specific issues. In Cold War Canada, Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse provide some
context for Canadians’ awareness of McCarthy. Data from the Canadian Institute of
Public Opinion suggests that, in late 1953 approximately 65 percent of Canadians
polled claimed to know of the senator.31 This compares with a survey conducted in the
United States by the American Institute of Public Opinion that indicated 87 percent of
Americans had read or heard some details of the Army-McCarthy Hearings.32 This
American polling data was also published by the Gallup Poll of Canada. While no
definitive conclusions can be drawn about Canadian public opinion from this polling in
isolation, it’s reasonable to assume engaged citizens also maintained some awareness
of McCarthy through national media coverage. A brief survey of the Globe and Mail in
1953, for example, shows monthly news coverage and editorial content concerning the
senator and the “McCarthyism” phenomenon.33
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The response to McCarthy’s Toronto speech does suggest a complex federal
political consensus in opposition to the type of anti-communism he represented. By
embodying the reckless character of American congressional anti-communist “witch
hunts,” McCarthy came to personally represent a form of extremism. This was more
about perception than the realities of domestic anti-communism, as chapter two outlined
the broad punitive action faced by Canadian civil servants suspected of communist
sympathies or activities. The identification and prosecution of communists in Canada
occurred without the same level of notoriety and public awareness. This is not to
suggest there were no differences in the anti-communist approaches of Canada and the
United States, but the perception of dissimilarity produced undertones of moral
superiority and reinforced idealized notions of a unique Canadian national identity.
The lack of a visible McCarthy-esque figure or movement in Canada remained
one of the clearest differences between the Canadian and American anti-communist
movements. Several politicians attempted to mimic that style and exploit fears of
communism, but with little success. Social Credit Party Member of Parliament Solon
Low advocated for the establishment of a House Committee on Un-Canadian Activities,
but his party’s minor status limited the influence of such suggestions.34 Similarly,
George Drew’s agenda for legislative reform to address communist threats, such as his
attempts in 1950 to criminalize the Communist Party and other “similar activities,”
discussed earlier, proved ineffective in a Liberal dominated majority government. Even
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Low was on record opposing this legislative effort by the Progressive Conservatives.35
Drew’s opposition to a McCarthy visit also distracted from his suggested public image
as an unrepentant anti-communist crusader. Despite the existence of anti-communist
political pressure, Canadian sociologist S. D. Clark argued the perceived lack of
McCarthyism in Canada did not mean Canadians experienced a greater degree of Cold
War freedom.
In an essay originally published in 1954, Clark discusses the historical context of
American imperialism in order to explain McCarthyism. American continental expansion
included the consistent acceptance of non-conformist movements. Frontier populations
desired local autonomy, hoping to escape the restrictions of outside political authority.
Central government would impede the control of new territories, bursting with natural
resources and economic opportunity, by imposing political patronage and burdensome
taxation.36 The emergent United States government tolerated non-conforming elements
on the frontier because they furthered the American realization of Manifest Destiny, a
belief in an inevitable right to occupy the continent. Frontier populations violently
displaced Indigenous populations and challenged the territorial claims of European
colonial empires. Clark argues that “by tolerating the frontier settler’s exercise of a large
measure of independence, by granting in effect a large degree of autonomy to frontier
communities, the American society was able that much more speedily to complete the
occupation of the continent.”37 The tolerance of a variety of domestic non-conformist
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movements remained constant because after violently asserting its independence from
the British Empire, the United States did not experience any substantial or prolonged
foreign threat to its political existence.
Following the Second World War, the Soviet Union emerged as a geographic
and ideological threat to the United States. While the American anti-communist
movement appeared to abandon earlier revolutionary traditions by mobilizing the
powers of the state, Clark maintains the perceived intolerance of McCarthyism and
other anti-communists was more representative of the American “frontier” spirit and was
only possible because of the level of political freedom enjoyed in the United States. The
overriding American intolerance was of the perceived foreign interference of Sovietinspired communism.38 As a Midwestern Senator, and a representative of an ethnicreligious population, McCarthy could direct his attacks at powerful political leaders in
Washington by embodying the familiar isolationist and “frontier” sentiment. In this
interpretation, McCarthy was defending the United States against the threat of Soviet
communism.
Conversely, Clark argues Canadian politicians did not experience the same
degree of freedom to attack their own government leaders.39 Individual parliamentarians
were generally unable to gain the independence and profile necessary to publicly
advance a controversial agenda without backing and were politically incentivized to be
deferential to centralized governmental decision-making. In this manner, Wilfrid Lacroix,
George Drew, and Solon Low all experienced unsuccessful attempts to establish more
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restrictive anti-communism policies when lacking majority support in the legislature.
Clark’s explanation of political freedom in Canada and the United States articulates a
nuanced and counterintuitive distinction not always represented in public dialogue.
Canadian state-led anti-communism was arguably more restrictive in part because it
lacked public accountability. As the next section will demonstrate, popular opinions and
the inferences drawn from them were at times more reactionary than accurately
reflective of Canadian anti-communism policy.

Herbert Norman

The vocal leaders of the American anti-communist movement, and the
committees associated with their efforts, gained increased notoriety in Canada when
their communist accusations reached further across the border. A convergence of
McCarthyism, domestic anti-communism, and Canadian anti-Americanism can be found
in the highly-publicized case of E. Herbert Norman.40 Born in Japan to Canadian
missionaries, Norman studied at the University of Toronto, Cambridge, Columbia, and
Harvard before joining Canada’s Department of External Affairs in 1939 as a scholar of
Japanese history. After the Second World War, Norman served at the General
Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Japan before being appointed Head of the
Canadian Liaison Mission in Japan in 1946. Transferred back to Ottawa in 1950,
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Norman served as Head of the American and Far Eastern Division, and then Head of
the Information Division. Communist suspicions lingered throughout Norman’s career,
but it was the early 1950s when the questioning intensified. It is also important to note
that there were unsubstantiated allegations that Norman was gay; which as chapter two
outlined, was often viewed as an indicator of subversion.41 Norman’s suspected
communist beliefs and whether he deserved the scrutiny of American anti-communists
have been well examined.42 This work does not participate in that debate, but rather
explores how Norman’s death, and the very public American witch-hunt that preceded it,
stoked anti-Americanism and further inspired notions of Canada’s differentiated
approach to the domestic threat of communism.
Norman was first suspected of communist sympathies by the FBI in 1942, when
he attempted to retrieve the books and papers of a former Harvard classmate, the
repatriated left-wing Japanese economist, Shinto Tsuru.43 Suspicions arose again
during Norman’s posting as head of the Canadian Liaison Mission in Tokyo, where he
was also seconded to the United States Army Counterintelligence Corps. The head of
American counterintelligence in Japan, Major General Charles Willoughby, instigated a
secret investigation into the release, under the authorization of Norman and another
State Department officer, of a group of political prisoners that included two communists.
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Although the order originated with Willoughby’s predecessor, General Elliot Thorpe, the
ardent anti-communist Willoughby was suspicious of Norman because he believed him
to be one of several key Near East experts adversely influencing policy in post-war
Japan.44 While muted at the time, Willoughby’s charges resurfaced during the 1950
Subcommittee on the Investigation of Loyalty of State Department Employees (Tydings
Committee) hearings, a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
struck to investigate the claims made by McCarthy about communists in the State
Department. Norman’s name emerged during the Tidings Committee questioning of
General Thorpe, whose testimony more broadly related to the loyalty of Far East policy
specialists.
By May 1950, the FBI had reopened Norman’s file and discovered a link to the
Gouzenko Affair. During testimony before the Kellock-Taschereau Committee in
Canada, Gouzenko had implicated Canadian mathematician Israel Halperin as a
member of the Soviet Military Intelligence espionage network operating in Canada. As
seen, charges against Halperin were dismissed when the documents disclosed by
Gouzenko failed to produce any incriminating evidence. Irrespective of Halperin’s fate,
his address book remained an exhibit of the Royal Commission, and the FBI continued
to believe it represented a key piece of evidence implicating additional spies.45
Norman’s name was one of the contacts contained in this address book.
When approached by the FBI, the RCMP proved to be an inconsistent
intelligence partner. In a rushed October 1950 report, the RCMP presented the FBI with
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three pieces of evidence that raised questions about Norman’s loyalty. One disclosure
included information provided by controversial former undercover agent Pat Walsh, who
in 1940 disclosed to the RCMP that Norman was introduced to him at a meeting as the
secretary of a suspected communist front group, the “Canadian Friends of the Chinese
People.”46 The RCMP indicated Norman’s name also appeared in the address book of
Frank Park, a suspected member of the Canadian Communist Party. Finally, an
unfavorable reference by Gouzenko at a Kellock-Taschereau hearing to another
“Norman” was erroneously attributed to the Canadian diplomat.47 A subsequent RCMP
report followed a more in-depth Canadian investigation, including an interview with
Norman, recently recalled from Tokyo. The December 1950 RCMP communication to
the FBI absolved Norman on several crucial issues, mainly that he was indeed
representing the interests of Canada when he collected Tsuru’s materials, and he was
unaware of Halperin’s suspected communist affiliations.48 Despite this reversal by the
RCMP, in 1951 the American Senate Internal Security Subcommittee49 (SISS) turned its
attention to Norman.

1951 – The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee
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Authorized in 1950 as an instrument of the Internal Security Act, SISS was
mandated to investigate subversive activities in the United States. The Democratic chair
of the committee, Senator Pat McCarran, proved to be as motivated by the domestic
threat of communism as McCarthy. While McCarthy was a freshman senator from an
opposition party dependent on publicity for power, McCarran held the power and
influence required to instigate and assume the chairmanship of a subcommittee
dedicated to thoroughly investigate the domestic threat of communism.50 McCarran
populated his subcommittee with conservative Democrats and Republicans likely to
support an aggressive anti-communist agenda.
Professor Karl Wittfogel, a German-born China expert and former communist
adherent, testified before SISS in early August 1951 that Norman participated in a
communist study group with Moses Finkelstein, a graduate student at Columbia
University. Norman learned of Wittfogel’s testimony from a member of the Canadian
delegation to the United Nations and immediately sent a rebuttal to George Glazebrook,
the External Affairs security and intelligence division head directly involved in these
investigations. Wittfogel’s account was riddled with inaccuracies, mainly the assertion
Norman was studying at Columbia, when in fact he was completing his doctoral studies
at Harvard, and both he and Finkelstein denied having ever met. Norman also clarified
that his relationship with the Institute of Pacific Relations, an organization SISS believed
to be a communist front, was academic in nature.51 In light of the SISS hearings,
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External Affairs and the RCMP completed a further comprehensive security check of
Norman that failed to substantiate any concrete charges of subversion.
This investigation was met with indignation in Canada. An editorial in the Globe
and Mail accused the American government of “smearing” Norman and asserted that
Canadians were not interested in the current Washington witch-hunt, and were
“justifiably resentful when some of the red paint being splashed about for the edification
of Congress [came] flying across the border.”52 The Globe argued that if American
authorities had proper cause for suspicion about a Canadian civil servant they should
convey that information through the appropriate diplomatic channels instead of making
public accusations. The editorial makes an important connection between the Norman
witch-hunt and broader Canadian-American relations. Canadians are described as
concerned about an American attitude of indifference, and a lack of recognition that
Canada was an independent nation with distinct opinions, interests, and institutions.53
This deepening grievance reinforced the assertion that Canada approached the threat
of domestic communism differently than the United States. The editorial continued:
In the case of Mr. Norman there is a sharp cleavage on the right way to handle
an urgent public question. Canada is as anxious as the United States to keep
Communists out of key positions, and perhaps just as successful in doing so.
The American people may believe that a public inquiry, with names freely
bandied about and reputations freely damaged, is the right method. The fact that
Canadians do not agree is, perhaps, something Washington neither knows nor
cares a hoot about. Granting that, it is still up to Washington, in common
courtesy, to let us do our own probing in our own way.54
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Appearing in an influential English-language newspaper, this opposition to certain anticommunist practices represented a significant contribution to Canadian public debate.
The Norman case was perceived to challenge Canadian sovereignty by applying
American interpretations of the domestic communist threat to Canadian citizens.
The Canadian government voiced its concern to the United States Department of
State. Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Hume Wrong, protested the publicity
given to the SISS charges against Norman directly to Freeman Matthews, Deputy
Under-Secretary of the Department of State. A memorandum provided to Matthews
questioned the use of “unimpressive and unsubstantiated” statements of a former
communist and voiced surprise that SISS found it necessary to make public reference
to a high official of the Canadian government. Reiterating the government’s support for
Norman, the memorandum urged American officials to act differently in the future and
confidentially contact the Canadian government if there was reason to suspect a
Canadian official.55 SISS continued unabated; in the days following Wrong’s
memorandum, sub-committee members referred to “two top Canadians” during
hearings. This prompted a strong reaction from Canadian officials and demands for the
State Department to produce the names mentioned and the evidence used to
substantiate their inclusion in the sub-committee hearings.56 Discussions between
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Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Arnold Heeney and American Chargé
d’Affaires Don C. Bliss reveal the independence SISS asserted. Bliss maintained the
State Department was working diligently to retrieve the information requested by the
Canadians but were powerless to compel SISS to act.57
Compounding its frustration, the Canadian government received ongoing
pressure from media outlets to disclose information about the two important officials
mentioned during the public hearings of SISS and reported on by the American press.
With the sub-committee delaying any transfer of information, External Affairs prepared a
press release on August 23, 1951, outlining the unsatisfactory SISS response to
Canadian requests. The Canadian government was not given an opportunity to evaluate
the charges against the still unnamed government officials, which if substantiated,
would require intervention in Canada.58 The government was also placed in a
compromised position, with the public aware that it lacked sufficient intelligence on a
matter of domestic security. On August 24, 1951, The Globe and Mail reminded readers
that SISS had just made very public, false allegations against Norman and was now
declining to clarify when unnamed Canadian officials were again subject to similar
allegations. The Globe stated what the Canadian government perceived, that the State
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Department was powerless to influence Congress, and acknowledged External Affairs
was similarly struggling to rectify the dispute.59
That same day, the State Department received word from a SISS representative.
The message relayed to Hayden Raynor was that SISS was endeavouring to conduct
their proceedings with “dignity and fairness.” The sub-committee abdicated any
responsibility for how the press handled information disclosed during public hearings
and indicated a willingness to exchange information through the State Department but
provided no details about the Canadians discussed during hearings.60 External Affairs
proceeded to publish their press release, even though the SISS letter would be public
soon after. Putting the Canadian position on record was considered necessary as long
as SISS refused to provide the names of the Canadians raised in discussion before the
sub-committee, or any details of the evidence presented in support of the accusations.
Heeney made this point explicit in a letter to Bliss on August 24, 1951.61 Publicly,
Pearson declared the controversy to be closed during a speech in late August,
explaining that Canada would not make any further requests to Washington about
Canadians reported on by American congressional committees.62
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This diplomatic dispute was significant because of the competing priorities at
play. The Canadian government wanted to pursue its diplomatic initiatives privately,
while the contentious actions of SISS were often conducted during public sessions.
External Affairs initially did not want its protests over the Norman accusations to be
publicized. Hume Wrong reiterated to the State Department that increased publicity on
the matter would only bring more attention to the unsubstantiated charges.63 Canadian
diplomat Robert Ford argued in retrospect that by publicizing their proceedings,
American congressional committees turned the Norman case into a bilateral conflict.
The attempt to dictate Norman’s culpability was a direct challenge to Canadian
independence.64 As a result, the Canadian government was ultimately driven to
publicize its diplomatic frustrations with SISS, which occurred alongside criticism of the
American congressional committees in the Canadian press. A public diplomatic dispute
that centered on unsubstantiated accusations by a “witch-hunting” American
congressional committee contributed to the perception of a unique Canadian approach
to the domestic threat of communism. As the Globe and Mail editorial cited earlier
suggested, Canada had its own anti-communist strategy, believed by some Canadians
to be more effective than that of the United States.65 The American tactic of making
broad and public accusations was increasingly conflated with the full complexities of
anti-communist policies and initiatives.
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1957 - Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Round Two

Following a 1953 posting to New Zealand, Norman was appointed Canadian
Ambassador to Egypt in 1956. The international prominence of the diplomatic posting in
Egypt led SISS to revive their investigation of Norman in March 1957. During multiple
open sessions, SISS presented allegations and insinuations of disloyalty that the
Canadian government believed to be of the same nature as discussed in 1951. Pearson
contacted Norman and voiced his personal regret that the allegations had once again
been raised publicly.66 The Canadian government was steadfast in its response to the
United States. In a note delivered to the State Department, Pearson described the
newest allegations as irresponsible and explained that Canada protested them in the
strongest terms. Further, he argued it was disturbing that SISS had failed to consult or
even inform the Canadian government, given the information already on the record and
known by the sub-committee. Pearson reiterated that the Canadian government
performed an exhaustive security enquiry after the 1951 allegations and maintained full
confidence in Norman’s loyalty and integrity.67 SISS ignored the scrutiny and released
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additional testimony questioning Norman on March 28th. Tragically, in the midst of the
reinvigorated American accusations, Norman died by suicide in Cairo on April 4, 1957.
There was a belief at the time that the persistent and pervasive accusations of
communist beliefs contributed to Norman’s suicide. Shortly after the renewed
investigation was announced, Norman’s colleagues in Egypt noticed a change in his
demeanor. After not broaching the subject previously, Norman began mentioning the
activities of SISS to his deputy, Arthur Kilgour. In a chapter of Roger Bowen’s edited
volume E. H. Norman: His Life and Scholarship, Kilgour recalls some of his personal
experiences working with Norman prior to his death. The mental strain and worry was
apparent. For example, Norman persistently questioned a visiting United Nations
delegation about how he was being portrayed in the American media. Following the
March 28th release of testimony, Norman grew increasingly exhausted, only attended
the office intermittently, and was often observed resting on his office couch. Kilgour
wrote that it seemed Norman was already anticipating the demoralization of a second
prolonged security investigation.68
At the same time, Norman’s secretary described the Ambassador as preoccupied
and tense.69 Norman reportedly discussed taking his own life with his friend and
personal physician, Dr. Halim Doss, on April 2, 1957. According to Doss, the American
investigations and the continual speculation about his connections to communism
factored heavily into the conversation.70 Norman’s contemporaries were also convinced
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the anti-communist witch-hunt was a factor in his death. In his memoirs, Canadian
Ambassador to the United States Arnold Heeney remarked that “there seemed little
doubt that the tragedy had resulted from the renewed outrageous and cruel publicity
given by [SISS] to the old 1951 charges against Norman.”71 The circumstances
surrounding the suicide produced significant anger in Canada and contributed to
reinvigorated anti-Americanism.
Years of anti-communist accusations directed at Canadian officials by American
congressional campaigns had steadily intensified Canadian concerns. The persistent
SISS investigations were increasingly perceived as an unwarranted and inexcusable
American interference in Canadian affairs.72 The Toronto Daily Star emphasized the
anger incited by Norman’s death and led with the bold headline, “MURDER - MP: Envoy
Smeared by U.S., Kills Self” on April 4, 1957. CCF Member of Parliament Alistair
Stewart boldly asserted in the House of Commons that Norman was “murdered by
slander just as surely as if someone had stuck a knife in his back.”73 Stewart called for
the government to withdraw Ambassador Heeney from Washington.74 While the Prime
Minister did not go that far, there were persistent concerns other Canadian diplomats or
politicians would be similarly investigated.
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From as early as 1950, for example, even Pearson had been a consistent
individual of interest for American anti-communist congressional committees. Strong
opposition in the House of Commons to Drew’s proposed anti-communism legislation
and consistent support for Norman were two factors that contributed to American
suspicions.75 In 1953 Pearson denied both SISS and State Department requests for
Gouzenko to testify in the United States, adding to suspicions about the Canadian
politician. Pearson’s obstructionism with American anti-communists earned him
increased attention from the FBI, and Colonel Robert S. McCormick of the Chicago
Tribune labeled the Canadian, “the most dangerous man in the Western World.”76 There
were also indications the American congressional pursuit of Norman was intended to
expose Pearson as a communist sympathizer. In his memoirs, William Rusher, counsel
to SISS, admitted Pearson was the ultimate Canadian target of the senate
investigations.77 The Norman and Pearson cases illustrate the willingness of certain
American anti-communists to project accusations onto notable Cold War allies.
Outrage at the circumstances of Norman’s death were shared across party lines.
Progressive Conservative Leader of the Opposition John Diefenbaker addressed
Parliament and remarked:
I think all of us in this house cannot but feel a sense of deep sorrow that this
man’s good name was filched from him by indiscriminately branding him as an
enemy, trying him by suspicion and, in the public mind to a great extent,
convicting him by innuendo. I think every member of this house will agree that
the terrible results in the lives of those subjected to such indiscriminate attacks
as were made on this man cannot but lead each of us to determine that we shall
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not ourselves engage in words which can only destroy the heart and soul of
those attacked. This man was a devoted public servant; he is a victim of witchhunting proclivities; and while it may be unusual to suggest this, and I doubt that
it has ever been done before, I suggest through you, sir, to the Minister of Public
Works that parliament show its feelings by having the flag on this building flown
at half-mast for one who served well and died in the service of his country.78
Responses were also not limited to federal politicians. At the April 1957 convention of
the Ontario provincial CCF, a resolution passed condemning “the practice of
maintaining police dossiers containing allegations against Canadian citizens of which
they are not informed and in which they are given no opportunity to reply.”79 This motion
directly referenced the RCMP’s practice of passing secret reports to their American
counterparts.
There was an immediate outcry from both the press and broader public in
English Canada. Many of the themes of the political reaction were similarly expressed
by individual Canadians. In a Toronto Daily Star letter to the editor, Angus H. Jones
argued that every flag in Canada should fly at half-mast to mark the death of Norman,
who he argued was the victim of character assassination and a preposterous trial by
innuendo.80 The Globe and Mail ran a series of “Readers’ Views” on the Norman issue
over the month of April 1957. Michael Day from Hamilton, Ontario, spoke harshly
against the use of “insidious innuendo” and nefarious methods that emphasized
accusation over evidence. Day stressed that SISS was a great threat to individual
freedom and warned Canadians that anti-communist tactics had not moderated with
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McCarthy’s departure from the cause.81 R. M. C. Swan from Toronto, Ontario, described
feelings of indignation at the history of American congressional campaigns slandering
and defaming innocent people. It is suggested by Swan that Globe readers collectively
cut out and mail a recent editorial cartoon, where the Statue of Liberty is depicted
hanging her head in shame, to members of SISS as a means of protest.82 Another
Toronto resident, Roy Begley, simply asserted that the American Senate and
Congressional investigations served no purpose and their quasi-judicial nature served
only to enforce guilt by association.83 Anger and accusations directed at the methods of
the anti-communist American congressional committees were accompanied with
commentary on how the differences between Canada and the United States influenced
this tragedy.
There was a feeling for some Canadians that the anti-communist influence
exerted by the United States reflected broader differences between the two countries.
Margaret Campbell of Toronto, for example, spoke of American entitlement by
suggesting the contemptuous arrogance of successive administrations contributed to a
lack of respect for the “backwoods nation to the north of them,” which allowed SISS to
damage the character of a Canadian diplomat.84 C. L. C. Allinson acknowledged the
operational independence of American Senate committees, but also made a point of
directly associating anti-communist “witch-hunting” with the United States.85 The
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investigation committees were described as overzealous and “McCarthyist” by John
Callan of Toronto, who then proceeded to argue that while most countries had
communist citizens, the United States was unique in its efforts to “hunt” them with fervor
and publicity. Callan maintained the American approach eroded personal freedoms and
the anti-communist vigilantism was an “uncomfortable step removed from [George]
Orwell’s 1984!”86 This limited sample of individual reactions indicates opposition to an
identifiably American approach to anti-communism. Popular opinion centered around
the assertion Norman’s persecution was erroneous, and that the investigatory tactics
employed were objectionable.
Public opposition to Norman’s treatment emerged from a variety of civic groups,
including faith-based communities. The United Church of Canada protested what its
leadership perceived to be character assassination.87 Dr. Ernest E. Long, Secretary of
the General Council of the United Church, argued that blame for Norman’s death rested
with SISS. Long accused the sub-committee of “shocking and sadistic methods,” and
argued that fear, hysteria, and political ambition had corrupted American security
measures.88 Rabbi Abraham Feinberg, who opposed McCarthy’s proposed visit to
Canada, told his Sabbath evening congregation at Holy Blossom Temple in Toronto that
by “word and gesture” SISS “pursued Herbert Norman to the edge of a Cairo roof.”
Feinberg’s message reiterated the continuing implications of McCarthyism, while
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concentrating on slander as a crime against God. He urged all churches and
synagogues to reject any attempt to use religion as a justification for slanderous anticommunism.89 The Unitarian Church criticized both the Canadian and American
governments for their roles in the Norman affair. Guy Grislason, Chairman of the First
Unitarian Church Social Action Committee, charged that the Canadian government
lacked motivation to publicly denounce the American anti-communist action. SISS was
condemned by Grislason for its “mental assassination” of Norman. According to
Reverend Robert Brockway of Hamilton Unitarian Church, this inaction was part of the
broader and ongoing sacrifice of Canadian sovereignty. Finally, Reverend Frank
Chidsey of Don Heights Unitarian Church told his congregation that Norman was the
victim of the American McCarthyism phenomenon.90
A variety of civil rights and labour leaders added to this chorus of Canadian
outrage. The Toronto Association for Civil Liberties issued a statement condemning
SISS for reviving the discredited 1951 accusations against Norman.91 The Toronto and
District Labour Council described the Norman tragedy as “one of the most outrageous
insults Canada has ever suffered at the hands of a friendly nation.” Participants
contributing to this declaration included steel-workers, typographers, and postal
workers. The Labour Council maintained the United States was responsible for the
actions of “inquisitorial” congressional committees and further argued that Canadians
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were “humiliated by the arrogant, indecent, bully-behaviour of SISS.92 The sensational
nature of Norman’s death and the seemingly apparent causal connection to the anticommunist movement in the United States with this case, served to reinforce a more
comprehensive perception of pervasive American influence.
In an educational context, high schools from both Canada and the United States
debated the implications of Norman’s death as part of the New York Times Youth
Forum in May 1957. Participating through a simultaneous broadcast from both New
York and Ottawa, the Canadian students demonstrated a passion for the circumstances
surrounding Norman’s death. Canadian Geoffrey Scott, 19, argued SISS had no
business judging Norman, and its activities represented an American encroachment on
Canadian affairs. Scott’s classmate, 17-year-old Debbie Schwartz, maintained that civil
rights should take priority over the fight against communism.93 While two of the
American students agreed on the issue of American encroachment, Rosemary Owens,
17, spoke to the necessary priorities of American security. Owens argued that because
the Norman case carried security implications for the United States, the investigation
was justified.94 Not all engagement with the Norman tragedy was as civil. Students at
the University of Toronto burned effigies of Senator Joseph McCarthy and Robert
Morris, counsel for SISS, in order to voice their anger and to communicate their belief
that American officials were complicit in Norman’s death.95 This type of visceral
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demonstration illustrates the raw emotion produced by the perceived American
interference into Canada’s affairs.
As Canadians continued to grapple with the implications of Norman’s death, one
playwright was motivated to adapt the story. John Gray’s Bright Sun at Midnight was
born out of the writer’s anger upon hearing of Norman’s suicide. Gray recalls his early
motivation being an “attack on the American attitude,” which he believed to be directly
responsible for Norman’s death. Gray ultimately reduced the production’s confrontation
of McCarthyism, in part to differentiate from Arthur Miller’s 1953 play, The Crucible,
which used the Salem witch trials as an allegory for McCarthyism.96 The plot of Bright
Sun at Midnight begins with the revelation that Canada’s Ambassador97 to India, after
being subject to old charges of communism by an American congressional committee,
has died by suicide. The play focuses on the troubled Canadian External Affairs
Minister, who is determined to protect the good name and reputation of an old friend,
but ultimately becomes subject to an American anti-communist investigation himself.98
While complimentary of several of the performances, Globe and Mail theatre critic
Herbert Whittaker’s review of the play was generally mixed. What’s particularly
significant for this study are his comments on the transformation of a real tragedy onto
the stage. Whittaker explains that while basic facts are changed, the general story arc
remained the same, which was naturally captivating. Gray used the stage to create a
discourse about a very public issue, and with it the public brought their own knowledge,
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prejudices, and honest reactions.99 Similarly, Rose MacDonald of the Toronto Evening
Telegram argued the play’s nearness to Norman’s death was also its weakness.
MacDonald observed that at times the audience seemed to be applauding the
playwright’s political views rather than the performance itself.100 The adaptation of
Norman’s life story to the stage further illustrates the consequential nature of his death.
Not only did the government grapple with the diplomatic fallout, but this analysis
demonstrates the pervasiveness of public protests spanning educational, intellectual,
and artistic forums.
American government officials were aware of the sensitive climate created by the
Norman affair. United States Ambassador to Canada, Livingston T. Merchant,
recommended caution when dealing with Canada in an April 1957 telegram. During a
trade discussion pertinent to Canadian interests, Merchant advised that animosity
produced by the Norman affair and the heated 1957 Canadian federal election had
created a tense environment. Washington was informed that any disruptive proposals
could significantly impede bilateral trade policy in the near future.101 The eventual
change in Canadian governments aggravated the situation further. Speaking at the
Northern European Chiefs of Mission Conference in London, Merchant explained that
the United States was experiencing growing problems with Canada. Prime Minister
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John Diefenbaker’s new Progressive Conservative government was described as more
nationalistic and more pro-Canadian than the Liberals, which Merchant argued
aggravated the anti-Americanism associated with the Norman affair. He claimed this
would lead to attempts to reduce Canadian dependence on the United States.
Ultimately, Merchant explained, the coalescing anti-Americanism produced by the
Norman affair was symptomatic of a suppressed but basic Canadian resentment of the
power and wealth of the United States.102 American officials were left to navigate a
diplomatic environment more antagonistic to bilateral cooperation.

Conclusion

Canada’s defence and broader continental security integration with the United
States contributed to a degree of shared interest with respect to domestic anticommunism. Despite similar goals, the bombastic rhetoric of Senator Joseph McCarthy
and others in the United States captured more attention at times than Canada’s less
visible anti-communist initiatives. Congressional committees in the United States, for
example, disregarded Canadian sovereignty in their pursuit of subversive communists in
the 1950s. The very publicized reaction to the death of diplomat Herbert Norman in
1957 provides insight into the influence of anti-Americanism on Canadian perceptions of
anti-communism and national identity. Reacting to Norman’s death, engaged citizens
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concentrated their criticism on American anti-communism in letters to the editor, on
university and secondary school campuses, and through civic and religious leaders.
Anti-communism became directly associated with American practices that were
aggressive, pervasive, and notorious. This dissertation has continually argued that there
was far less publicity placed on the personal experiences of those individuals targeted
by Canada’s less visible anti-communist initiatives. As a result, a public narrative that
the Canadian approach to the domestic ideological threat was less punitive than the
United States gained frequency.
This constructed perception of Canadian anti-communism was motivated in part
by the nationalist pressures of the postwar period. Opposition to American anticommunism served as a unifying force that instinctively reinforced the appealing idea
that Canada was different from the United States. Ongoing concerns about American
political, economic, and cultural influence produced a desire for a more recognizable
articulation of Canadian national identity. The Norman case is particularly useful to
illustrate how opposition to certain American anti-communist practices reinforced this
nationalist impulse. The final two chapters of this dissertation will explore this perception
further by establishing the importance of cultural analysis. Canadian arts and
entertainment communities proved to be important interpreters of the communist threat.
Supposed differences between Canadian and American anti-communism were often
perpetuated in radio dramas broadcast on the CBC, and in the observed careers of
broadcasters, musicians, and writers. The intersection of anti-Americanism and
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nationalism adds an additional level of complexity to the historiographical understanding
of Canadian anti-communism.
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Communities of cultural influence were active interpreters of the perceived
domestic threat of subversion and contributed to a broader understanding of the
complexity of anti-communism in Canada. Cultural institutions served a significant role
in the promotion of national identity but were also the focus of certain Cold War
suspicions. An important aspect of this analysis is the tension between accusations
lodged against these public cultural institutions and the way communist sympathies
were handled internally. Perspectives from the cultural sector, and the experiences of
writers, musicians, and broadcasters, will explore this nationalistic emphasis and
deepen the historiographical understanding of how anti-communism was culturally
portrayed in Canada.
The significance of Canadian cultural content was often contested by
encroaching American influence. The 1929 Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting
(Aird Commission), the 1951 Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts,
Letters and Sciences (Massey Commission), and the 1957 Royal Commission on
Broadcasting (Fowler Commission) all contributed at various points to the establishment
and growth of publicly funded film, radio, and television in Canada. Prominent cultural
institutions, such as the National Film Board (NFB) and the CBC, navigated a tension
between a nationalistic cultural emphasis and the fear communists could pervert
popular culture with subversive messaging. The socialist background of John Grierson,
the NFB’s inaugural commissioner, led to organizational anti-communist firings. Minister
of National Revenue James McCann and Progressive Conservative Member of
Parliament G. P. Fraser voiced concerns about persistent communist sympathies at the
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NFB. Similarly, Members of Parliament Norman Jaques from Social Credit and Liberal
Chesley Carter claimed CBC programming was disseminating communist propaganda.
Independent anti-communist activist Ron Gostick, profiled in chapter three, also used
his publishing platform to accuse the CBC of producing ideological propaganda. The
risk of ideological subversion at Canadian federally-funded cultural institutions was
heightened because of their role shaping national consciousness and identity.
Despite concerns of communist infiltration, the CBC remained an important
platform for writers to engage with Cold War themes. Episode in Red (1944), The
Intrigue at Mill Centre (1947), and Red is for Danger (1953) were all radio dramas that
featured stories dealing with the individual responsibility to identify communist threats,
the demand for citizen loyalty, and erroneous suspicions. Artistic venues and musical
performances, including the Stratford Festival in Ontario and a visit from the Chinese
Peking Opera, created space for mutual engagement between Canadians and
communists. Similarly, the easing of global tensions facilitated more organized cultural
exchanges, including a technical agreement between the CBC and the Soviet Union. An
inconsistency is also revealed throughout Canada’s arts and entertainment industry.
While cultural institutions were at times able to resist aggressive anti-communism and
engage the ideology, many writers, directors, performers, and technical staff affiliated
with the sector lost their artistic platforms because of suspected sympathies. Through
each of the interactions described, Canadians gained different perspectives on
communist ideology.
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Culture and the Cold War

It is important to consider cultural expression when analyzing the complexity of
Canadian anti-communism. “Culture” is of course used in a variety of contexts, with
differing connotations. As historian Jonathan Vance acknowledges in his survey of
Canadian culture, the term often describes the many characteristics of a society,
including customs, modes of behaviour, beliefs, values, and social practices.1 This
chapter will concentrate on the arts and popular entertainment in Canada, focusing on
radio, music, film, the stage, and the written word. This is not an exhaustive
interpretation, but one that concentrates on personal engagement with the culture of the
Cold War, specifically the outlets of artistic expression that attempted to interpret the
fears associated with communism.
When focusing on the stark ideological conflict that defined the Cold War, there
are two concepts of international cultural interaction that must be articulated. “Cultural
relations” occur across a spectrum which includes the actions of both private citizens
and public institutions. Canadians engaged directly with the culture of the Soviet Union,
often through communist inspired performances and literature, or the permitted visits of
Soviet artists to Canada. In contrast, “Cultural diplomacy” is narrower in scope and
primarily the product of government initiatives.2 For example, the first overseas
broadcasting activities of the CBC were undertaken by its International Service, often
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initially referred to as the “Voice of Canada.”3 In the Cold War context, these
transmissions became a useful means to project Canadian culture across the Iron
Curtain. In February 1951, the International Service launched Russian-language
broadcasting directed at the Soviet Union, followed shortly by Ukrainian and Polish
programming.4 The inherently persuasive nature of cultural expression made it a useful
tool for the ideological battles of the Cold War.
In a domestic context, the fear global communism could influence and subvert
popular culture produced both broad suspicions and the imperative to employ the arts to
promote Western ideals. Historian Stephen Whitfield examined American popular
culture in the late 1940s and 1950s and argues the politicization of culture was not
about defeating communism, but about defining it. The movie industry, for example,
became a necessary means to combat communist ideology. Organizations such as the
Motion Picture Alliance for the Preservation of American Ideals took the firm stance that
if you were not fighting the communist threat, you were advancing communism. The
organization, whose founding members included John Wayne, Cecil B. De Mille, and
Walt Disney, even invited the congressional House Un-American Activities Committee
to hold hearings in Los Angeles in 1947.5 The anti-communist emphasis of this segment
of the film industry employed their influence to shape popular conceptions of both the
ideology and the Soviet Union.
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Communists were depicted in Cold War films as rude, humourless, childless, and
cruel to animals. More specifically, communist women were routinely unfeminine,
unattractive, or portrayed as nymphomaniacs.6 Anti-communist movies created
caricatures of communists in attempts to broadly vilify and diminish the appeal of
subversive elements. The film My Son John (1952) explores how Cold War tensions
could impact family life. In this story, a mother grows suspicious of her son’s political
beliefs, his repudiation of the Korean War, and a girlfriend suspected of espionage.
Convinced her son is a communist and a spy, the mother reports him to the FBI.7 The
message of this film is clear: the destructive potential of communism was so pervasive
that at times it required national allegiance to take priority over family relations. Similar
themes were also explored in Canada, but within a smaller industry that was initially
very state-driven.

The Origins of Publicly Funded Culture in Canada: Offsetting American Influence

To properly understand the politicization of culture in Canada during the Cold
War, it is useful to first consider the origins of publicly funded cultural production. The
first radio broadcasting license was issued by the government to the Canadian Marconi
Company of Montreal in 1919, and within ten years there were sixty-two stations
broadcasting to 296,926 licensed listeners.8 Montreal newspaper La Presse founded
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CKAK, Canada’s earliest French-language radio station, in 1922. The Canadian
National Railway (CNR) also developed its own broadcasting capabilities during the
early 1920s. As radio grew in popularity in Canada, it also became more susceptible to
American influence and produced fears of cultural annexation. The Royal Commission
on Radio Broadcasting (Aird Commission), appointed by Prime Minister William Lyon
Mackenzie King in 1928, confirmed many of these concerns. While private enterprise
succeeded in extending radio at no cost to Canadians, most programming came from
outside the country, was dependent on advertising, and neglected rural areas. The Aird
Commission stressed that in a country as geographically large as Canada, national
broadcasting held the potential to foster a national spirit and interpret what it meant to
be a Canadian. To achieve this objective, the Aird Commission included in its
recommendations the creation of a national broadcasting system owned and operated
by one national company as a public service and focused on producing high-quality
Canadian content.9
After the conclusion of the Aird Commission, a group of citizens formed the
Canadian Radio League to advocate for public ownership of broadcasting. These efforts
led to the creation through legislation of the publicly owned Canadian Radio
Broadcasting Commission (CRBC). Presented in English and French, the CRBC was
estimated to have increased national broadcasting by six times in its first half year and
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eventually achieved coverage of close to ninety percent of the Canadian audience.10
The Canadian Broadcasting Act of 1936 reaffirmed the value of a publicly funded
national system by establishing the CBC as a crown corporation. Changes to
organizational structure and funding increased the CBC’s autonomy from the
government and allowed for more direction over programming.11 By 1952 the CBC had
expanded its broadcasting capabilities to television.
During the early Cold War period, Canadians continued to be exposed to more
American cultural content. For example, audiences regularly consumed the genre of
American cultural anti-communism described by Whitfield. In 1948, Twentieth Century
Fox released The Iron Curtain, one of the earliest explicitly anti-communist films, and
one that specifically depicted the Gouzenko Affair in Canada. The film’s focused critique
of communism portrayed Russians as villains and enemies of freedom. In contrast, the
defecting Gouzenko was characterized as sincere and his wife as having the idealized
feminine traits of Western domesticity.12 Historian Robert Teigrob argues this type of
American Cold War cultural influence was one contributing factor to a widespread
Canadian endorsement of the American-led global anti-communist campaign, including
participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance and the North American
Air Defence Command. Teigrob acknowledges this emerging bilateral foreign policy
direction existed in tension with intensifying efforts to preserve Canadian sovereignty
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and cultivate a recognizable national identity.13 Creeping American cultural influence
was a significant component of this debate.
The recommendations of the 1951 Royal Commission on National Development
in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (Massey Commission) resulted in a series of
institutions and measures designed to promote and preserve distinctively Canadian
modes and expressions of culture, including the Canadian Council for the Arts, and the
National Library of Canada.14 The continual struggle to mitigate American cultural
influence was part of broader tensions within the Canadian understanding of
nationalism and the country’s evolution from a British colony to an independent nation
marked by competing allegiances to the United Kingdom and the United States, or in
the case of Québec, the pursuit of a separate nationhood. Historian Robert Wright
argues the Canadian understanding of culture, national identity, and sovereignty was
consistently informed by a pragmatic approach to competing priorities.15 The necessity
of close national security and economic ties with the United States following the Second
World War pushed the government to address fears of cultural and political assimilation.
Publicly funded domestic cultural institutions were intended to mitigate American
influence and shape more recognizable and distinct Canadian content. The government
recognized the significant role broadcasting mediums played in shaping the public
consciousness. While a nationalistic cultural emphasis increased Canadian content that
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engaged with the themes the Cold War, the fear communism could subvert popular
culture remained.

The National Film Board

The NFB, an important publicly funded cultural institution critical to this
nationalistic cultural emphasis, was continually encumbered by communist suspicions.
Similar to radio, many of the early available films in Canada originated from Hollywood
in the United States. Unlike the entertainment focus of these films, the Canadian
government was focused on the potential of documentary films. There was a desire to
create and distribute national films purposefully designed to help people around the
country understand and engage with what it meant to be Canadian.16 The 1939 National
Film Act created the NFB, which immediately began producing features for the
Department of National Defence, the Department of Munitions and Supply, the
Department of Health and Welfare, the Wartime Prices and Trade Board, the War
Finance Committee, and the Wartime Information Board. British documentary film
producer John Grierson, who provided an initial investigation and report prior to the
creation of the NFB, was appointed its first commissioner in 1939. During the war
period, the NFB not only produced films deliberately focused on information and
propaganda, but also distributed regional films intended to distract Canadians on the
home front from the horrors of battle. Programming featured Grand Manan Island in

16

Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences Report, 50-51.

195

Chapter 5 – A Cultural Lens of Analysis
Eastern Canada, the Alaska Highway, musical features, and films examining the visual
arts.17
In Plateaus of Freedom, Mark Kristmanson focuses on the connections between
intelligence, censorship, and propaganda, with a specific concentration on identifying
the relationship between national culture and state security in the mid-twentieth
century.18 Specifically addressing the NFB under the leadership of Grierson,
Kristmanson examines a purposefully created audio-visual narrative of Canada that
incorporated a pragmatic mix of information and disinformation to address the
immediate security threat of the Second World War.19 Grierson often discussed why he
believed cinema had the persuasive power capable of mass influence, and the
importance of creating an “audio-visual citizen.” In a January 1940 broadcast talk,
Grierson explained:
The film can give us a sense of the communion that exists between people in
spite of the apparent distance in our daily lives. By showing the themes of
national and community achievement it can conquer the isolation of our personal
existence and reveal our reality. It is, and who does not want it, a way of a
national self-realization.20
The NFB established a vast distribution network to purposefully foster this national selfrealization. Films were showcased regularly, particularly in rural Canada where
screenings reached populations with limited access to other film technology. Pictures
such as The Peoples of Canada (1941) attempted to bridge the territorial, linguistic, and
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cultural differences of an increasingly diverse Canada.21 Creating a consolidated
“image” of the country was useful for unifying public opinion behind the national war
effort, which was especially significant given the possible necessity of conscripted
military service.
At the outset of the Cold War, Kristmanson argues, the NFB’s emphasis on
shaping a consistent image of Canada remained unchanged, but the perceived
domestic threat of communism complicated its mandate. Both the NFB and the security
state acted as “ordering” or “patterning” forces within Canadian society. Through
documentaries and other intentional audio-visual narratives, the NFB managed cultural
differences between nationality groups by organizing or establishing them as
“observers” of societal norms. Concurrently, the security state attempted to scare
Canadians into a submissive and manageable population.22 The anti-communist firings
of the early Cold War years curtailed the NFB’s ability to continue in this role.
Kristmanson argues that ultimately “red scare” surveillance of the NFB, including data
collection, staff dismissals, and internalized self-censorship weakened the NFB’s ability
to continue its wartime role as a propaganda agency.23 Sustained accusations of
subversion plagued the NFB and kept it a routine target of the anti-communist
movement.
Grierson’s biographer and former student, Gary Evans, describes his work as
crucial to the development of documentary filmmaking in Canada. By using propaganda
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as an education tool, Grierson sought to liberate the confused and the uninformed.24
Grierson left the NFB prior to the eventual anti-communism firings; however, his
suspected communist sympathies continued to impact the cultural institution. Before his
time at the NFB, Grierson’s international reputation was characterized by some as “leftwing” or “radical.”25 Not dissimilar to other targets of Canadian anti-communist
suspicion, the perception of the NFB worsened in the aftermath of the Gouzenko affair.
Called to testify before the Kellock-Taschereau Royal Commission in 1946, Grierson
admitted to holding a range of personal political views, including international
socialism.26 This disclosure fueled fears the NFB was institutionally predisposed to
communist sympathies and susceptible to subversive activity. Specific NFB employees
who supposedly had “left-wing” views or associations, including Grierson’s former
secretary, were further implicated after they were named in Gouzenko’s espionage
documents.27 In response, the RCMP began compiling extensive dossiers on NFB
filmmakers and employees. Political pressure accompanied the activity of the security
services. In 1948, Minister of National Revenue James McCann communicated his
concerns regarding the possibility of communist activity at the NFB directly to RCMP
Superintendent George McClellan. Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament
G.J. Fraser, influenced by a New Zealand film industry investigation, similarly called for
an inquiry into the possibility of communist infiltration in the NFB in 1949.28 This climate
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of suspicion and mounting belief of communist subversion only intensified the scrutiny
directed at the NFB.
The subject matter of some NFB films exacerbated ongoing anti-communist
concerns. A perception existed, both during and after the Second World War, that NFB
films were too sympathetic to China and the Soviet Union.29 Concerns about national
allegiance were aggravated in late 1949 when the Financial Post reported the
Department of National Defence had suspended its relationship with the NFB because
of security concerns.30 The Financial Post’s claim was seemingly legitimized when the
Security Panel, the Canadian interdepartmental body that advised the government on
internal security matters, designated the NFB a “vulnerable” agency that same year.
Consistent with the departments of External Affairs, National Defence, the Prime
Minister’s Office, the Privy Council Office, and the RCMP, all NFB employees would now
require security clearances.31 W. Arthur Irwin, who became NFB Commissioner in 1950,
confirmed the heightened level of scrutiny at that time. The Defence Department
refused to let the NFB handle any confidential or secret material on the basis the
agency was a security risk.32 Irwin recounted an unproductive investigation with only
three substantiated leads from a staff of around 560. One trivial case included suspicion
of a staffer based solely on his affiliation with the progressive and socialist Co-operative
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Commonwealth Federation (CCF), and an incidence of heckling the Minister of
Agriculture at a political meeting.33 Even if unfounded, the susceptibility of the cultural
realm to communist influence remained a consistent concern and a fear often exploited.
The negative legacy of John Grierson and a powerful lobby of competitors
resulted in persistent anti-communist pressure on the NFB. An outsider to the Canadian
government, Grierson’s administrative manner had clashed with accepted bureaucratic
practices. A grating personal style, mixed with “left-wing” politics, led critics to assert and
proclaim Grierson’s alleged communist sympathies.34 Continued concerns about the
NFB coincided with an attempt by the cultural institution to gain greater independence
and expand its programming reach. In a brief presented to the Massey Commission, the
NFB advocated for several changes. Originally an advisory board, the NFB had grown
into a large film studio with a wide distribution network. The Massey Commission
submission advocated for an increased budget and staffing infrastructure as part of
transitioning the NFB into a corporate body operating under Parliamentary review. This
would be accompanied by the extension of fieldwork, research, library services, the
further development of international distribution, and enhanced resources for television
programming.35 The commercial entertainment industry used the previously identified
suspicions of communist influences at the NFB to raise concerns about this plan for an
expanded scope of operations.
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In addition to considerable concerns about the NFB holding and expanding its
industry monopoly, private film companies criticized the studio on a variety of fronts. It
was alleged the NFB exhibited ideological predispositions and skewed its programming
by specifically promoting communist unions.36 General complaints of high prices,
special charges, and long delays were used to substantiate accusations the NFB
misused its public funding. In a related attack, the NFB was accused of using political
pressure to restrain private competition.37 This opposition was not without motive, as
the commercial film industry stood to benefit from a weakened NFB. For example,
instead of the NFB, Canadian private firms Associated Screen News and Crawley Films
received the classified Department of National Defence contracts referenced earlier in
the Financial Post article.38 These suspicions culminated in the removal of accused
communists from the NFB.
There have been, however, opposing historiographical explanations of the scope
of the subsequent dismissals. Reginald Whitaker, Gregory S. Kealey, and Andrew
Parnaby outline this debate in Secret Service: Political Policing in Canada From the
Fenians to Fortress America. The traditional interpretation is that a security problem
within the NFB in the late 1940s necessitated an investigation by security services.
Three individuals representing specific security risks were identified and terminated, and
the NFB resumed its role as a crucial facilitator of Canadian culture.39 The alternative
historiographical explanation argues the anti-communism investigation was more
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punitive and secretive, resulting in a McCarthyist-style “purge” at the NFB. This was said
to be motivated less by subversion and more by personal politics and industry
dissatisfaction with a publicly sponsored competitor. In Cold War Canada, Whitaker and
Gary Marcuse argue that while the exact number of employees “purged” was not readily
identifiable, “it [was] absolutely clear, however, that the three dismissals represent a
mere fraction of the total.”40 After the further declassification of pertinent records, this
interpretation was refuted. In Secret Service, Whitaker, Kealey, and Parnaby, argue that
newly released source material disproved the “purge” theory and strengthened the
validity of the original explanation.41 Both historical interpretations reiterate a concern
the NFB, a historically powerful tool of cultural propaganda, was considered susceptible
to subversive influences. Whether motivated by a genuine fear of communist ideology,
or the potential for self-interested economic gain, the ability of the NFB to continue as a
legitimate cultural institution was increasingly contested by its critics.
The experience of the NFB illustrates a reoccurring dichotomy within the arts in
Canada. While publicly-funded institutions were intended to bolster Canadian national
identity, they routinely became the targets of anti-communists. The fear of subversion
was connected to the ability to influence. With the power to shape national narratives,
cultural institutions were perceived to hold significant power. The same reason the NFB
was relied on to construct notions of Canadian identity made it a focus of suspicion for
some anti-communist activists. This pattern is also evident when looking at the evolution
of the CBC.
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The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation

As outlined earlier in this chapter, the CBC played a primary role as radio and
television became integrated into the daily routines of Canadians. The 1957 Royal
Commission on Broadcasting (Fowler Commission) argued that radio and television
enriched the lives of Canadians by bringing into the home a variety of informational and
entertainment programming spanning history, world affairs, art, and science.42 This
commission was charged with considering the implications of private television and the
broad financial challenges within Canadian broadcasting. While the CBC was
responsible for broadcasting and distributing Canadian content, the Fowler Commission
argued that both public and private entities must work to elevate cultural content that
created and reinforced a national consciousness and identity. It also concluded that the
CBC would not survive on commercial revenues alone, and public money was
necessary to prevent the further intrusion of American culture.43 The Massey
Commission’s nationalistic cultural emphasis was very much still present in this
investigation of Canada’s broadcasting systems.
Despite being relied upon to construct visions of Canadian nationalism, the CBC
was also hindered by continual communist accusations. Like the NFB, the CBC faced
criticisms based on the supposed influence of foreign ideologies. As early as July 1946,
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Social Credit MP Norman Jaques44 suggested the CBC was used along with the NFB to
spread communist ideology throughout Canada.45 Primarily concerned about
propaganda in the wake of the Gouzenko revelations, Jaques raised the issue of access
to the public broadcaster. He criticized the CBC for providing the Labor-Progressive
Party (LPP) with the same amount of free broadcasting time as the Social Credit Party,
despite the former’s various associations and connections to the Communist Party of
Canada (CPC).46 Vigilance in the face of the communist threat was stressed. Jaques
warned that no one should “make the mistake of thinking that we have rounded up the
last of the spies, that that is the end of communism and the end of traitors in Canada.”47
Another Social Credit MP, E.G. Hansel, raised the LPP’s access to CBC broadcast time
again a month later.
Speaking before the Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting, Hansell pressed
A. Davidson Dunton, Chairman of the CBC, on the legitimacy of continuing to allow the
LPP to broadcast on the national network given their status as a “front” for the CPC.
Dunton responded that under the parliament-approved white paper policy on political
and controversial broadcasting, the LPP qualified as a national political party permitted
to broadcast during the times disputed.48 Further, Dunton asserted that while the CBC
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retained authority over radio broadcasting, the broadcaster ultimately operated under
the authority of the government. The parliamentary committee retained the right to
determine the broadcast rights of communists or entities with suspected communist ties.
Dunton denied it was the function of the CBC to mold opinion and maintained the role of
the public broadcaster was “to give the opportunity for minds of Canada to be influenced
- not to influence them.”49 Despite this assurance, fears remained that communists were
embedded in the CBC.
A 1955 CBC public relations newsletter acknowledged the anti-communist
attacks of Ron Gostick and the Canadian Intelligence Service (CIS). In materials sent to
a variety of weekly papers, Gostick charged that the CBC was dominated by communist
propagandists. Reassured by the RCMP that the group had no official standing, the
memo explained that two recent editorials had picked up the claims made by the CIS.
The Brockville Recorder and Times in Ontario reprinted the accusation, which it
described as “rather alarming reading.” The editorial cautioned against the possibility of
Canada becoming a base for subversion on the continent and warned that “because
radio offers these subversives a mighty powerful tool, officials of the government should
concern themselves over the possibility of Red influences.”50 The CBC’s vast audience
fostered further fears of communists working within the national broadcaster.
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While the Brockville Recorder and Times appeared to lend credibility to Gostick’s
criticism of the CBC, this claim was also scrutinized. Harold Horwood, columnist for
Newfoundland’s Corner Brook Western Star, was quoted in the same brief arguing that
the CBC was the subject of a prolonged smear campaign influenced by American
Senator and anti-communist crusader Joseph McCarthy. Horwood suggested some
individuals within independent Canadian radio and television companies, motivated by
jealousy of the CBC’s preeminence, “aligned themselves with the red-baiters and Jewbaiters of the McCarthy camp in order to smear CBC for their private advantage…”51
This commentary alludes to the fact that the CBC was also subject to the type of anticommunist attacks influenced by commercial self-interest which plagued the NFB. Anticommunism continued to be employed as a tool to delegitimize and disadvantage
competitors.
This tension between commercial radio broadcasters and the CBC originated out
of the public broadcaster’s funding model. Private broadcasters protested their industry
being regulated by the government, which also funded their rival, the CBC. These
claims were presented to the Massey Commission, which responded in its report that
the Canadian radio broadcasting legislation effectively provided for one national system,
which private commercial broadcasters needed to operate within.52 The government
similarly regulated television broadcasting. It was believed that the higher costs
associated with television broadcasting would lead uncontrolled private operators in
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Canada to become channels with primarily American content.53 For private broadcasters
in radio and television, the perceived disadvantage of being regulated by a competitor
remained a significant point of contention.
One prominent accusation lodged against the CBC from the private sector came
from H. Gordon Love, President of Calgary’s CFCN television station. Love’s station
was associated with a nation-wide commercial television network operating in direct
competition with the CBC. In addition to arguing the CBC was “riddled with Communisttype thinking,” Love maintained the broadcaster deliberately elevated socialist
programming.54 Love used some provocative language in his attempts to accentuate
this point. Not only did Love claim the CBC was “the greatest single promoter of
socialism in the world,” but he further stated it was a “monster” which would one day
turn on the Canadian people. In Love’s interpretation, the very existence of the CBC
represented a tangible threat to Canada.55 This aggressive criticism produced several
poignant rebuttals.
A Calgary Herald editorial argued that regardless of the personal programming
preferences of individuals, the CBC had a mandate to cover a wide range of ideological
perspectives, including interviews with socialists, pacifists, atheists, and even
communists. For example, it was suggested the CBC’s interview of the socialist former
leader of the Canadian Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, M. J. Caldwell, should
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not automatically indicate a preference for “communist thinking,” but rather reflected the
necessity of covering individuals and movements of consequence to Canada’s national
politics.56 The Winnipeg Free Press suggested Love’s accusations mimicked the earlier
tactics of Joseph McCarthy. This editorial was especially critical of Love’s use of the
phrase “communist-type thinking.” While clearly suggesting the existence of
“communist-type thinkers” disseminating propaganda at the CBC, Love failed to identify
any specific subversives working at the public broadcaster. Regardless, such
unsubstantiated accusations contributed to the ongoing suspicion directed at CBC
personnel.57 The editorial further argued Love’s rhetoric echoed ardent anti-communists
such as the American influenced John Birch Society, and Québec critics of the CBC
who were prone to the same ideological extremes of which they accused communists.58
Conspiracy theories were prevalent and accompanied by vague charges and abusive
personal smears.
The early 1960s brought accusations directed at the Canadian media more
broadly by Pat Walsh, Gostick’s frequent collaborator. In a June 1960 issue of The
Canadian Intelligence Service, Walsh accused Jean-Louis Gagnon, then editor-in-chief
of Montreal’s largest francophone daily, La Presse, of being a communist. As outlined in
chapter three, Gagnon was a consistent target of Walsh, with accusations continuing
through 1970. This charge stretched back to the Young Communist League in 1935, but
Walsh’s primary concern was Gagnon’s influence at La Press. Walsh argued that you

“The Woes of the CBC.”
“Those CBC Reds.”
58 Ibid.
56
57

208

Chapter 5 – A Cultural Lens of Analysis
could “take any issue of La Presse since Gagnon took over virtual control of its editorial
policy and you [would] find dozens of examples of subtle Communist propaganda
cleverly injected.”59 Referring specifically to the editorial pages of La Presse, Walsh
pointed to support for Fidel Castro in Cuba, the promotion of cultural exchanges with the
Soviet Union, and favouring the end of nuclear tests for the purposes of disarmament.
The news coverage of La Presse also drew Walsh’s ire by presenting opposition to
missile-launching platforms in Canada, but not opposing similarly aggressive defence
preparations undertaken by the Soviet Union.60 As a concluding thought to this report on
Gagnon, Walsh lamented the lack of a robust process for the government to identify
threats to domestic Cold War stability. Walsh remarked:
How unfortunate that we have no Committee on Un-Canadian activities or
Senate Internal Security Committee to probe Commie infiltration. If we had, we
could uncover many other Communist agents in newspapers such as the GLOBE
AND MAIL, the TORONTO STAR, and LA PRESSE. This would explain why
these so-called “capitalist” newspapers so often slant news in favour of the
Soviets and in favour of ‘recognizing’ Red China. Especially, we could expose
Comrade Jean-Louis Gagnon as one of the most dangerous Reds in Canada.61

While Walsh’s criticism of the Canadian media was broad in scope, the focus of anticommunists continued to coalesce around the CBC.
With a perspective similar to Walsh, Calvin MacDonald raised suspicions about
the CBC. In a 1962 article for the Toronto Telegram News Service, MacDonald detailed
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the ten years he spent as a member of the CPC, while also acting as a RCMP
informant. MacDonald claimed Toronto was the headquarters of the communist
movement in Canada, emphasizing the ability of the CPC to draw members from ethnic
groups in the city, especially recent immigrants from behind the Iron Curtain.62 Unlike
other anti-communist activists, MacDonald attempted to avoid generalizations by
admitting that not all new Canadians were likely to be sympathetic to communist
ideology. Nevertheless, his claims reinforced the common fear of subversive elements.
MacDonald maintained an explicit concern about communist infiltration at the CBC. In
reference to the influence of communists in Toronto, MacDonald stated:
The CBC immediately comes to mind. Don’t misunderstand me. The CBC isn’t
run by Communists and, as far as I know, none of the highly-ranking officials is a
Communist. However, I have been told by provincial Communist leaders that
there are Communists at the CBC and that there is a Communist Club whose
members are drawn from the CBC. In sensitive positions in such an organization,
they could certainly get across ideas that are helpful to the party. I make no
accusations and I name no names.63
MacDonald’s comments were both accusatory and dismissive. The suggestion the CBC
was a complicit ally for communists or their sympathizers was a consistent narrative, as
the public broadcaster was deemed vulnerable to domestic ideological infiltration.
In early 1961, Liberal Member of Parliament Chesley W. Carter had raised
familiar concerns about the CBC consciously disseminating subversive communist
propaganda. The Newfoundland Member of Parliament suggested subtle ideological
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messaging was influenced, or perhaps directly coordinated, by the Kremlin.64 When
pressed to substantiate his claims, Carter pointed to several programming decisions
indicative of CBC communist sympathies. For example, the visit of the West German
Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, coincided with anti-Nazi films on the CBC. Carter did not
believe this was unintentional. He suggested CBC programming focused on Nazi
atrocities whenever the Kremlin encouraged an anti-German position. Other instances
included content sympathetic to “Red China” and a film on atomic weaponry presented
in a perceived anti-American context.65 To deal with this perceived internalized CBC
ideological prejudice, Carter called for changes to the 1958 Broadcasting Act.
Carter’s proposal reflected a desire for increased control over the CBC. Clarifying
the CBC’s governing legislation would allow for a Parliamentary directive that
specifically referenced national security.66 If there were communist “enemies” within the
CBC, their discretionary influence on programming had to be mitigated. Carter’s
accusations were forcefully denied by then CBC president Alphonse Ouimet. Replying
in a House of Commons broadcasting committee, Ouimet maintained the CBC always
attempted to reflect the range of viewpoints present across the country and ensured
employees with visible or obvious ideological positions were not placed in news delivery
or other positions requiring impartiality. Further, security screening was in place to
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protect vulnerable roles, such as transmitter operations.67 This type of criticism often
provoked a noticeable public reaction.
While by no means conclusive, newspaper letters-to-the editor provide a valuable
perspective from a subsection of engaged citizens. Québec City resident John B.
Mitchell described Carter’s claims as indicative of a “great Canadian witch-hunt.”68 In a
similar letter, also written to the Ottawa Citizen, Charles Bowman from Nanaimo, British
Columbia was concerned the Liberal Party would allow itself to be influenced by the
“fear” of domestic communism.69 Conversely, David Freedman from Ottawa expressed
appreciation for Carter’s concern about the CBC. Freedman shared Carter’s fears that
the CBC disseminated pro-communist ideas and specifically mentioned a quiz-based
program he believed celebrated the personal experiences and perspectives of a selfidentified former communist turned Marxist.70 It must be reiterated that consensus
favouring either interpretation of the cultural communist threat was elusive, but it is
nonetheless important to recognize that the public was critically engaged in this debate.
In another noteworthy letter-to-the editor, David Michaelson from Montreal wrote
that the projected fear of communism stemmed from a belief that if permitted to occupy
positions of power, communists would strip away personal liberties. The difficulty,
Michaelson argued, was that this anti-communist inspired suppression of free speech
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was equally problematic.71 This climate of “fear” effectively hindered constructive public
and civic discourse. The threat of appearing to support communist ideas forced policymakers to abandon positions on issues ranging from hospital insurance to humanitarian
aid and foreign policy neutrality: “As long as the Reds are for it, we will have to be
against it.”72 Michaelson suggested many Canadians desired to see the country assert
its international independence more clearly. However, given that the Communist Party
of Canada favoured cuts to arms expenditures, the removal of American military bases
from Canadian territory, and objected to the Canadian military acquiring American
nuclear armaments, the adoption of these positions by the government risked
accusations of communist influence or intrusion.73 Michaelson’s concerns illustrate how
the “fear” of domestic communism often merged debates about acceptable forms of
cultural expression, policy formation, and expressions of Canadian sovereignty.

Radio Dramas

Despite the controversies surrounding the cultural institutions themselves, arts
and entertainment communities in Canada had been engaging their audiences with
interpretations of subversive Soviet communism since the later stages of the Second
World War. Common concerns about the seditious nature of cultural institutions were
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both reinforced and dismissed. Canadian radio dramas broadcast in Canada but with
stories based in the United States allowed for engagement with certain early Cold War
themes, but from an observational rather than self-reflective perspective. Canadian
audiences were not necessarily forced to consider whether a certain story was plausible
in their personal context. In Merrit P. Allen’s Episode in Red, broadcast on CBC Radio in
1944, a suspected young communist is seemingly exposed in a small Vermont village.74
Noah Perkins and his wife Mary were renting a room to Judd Andrews, who began to
exhibit suspicious behaviour. The Perkins’ friend Abel Hodge, who owns a small
business that employed the boarder, observes Judd scribbling notes on pieces of paper.
The Perkins debate whether Judd’s odd actions could be related to illness, or perhaps a
budding romantic relationship with another acquaintance, Sally Peet. Abel, on the other
hand, perceives Judd to have malicious intentions.
While Judd is out on a delivery for the store, Noah and Abel search his jacket and
find pieces of paper containing threats of murdering “the boss,” poisoning the governor,
and even detonating explosives. In addition to tips for preventing fingerprint evidence,
another note indicates this planning was approved by the “World Revolution
Committee.” Abel explains the drastic consequences of this discovery:
Abel: It means Judd’s turned Red. He’s a Bolshevieky.
Noah: They - they’re Roosians, aint’ they?
Abel: Not all of ‘em. They’re anybody who wants to bust up the gov’ment with
gunpowder.
Noah: But gosh sakes, Abel, Judd never shot a gun in his life.
Abel: Them’re just the ones who plan revolutions.75
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Noah remains incredulous:
Noah: How’d they git hold of him? He’s never been outside the state of Vermont
in his whole life.
Abel: They’ve got a grapevine, Noah.
Noah: A grapevine?
Abel: Yeh, that’s what they call their secret way of sending’ word round ‘mongst
themselves.76
With this apparent evidence in hand, the Perkins confront Judd about his subversive
agenda.
Despite Abel’s insistence, it turns out Judd’s actions were explainable. Desperate
to pay off a work debt so he and Sally could marry, Judd had attempted to write a novel.
Convinced he could make good money on a relevant international affairs topic, Judd
had been jotting down ideas about communists and revolutions on pieces of paper and
had even constructed an imitation bomb to assist the accuracy of his writing.77 Episode
in Red is noteworthy for several reasons. Its portrayal of ideological suspicions
demonstrates how the fear of communism existed in the public consciousness before
the intensification of the Cold War. Longstanding suspicions of communism, dating back
to the 1919 Winnipeg General Strike, were quickly reawakened by the Soviet Union’s
challenging relationship with the Allied powers during the Second World War. Presented
as a comedy, this story also allowed a Canadian audience to satirically associate inane
and ultimately false communist accusations with the United States.
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In March 1947, the Popular Radio Playhouse series on CBC’s Trans Canada
Network aired Kimbrall McIlroy’s comedy, The Intrigue at Mill Centre.78 This story
revolved around two “small-town loafers,” Walter and George, increasingly irritated by
the police evicting them from a public park. Walter devises a plan to earn some easy
money and prove to the constable the error of disrespecting a “substantial citizen.”
Earlier that week, Walter encountered a “foreign looking fellow” who explained he could
earn some quick money by conveying information about military installations. George
was initially skeptical:
George: Wouldn’t that be sort of like spying?
Walter: The fellow said it wasn’t like spying at all, because it was for the benefit of
the working classes and that’s what we are.
George: (Doubtfully) Are we?
Walter: Sure we are, whether we know it or not. Everybody’s either a worker or a
capitalist.79
After further debate about the possible consequences of spying, another altercation with
the police convinces them to pursue the plan.
Walter and George struggle to find a target in their small rural town. After ruling
out the cheese factory, they settle on the waterworks. George is convinced an important
public utility would be an unexpected and valued target, especially in the event of a war.
To ensure adequate financial compensation, the pair decide to exaggerate the
importance of the facility in their letter to the foreign contact. To make it sound more like
a hidden military installation, they describe the facility as housing guns, bombs, and
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mines.80 While drafting the salutation of their letter, Walter remarks “the fellow was
talking about the working classes all the time. ‘Sir’ sounds sort of fancy. Sort of
capitalistic, like. Just plain ‘Mister’ would be better.”81 After eagerly anticipating a
response to their disclosure, Walter and George are startled when two foreign men seek
them out in person.
Karl, the more vocal foreign contact, expresses keen interest in the information,
but requires Walter to smuggle a briefcase bomb into the waterworks before payment is
received. Opposed to this demand, Walter secretly leaves the bomb in Karl’s trunk. As
the car sped away in an attempt to cheat the two locals, Walter and George are relieved
and ultimately pleased with their ability to outsmart the two foreigners. Back in the park
and again confronted by the police, Walter uses the ensuing distant explosion of the
briefcase bomb to convince the constable they are not a priority and remarks to George
that they are indeed “substantial citizens,” in ways the officer would never realize.82
There is an intentional irony played out in this story, as the two main characters attempt
to take advantage of foreign communists, preying on their championing of the working
class for their own capitalistic ambitions. Further, interactions with an arbitrarily abusive
police force hint at emerging public unease with security services attempting to control
individual behaviour.
Cultural depictions of the domestic threat of communism focused on several key
themes. Episode in Red, broadcast in 1944, explored the development of individual and
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personal suspicions, which reflected contemporary anxieties about international
communism. The fraught wartime alliance between the Soviet Union and the Western
powers produced a multitude of diplomatic debates, guarded defence planning, and a
general uncertainty about future relations.83 Episode in Red also engaged the perceived
connection between communism and the threat of violent revolution. When one
character in the story is suspected of plotting a political assassination and planning to
set off explosives, his accusers assume that he must be a “Red,” a Russian, or a
Bolshevik. While The Intrigue at Mill Centre explored the idea that communists were
covertly trying to recruit followers, its use of humor can be interpreted as an attempt to
discredit the perceived effectiveness of these efforts. As the previous chapter illustrated,
concerns about subversive communists, especially following the Gouzenko espionage
revelations, were a part of the early Cold War public discourse. Analyzing cultural
interpretations of these threats and fears informs a more comprehensive understanding
of this ongoing debate.
By 1953, certain writers were increasingly focused on the consequences of
suspected communist affiliations or sympathies. Broadcast in May of that year on CBC
Radio, James Bannerman explored this topic in his drama, Red is for Danger.84 In this
production, a man’s words and actions are misinterpreted by his co-workers, whose
misguided suspicions ultimately contribute to his firing. This confluence of incriminating
circumstances begins when Joe Harwood is asked by a chemist acquaintance to
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provide a character reference to the RCMP. A neighbour watches an officer visit the
Harwood household to complete the check, and when later questioned about the nature
of the observed encounter, Joe’s dismissive explanation raises questions.85 Similar
misgivings emerge when Joe’s co-worker, Jim Carter, challenges his seemingly passive
opinion about defence production. Coincidentally, Carter happens to have lunch shortly
after with Joe’s neighbour, who inaccurately insinuates the RCMP were at the Harwood
residence on a matter related to communist suspicions.86 While this gossip confirmed
Carter’s concerns, it was a series of further observations that force him to act.
While walking down the street together Joe does not buy a Remembrance Day
poppy, excusing this to Carter by remarking that he did not have any change. Later,
Carter observes Joe entering a building containing the headquarters of an identified
communist organization. Unbeknownst to Carter, Joe had stepped into the store to use
the phone to arrange assistance following car problems.87 Unsure exactly how to
proceed, Carter shares his suspicions with his superiors. Company official J. B. Gelhorn
was not convinced, and their direct superior Mr. Brown, assuming there was a logical
explanation, urges his employees not to jump to any conclusions.88 While Joe was
afforded the benefit of the doubt, questions continued to mount. It was discovered that
Joe was listed as a patron of the “League of Cultural Objectives,” a recently exposed
communist front. After further inquiries, Brown also uncovers an editorial written by Joe
during his university days where he called munitions manufacturers “Merchants of
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Death,” and declared that his generation should reject war under any circumstance.
Such examples validated Carter’s assertions, and Brown is forced to admit that “[Joe]
continues to give us all these various reasons for suspecting him, I’m afraid we’re
simply going to have to act on the principle that there’s no smoke without fire.”89 Joe’s
credibility was irrevocably damaged when it came to light that he held unauthorized
meetings with the company’s union representatives.
Carter once again serves as the coincidental observer, witnessing Joe meet with
a union organizer in what he assumes to be strike organizing. At this point, Joe realizes
there are growing perceptions he is a communist. The impending strike forces a
confrontation with Brown, and Joe protests suggestions he has nefarious intentions:
Joe: (BITTERLY) Look Mr. Brown - who do you think you’re kidding? What you
really mean is that Jim Carter’s been insinuating I’m a communist and it’s turned
you against me.
Brown: (SUAVELY AND A LITTLE TOO HASTILY) Not at all. That’s got nothing to
do with it.
Joe: You don’t deny he has been insinuating that, do you?
Brown: (CAUTIOUSLY) He has certainly - ah… expressed concern about it…
Joe: (BURSTING OUT) But he’s absolutely wrong - and I can prove it!
Brown: (SMOOTHLY) I’m sure you could - but you’d be very foolish to try.
Neither Carter nor anyone else has actually accused you - and under the
circumstances people might think you were protesting too much…90
Joe presses Brown on the legitimacy of false accusations as the justification for forcing
him out of the company:
Joe: With all that’s going around, who’d want me? (BURSTING OUT AGAIN)
Anyway I’m not a communist! It isn’t true!
Brown: (ALMOST GENTLY) The way things are these days it doesn’t really have
to be true. Once a rumour like that gets out of hand, the damage is done.91
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Ultimately, Joe is fired outright. This radio drama communicated the consequences of
perceived communist subversion, and the societal imperative to continually demonstrate
both private and professional loyalty to Western ideology. Even unsubstantiated
rumours had the potential to endanger reputations and careers.
Each of the radio dramas discussed in this section tell stories that engage with
themes of suspicion, sabotage, subversion, and the general fear of communism. It is
significant that all three stories mostly concentrate on interactions between citizens.
There are no scenes depicting punitive government action, the overreach of security
services, or the abuse of civil rights. Bannerman included a passing reference to the
RCMP, but not as a driving force of anti-communism. In different ways, each story
depicted the personal reaction of people to suspected subversive behaviour or
communist sympathies. In these examples, the domestic threat of communism was
addressed by citizens in public spaces without the direct intervention of the state. In two
of these stories, allegations proved to be largely erroneous. It’s possible this reinforced,
in the minds of certain listeners, the need for more effective police action or dissuaded
others from making similarly hasty claims. The audience reaction, or whether the writers
intended these thematic elements, is unknown, but it is significant to observe the
different cultural interpretations offered to Canadians. Returning to Stephen Whitfield’s
analysis of the politicization of culture during the Cold War, radio dramas broadcast on
influential CBC Radio appeared more focused on the flawed aspects of public anticommunism than defining the specific threat faced by Canadians. This was a foundation
of the perception that Canadian anti-communism was less punitive than in the United
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States. It was easier to define and condemn American anti-communism, than engage
with the consequences faced by Canadians themselves.
CBC Radio was an important cultural medium at this time. Alice Frick, a script
editor with the CBC’s drama department for nineteen years, described the period
between 1949 and 1954 as the “golden age of Canadian radio.”92 Reflecting both on her
own experience and speaking with contemporaries, Frick emphasized the Stage series
of radio dramas as an important factor in this success. There were a variety of themes
and ideas explored, from comedy to tragedy, and often stories that were only possible
because of the technical creativity made possible by the radio drama format. A satirical
exploration of communist themes, written by Canadian writer Reuben Ship, featured
prominently in Frick’s recollection of this prominent period and will be discussed indepth in chapter six.93 Evidence presented to the Fowler Commission supports Frick’s
assertion about CBC Radio’s peak period of popularity. The CBC’s net commercial
revenues from radio reached a high of $2.5 million in 1953, before steadily slipping to
$1.7 million by March 1956, as advertising dollars migrated to television broadcasts.
Despite this decline in advertising revenue, the Fowler Commission maintained that
while radio listening no longer dominated the “living room,” evidence suggested that
Canadians continued to listen to the radio in very large numbers.94
Public polling offers some complementary insights into the cultural consumption
habits of Canadians. A Gallup Poll conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public
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Opinion in December 1957 asked Canadians what they did the previous evening. Just
over 55 percent of respondents indicated they watched television, while approximately
15 percent listened to the radio.95 Similar data is available from the Dominion Bureau of
Statistics, which conducted its first pilot survey of the Canadian radio and television
broadcasting industry in 1956.96 These surveys concentrated on financial statistics and
gained comparative value each year and with increased participation from private
broadcasters. The data reinforces the identified trend of television becoming steadily
more popular and profitable than radio. In 1956, total revenue for radio ($48.6 million)
just edged above television ($46.2 million), though the more expensive production costs
of the visual medium must be acknowledged. By 1960, the total revenues of television
($83.9 million) easily surpassed radio ($67.3 million).97 Employing a different metric, it
was estimated in 1961 that there were 12 million households with either a radio or
television receiving set.98 This represented a considerable percentage of Canadians,
given that the 1961 census indicated a national population of just over 18.2 million
people. Despite the inevitable shift in preference to television, the general comparison
suggests that when the three radio dramas investigated in this section hit the airwaves
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between the mid-1940s and mid-1950s, radio remained a competitive and highly
consumed source of entertainment.

Individual Encounters with Anti-Communism in the Cultural Realm

As this chapter has demonstrated, arts and culture communities were active
interpreters of communism. While the broad anti-communist targeting of the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation and National Film Board has already been discussed, this
section concentrates on the individual encounters of select cultural producers. At times
the very institutions being targeted by anti-communists were also probing their own
employees. When it comes to capturing the private experiences of Canadians, Len
Scher’s The Un-Canadians represents an early collection of personal and familial
accounts of those subjected to harsh Canadian anti-communism. In one contribution,
actress and writer-producer Susan Fletcher recounts losing her CBC radio program that
had aired in the late 1940s. Based out of Vancouver, Fletcher focused on the Hollywood
entertainment scene and especially the increasing number of Canadian artists, actors,
and musicians working south of the border. One of Fletcher’s trips occurred during the
American congressional House Un-American Activities Committees hearings in
Hollywood. Incredulous at the paranoia induced by HUAC amongst her Hollywood
peers, Fletcher decided to write a spoof. In the short sketch, a cowboy and his agent
have an intense discussion with an enraged journalist about whether it was appropriate
to ride off into a “red” sunset. After the broadcast, Fletcher received a wire from the
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CBC in Toronto informing her that her show would be cancelled, and the network would
no longer air her series because of complaints. An organization in Hollywood had
objected to her content. Fletcher was further informed that there was opposition to her
use of the show as a platform for her ideological opinions.99 At the CBC, there was an
inconsistent history of the type of censorship Fletcher experienced, and it was often
traced specifically to political affiliation or ideology.
Toby Gordon Ryan, an actor, director, and drama teacher, suggests in another
account in the The Un-Canadians that the “McCarthyist” style of anti-communism had a
long history in the Canadian arts scene. Ryan argues that, as early as the 1930s, a
“Red Squad” of the City of Toronto Police Department was monitoring theatre
rehearsals, noting participants, and taking pictures.100 These reflections are recalled in
great depth in Stage Left: Canadian Theatre in the Thirties: A Memoir.101 After
Gouzenko, Ryan suggested theatre audiences changed and that the Cold War
discouraged cultural examinations of the “left-wing movement.” Ryan explains that her
attempts to organize a progressive theatre troupe, “The Play Actors,” in the 1950s was
met with robust disapproval, including a Toronto critic labeling the group “agitprop,” a
term used to describe pro-Soviet political propaganda.102 For artists such as Ryan, anticommunism in Canada seemed to intensify over time.
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The Un-Canadians details a variety of other individual experiences with
communist suspicion, lost jobs, and close attention by the RMCP. Prejudice in various
forms because of prior communist associations or sympathies often triggered
perceptions of an unofficial entertainment “blacklist.” Gloria Cohen, widow of theatre
critic Nathan Cohen, recounted his removal as a reoccurring panelist on the CBC quiz
show, “Fighting Words.”103 Bob Mutrie had vivid recollections of the RCMP visiting his
home to question his father about specific CBC colleagues during the early 1950s.
Furgus Mutrie was head of CBC Television at the time.104 Poet Irving Layton described
the moment he discovered the RCMP had labeled him a “dangerous subversive.”105
Bess Shockett described how her older brother, a sportswriter and close friend of
American baseball player Jackie Robinson, was blacklisted in the industry after
publishing in the Canadian communist newspaper, The Daily Tribune.106 These
personal interactions with anti-communism help to create a broader understanding of
the culture of suspicion that existed in Canada. Lack of clarity was often the result of
ambiguous anti-communist policies, where the political message diverged from the
actions of security services or the government itself. The cultural institutions referenced
in these accounts were similarly characterized by conflicting anti-communist positions.
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In the late 1940s, there was active debate about what ideological perspectives
should be represented on the CBC. At a March 23, 1948, meeting of CBC Chairman
Davidson Dunton, Director General of Programs Ernest Bushnell, and Supervisor of
Talks in Ottawa Neil Morrison, it was determined that communists or communist
sympathizers would no longer be permitted to participate in CBC commentary
segments. Limited exceptions were available but required careful consideration in
advance. The justification provided was that the purpose of CBC commentaries on
national and international affairs was to educate listeners, not provide speakers the
opportunity to argue in favour of their own viewpoint.107 On March 31, 1948, a group
from the Talks Department that included Charles Harris, James Scott, Marjorie
McEnaney, Elizabeth Long, and Frank Peers responded with a memorandum of
concerns. The group provided a series of reasons why they believed the directive to be
both wrong and difficult to implement, including: the restriction of freedom of expression
and opinion; the lack of public transparency leading to the policy change; the risk that
denying access to communists would only enhance their public support; the possibility
some “leftist” contributors would perceive the policy as labeling them communist “fellow
travelers”; and the anticipation of criticism from a variety of sources.108
CBC leadership agreed to meet with the Talks department representatives on
April 7, 1948. In response to their concerns, Dunton explained this measure was only

UTMCA, Frank Peers fonds, Box 8, File 26-2, Confidential – Meeting of the Chairman, Director
General of Programs and Supervisor of Talks in Ottawa, March 23, 1948 RE. COMMENTARIES (23
March 1948).
108 UTMCA, Frank Peers fonds, Box 8, File 26-2, TO: Director General of Programmes (31 March 1948),
pages 1-3.
107

227

Chapter 5 – A Cultural Lens of Analysis
intended as a modification of existing policy, and that there were no intentions of
banning communists from the network. Dunton agreed to vacate the March 23rd
changes, and the group came to an understanding on several broad points of
compromise. Specifically, it was acknowledged that while communists would not be
banned, the CBC needed to be careful not to provide them with a disproportionate
amount of air time. A greater variety of commentators was also recommended, to
prevent contributors from being identified with specific points of view.109 This emphasis
re-affirmed the existing CBC policy on controversial broadcasting. The CBC Board of
Governors had specified that freedom of speech and opinion were critical for the
success of free institutions. Preserving opportunities for a variety of perspectives was a
necessary safeguard for upholding free expression.110
As Dunton’s temporary policy modification indicates, there were clear attempts to
implement anti-communist measures at the CBC. Opposition to outright prohibitions
preserved the CBC’s stated commitment to freedom of speech and opinion, but the true
application of this principle left room for interpretation. It is particularly noteworthy that
while the CBC was faced with and navigated its own anti-communism allegations, it was
also addressing its own internal precautions and suspicions. The personal accounts
compiled by Scher suggest that even with internal advocates at prominent cultural
institutions like the CBC resisting aggressive anti-communism, an unofficial and
inconsistent entertainment blacklist existed. The proliferation of suspicion in arts and
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entertainment communities, regardless of how overtly it manifested, also served to drive
cultural producers out of Canada. A lack of opportunities for those individuals with any
history of communist suspicions or affiliations was often as effective as outright anticommunism measures. Several Canadian writers found themselves in this scenario and
left for career opportunities overseas.
Playwright Ted Allan, whose work will be subject to deeper analysis in chapter
six, left Canada for the United Kingdom in 1954. That year Allan’s play Legend of
Pepito, in the process of being adapted for television on the CBC, was pulled on the
second day of rehearsals. An American advertising agency sponsoring the series
complained about content critical of the United States. Allan was convinced the history
of his ideological associations was a root cause of the cancellation and saw in this
decision the further encroachment of the American entertainment blacklist in Canada.111
Allan was not alone in embarking across the Atlantic. Reuben Ship, also a key focus of
chapter six, similarly left Canada for London in 1955 and joined a community of expat
creatives congregated in the United Kingdom. Fellow writer Mordecai Richler described
Allan as a generous supporter of other Canadian writers, offering up money or
temporary lodging. When Richler first travelled to London, Allan convinced a television
company to provide him with a story to adapt.112 Richler, who grew up in the same
Montreal neighbourhood as Ship and Allan, wrote a novel about the expat artistic
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community that formed in the United Kingdom to avoid the anti-communism of Canada
and the United States.
Richler’s A Choice of Enemies (1957) tells the story of a group of liberal and
socialist Canadian and American writers and filmmakers exiled to London after
encountering McCarthyist anti-communist witch-hunts. The story focuses on Norman
Price, a Canadian academic turned writer who had reportedly left his university position
after refusing to disclose whether he was a communist.113 As this community struggled
to find professional opportunities in London, the tensions of past political struggles
remained. At a dinner party, one character recounts that the pressures for conformity
were so concentrated in the United States that “not going to church was enough to
brand you as a Red.”114 Canadian theatre critic Nathan Cohen, himself a onetime
member of the Labor-Progressive Party and subject of anti-communist inquiries,
described how Price became ideologically disillusioned with this new life. Cohen writes
that Price’s “discovery that his fellow refugees from McCarthyism [were] every inch as
unprincipled and intolerant as their persecutors destroy[ed] his sense of security.”115
Despite being removed from the immediate threat of North American anti-communism,
the expats in this story demanded strict philosophical adherence and descended into
the very kind of accusatory behaviour they were attempting to escape.
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Public Spaces and Cultural Exchanges

While radio dramas told stories that engaged with a variety of Cold War themes
and cultural organizations managed the risk of ideological subversion, other physical
venues provided public forums for individuals with common ideological beliefs to
congregate, or for others to explore new ideas. On March 9, 1953, a gathering at
Massey Hall in Toronto commemorated the recent death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.
The event included the Russian Canadian Women’s and Youth Choirs performing “Song
to a Departed Hero,” described as Lenin’s favourite song.116 In addition to appearances
by the Jewish Folk Choir and the Shevchenko Male Chorus, featured Canadian
communist speakers included Tim Buck, the National Leader of the LPP. Buck mourned
the passing of Stalin as a loss to all mankind, and formal remarks provided in the event
program “condemn[ed] the revolting efforts of the imperialist warmongers and their
lackeys to exploit this great tragedy in the interests of their aggressive drive for war and
to becloud the monumental achievements of Stalin.”117 While a substantial police
presence was organized to safeguard the gathering of approximately two thousand
people, there were no demonstrations. City, provincial, and federal leaders, though,
were quite critical of the event, with Progressive Conservative Opposition Leader
George Drew scathingly observing the respective groups did not hold a similar event
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after the death of King George VI the year prior.118 Despite the prevalence of sweeping
anti-communist attitudes, certain public spaces remained available for engagement with
the controversial ideology. This is significant because it further demonstrates the
incongruity of public dialogue. Anti-communists existed alongside Canadians interested
in the Soviet experience and sympathetic to the communist ideology. A limited, but state
permitted, environment of cultural exploration characterized these transnational
interactions.
At times these cultural encounters included formalized visits, with the Canadian
arts scene serving as the attraction. For example, in the summer of 1957 an official
Soviet visit was arranged to the Stratford Shakespearean Festival, in Stratford, Ontario.
The private trip was organized in conjunction with the Soviet Embassy and the
Department of External Affairs, and received the approval of the Department of
Citizenship and Immigration and the RCMP.119 Members of the Soviet delegation
included actor Mikhail Kosakov and theatre director Mikhail Tsarev. The twenty-twoyear-old Kosakov tried on one of festival actor Christopher Plummer’s Hamlet costumes
during a tour of the Stratford Festival Theatre.120 Interestingly, the Soviet press did
report some criticism from the visitors. Kosakov was quoted in Russian newspaper
Izvestia as suggesting that the apron stage at the festival theatre limited creativity. The
lauded apron stage incorporated modern theatre concepts and those of Shakespeare’s
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Globe Theatre and was the marvel of critics throughout North America.121 The possible
insinuation drawn from this comment is the intentional assertion of superior Soviet
cultural practices. Subtle gamesmanship took place even during the friendliest of
cultural exchanges.
Festival organizer Tom Patterson petitioned for the inevitable RCMP surveillance
of the visit to be less pronounced. A few years earlier, police monitoring of a different
group of Soviet visitors was so zealous it became a source of embarrassment for the
festival authorities.122 Aside from these types of challenges, positive engagement
encouraged further exchanges. In October 1958, the Canada Council, the newly formed
crown corporation with an arts mandate, announced scholarships in support of a visit to
Moscow by Stratford Festival representatives. The four festival officials invited by the
Soviet government included founder Tom Patterson, music director Louis Applebaum,
artistic director Michael Langham, and honorary secretary C. Elspeth Hall.123 Such visits
presented opportunities for cultural diplomacy and the ability to showcase Canadian
democracy. It is clear that a balance was required between the willingness to engage
with foreign communists, and the security demands required by the broader realities of
the global Cold War.
Before representatives from the Stratford Festival traveled to Moscow, in May
1957 Glenn Gould became the first North American pianist to perform in the Soviet
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Union. Historian Graham Carr has examined the impact of this visit.124 The series of
eight concerts earned glowing reviews in the Canadian and American media, and while
the trip was not state sponsored, the Department of External Affairs was reportedly very
pleased with the outcome. Carr explains that these types of cultural visits reflected the
softening relations that followed the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, but political distrust
remained. With an emphasis similar to this dissertation, Carr argues that as an early
example of Canadian cultural diplomacy, Gould’s experience illustrates “how artist visits
framed leading tropes of Cold War consciousness.” 125 A consistent argument of this
study has been that Canadian perceptions of anti-communism were very much formed
by certain communities of cultural influence. This analysis of Gould’s role as a non-state
participant in cultural diplomacy also shares some parallels with the importance of
studying non-state anti-communist educators and activists. Carr suggests that in terms
of cultural diplomacy, the credibility of non-state actors grew with the advance of mass
communications, the heightened mobility of individuals and ideas, and as Cold War
audiences grew weary of obvious state-directed propaganda.126
The primacy of anti-communist concerns also impacted the planning for Gould’s
visit to the Soviet Union. Gould’s manager, Walter Homburger, was concerned that the
pianist’s reputation might be harmed for touring behind the Iron Curtain. This worry was
directly related to Gould’s growing popularity in the United States and the fear of a
negative American reaction. Prior to finalizing the trip, Homburger secured an
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acknowledgement from Canadian officials to the American State Department that the
trip was approved, if not officially sponsored.127 The Canadian government chose to
legitimize Gould’s trip and preempt communist suspicions. Analysis suggests this type
of non-state cultural diplomacy also had nationalist significance. Through an
examination of the media reaction to his performances, Carr argues that as a cultural
ambassador, Gould elevated Canada’s influence in the Soviet Union through the arts.
Gould’s foreign performances evoked a patriotic reaction and symbolized a diplomatic
achievement not previously reached by traditional means.128 This dissertation similarly
makes the case that nationalism influenced Canadian perceptions of anti-communism.
Pride in circumstances that established a unique Canadian identity reinforced the ideals
of nationalism.
The interplay between cultural engagement and public safety concerns related to
communism was not limited to the Soviet Union. The 1960 Canadian tour of the
Chinese Peking Opera illustrates how willing cultural engagement with communists
could in fact reinforce specific public safety fears. The performances were initially
approved without opposition by the Inter-Departmental Panel on the Exchange of Visits
with Communist Countries.129 RCMP reporting both during and after the musical tour,
however, suggests some of the 95-member Chinese ensemble participated in activities
outside the scope intended when they were permitted entry. In Vancouver, the opera
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company was met by several communist organizations, including members of the
Chinese Youth Association and the Chinese Workers Protective Association. Telephone
conversations between members of the opera company and local members of the
Chinese communist community in Vancouver were observed by the RCMP. Similar
contacts were made in Calgary, and while the opera was on a bus tour to Banff, Alberta.
In a more public display, opera director Chen Chung-Ching extolled the virtues of
communist China during an address at an Edmonton banquet sponsored by the Cultural
Recreational Association of Chinese Canadian Youth.130
In a report issued after the opera company’s musical tour, the RCMP articulated
the difficult balance between artistic appreciation and political influence. The
performances were widely acclaimed, but evidence supported the argument that the
true purpose of the visit was to cultivate contacts with important individuals and groups,
both communist and non-communist, in attempts to advance the cause of communism
globally.131 This episode was also seized on by non-state anti-communist activists. As
discussed in chapter three, Patrick Walsh accused journalist and civil servant JeanLouis Gagnon of providing the Peking Opera tour with favourable publicity.132 While
cultural curiosity provided opportunities to openly engage with communists, certain fears
of subversive activity were at times justified.
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CBC-Soviet Union Broadcasting Agreement

As bilateral relations with the Soviet Union evolved in the mid-1960s, Canada
became more willing to engage in cultural diplomacy. While political and diplomatic
tensions remained, this first period of Cold War détente led the Soviets to push for
improved economic ties, and Canada to actively pursue policies of economic selfinterest. Similar to other western nations, official academic, scientific, technical, and
cultural exchanges grew in frequency. Early foundational initiatives of note include the
1959 exchange agreement between Canada’s National Research Council and the
Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the 1964 Agreement for Cooperation in the
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy,133 and the 1965 exchange agreement between the
Mines Branch of Energy, Mines and Resources, and the State Committee of the USSR
for Science and Technology. A series of academic exchanges also occurred at the
University of Toronto, the University of British Columbia, and McGill University before
the Canadian government approved a recommendation for a more formal agreement in
1966.134 It was during this period of more amicable relations that the CBC began
negotiations for its own exchange agreements.
In the early 1960s, discussions began at a governmental level about the viability
of exchanges between the CBC and the Soviet Union. Speaking in the House of

Signed between Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, and the State Committee of the USSR for the
Utilization of Atomic Energy (Renewed through 1978).
134 Aloysius Balawyder, ed. Canada-Soviet relations, 1939-1980 (Oakville, ON: Mosaic Press, 1981), 188189 (Appendix).
133

237

Chapter 5 – A Cultural Lens of Analysis
Commons in February 1961, Revenue Minister George Nowlan indicated that radio
programs from Russia and other Eastern European countries could soon be carried on
the CBC.135 Within a few years, the CBC pursued an independent exchange agreement
with its Soviet counterparts. A two-year comprehensive exchange agreement was
signed between the CBC and Soviet Union on April 26, 1967 and focused on improving
cooperation in radio and television broadcasting. Select literary, scientific-educational,
sports, and children’s programs were included for exchange, in addition to taped
recordings of classical folk, modern music, as well as operas and concerts. The
agreement also detailed provisions for specialized short features and exchanges of
personnel.136 A significant step for the CBC, this official exchange program was
designed to increase its ability to broadcast from the Soviet Union.
This agreement represented the culmination of a series of bilateral negotiations
and internal discussions. While the Canadian government was generally supportive of
the terms negotiated by the CBC, External Affairs maintained specific concerns. In a
June 22, 1967, letter to CBC President J. A. Ouimet, Under Secretary of State for
External Affairs Marcel Cadieux stressed the perils of dealing with Soviet information
agencies because the communist cultural institutions operated under the direct control
and close supervision of Soviet political entities.137 External Affairs was concerned that
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the CBC viewed the agreement narrowly as a technical and commercial agreement, and
did not properly consider the advantages it ceded to the Soviets. Cadieux pointed to
Article III of the Supplement to Agreement, which outlined the basic conditions for joint
television filming and production in the USSR. This section required the CBC to send
final versions of all films to their Soviet counterparts for comment, which the CBC was
obligated to consider.138 Cadieux argued that the requirement to seek written Soviet
approval for program changes put the CBC in a vulnerable position.139 External Affairs
was similarly troubled by the Soviet Union holding the right to distribute Canadian films
to Eastern European Soviet bloc countries without sufficient oversight. The abuse of
these distribution rights risked Canadian content being altered, censored, or viewed
alongside Soviet propaganda.140
The CBC pushed back and argued that the perception of risk stemmed from
misinterpretations of broadcasting terminology. Ouimet maintained that professional
courtesies, technical requirements, and conditions of the Supplement to Agreement
allowed for Soviet cooperation but did not jeopardize Canadian control over content.141
A related point of contention was the desire of External Affairs to be more directly
involved in the CBC’s Soviet programming activities. They requested that the CBC’s
Moscow Correspondent consult with the Canadian Embassy in Moscow before
executing any production assignments. Ouimet explained that Soviet broadcasting
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officials were finally beginning to recognize the CBC as a public broadcasting
organization and its executives wished to avoid any perception of direct Canadian
government intervention and risk the legitimacy of the exchange agreement.142 Despite
the efforts of External Affairs to influence the terms and conditions of the CBC-Soviet
agreement, production sharing proceeded.
This section provides important context for understanding Canadian anticommunism during the less confrontational periods of the Cold War. The various
cultural exchanges of the 1960s provided opportunities for Canada to strengthen
economic ties with the Soviet Union and pursue closer diplomatic relations. This détente
did not eliminate the public safety concerns associated with communism. As explored in
chapter one, the state interpretation of the communist threat was not always consistent.
In this instance, there was a disagreement between the CBC and the Department of
External Affairs about the most responsible approach to cultural diplomacy. External
Affairs was concerned that the 1967 exchange agreement between the CBC and the
Soviet Union might unintentionally handover sensitive technical knowledge or distort
Canadian programming. As this exchange agreement was actualized, the CBC and
External Affairs continued to negotiate the acceptable parameters of involvement.
According to an internal CBC review, the early stages of the broadcasting
agreement were limited. Soviet broadcasters produced two programs on the 1967
International and Universal Exposition (Expo 67) in Montreal, and the CBC English
network produced a special program on the Soviet Union’s 50th Anniversary
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celebrations.143 Of greater initial significance was the perception of a closer working
relationship between the two broadcast entities. The CBC report detailed the
development of a “warm and professional” relationship cultivated through a series of
complimentary official visits and interactions at Expo 67.144 Despite this early activity,
the sentiment at the CBC remained reserved as attempts to complete CBC productions
in the USSR often faced obstacles and delays.145 Additional progress was made in the
months following this internal review. In November 1968, a CBC-TV crew traveled to
Russia to document the successful rise of the Soviet hockey system.146 In addition, on
March 10, 1969, the broadcast agreement between the CBC and Soviet Union was
renewed for another twelve-month period. With the agreement extended, the CBC
planned to produce a series of scientific and documentary programs.147 Throughout the
continued evolution of this exchange relationship, the Department of External Affairs
maintained a ubiquitous presence.
The CBC and External Affairs remained at odds in their interpretations of the risk
associated with cultural engagement with the Soviet Union. The highly-politicized nature
of these cultural exchanges required careful negotiation, and a balance between the
benefits of CBC access to the Soviet Union and the threat of communist influence in
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Canada. Despite the attempts of External Affairs to exert influence, there is no
indication that the CBC automatically yielded its position to the interests of the
government. This negotiated independence suggests internal governmental calculations
of the threat posed by domestic communism, especially in the cultural realm, were
subject to debate. As with several of the less formalized cultural exchanges discussed
in this chapter, a willingness to permit cultural exploration contributed to a more
complex public discourse on communism than commonly acknowledged.

Conclusion

Communities of cultural influence provided a varied and interactive means for
Canadians to learn about communism. This included engaging with negative
characterizations of communists and the Soviet Union, and critical depictions of the
impact of anti-communism on civil society. The nationalistic cultural emphasis of the
NFB and the CBC attempted to offset the influence of American radio, music, and
television on the Canadian art and entertainment sector. A series of Royal Commissions
reiterated the danger of losing cultural sovereignty and prescribed a series of
recommendations, including preserving a national broadcasting system. The fear
communism could pervert popular culture with subversive messaging produced
consistent suspicions of the NFB and CBC. Maintaining a broad audience through
publicly funded cultural institutions helped to combat American influence and to
reinforce a unique Canadian national identity, but also provoked fears that the networks
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could be appropriated to disseminate subversive communist propaganda. Accusations
were leveled from a variety of federal politicians, private sector competitors, and anticommunist activists like Ron Gostick.
An original analysis of radio dramas, broadcasting exchanges, and the
permissibility of cultural exploration reiterates the complexity of public engagement with
communism. Episode in Red (1944), The Intrigue at Mill Centre (1947), and Red is for
Danger (1953) all explore themes of suspicion, sabotage, and subversion. By situating
the private citizen in the center of these stories, writers prompted their listeners to
consider the implications of communism for their own lives. At the same time,
Canadians witnessed communists attending the Stratford Festival, or took in a
performance of the Chinese Peking Opera. The acceptable exploration of communism
through arts and culture had limitations, and events like the commemoration of Stalin’s
death did provoke significant public outcry. The permissibility of this range of interaction
with communist ideas reiterates the complexity of Canadian anti-communism. It was not
always evident what constituted a problematic encounter or association with communist
ideas.
This chapter further connects anti-communism and national identity. While
chapter four explored how anti-Americanism influenced Canadians’ perceptions of anticommunism, this analysis establishes the significance of cultural depictions of the
ideological threat and the state’s response to public safety concerns. Cultural
institutions prioritized Canadian content, but analysis of anti-communism often
emphasized the punitive state action most commonly associated with the United States.
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As the next chapter examines, the lack of a discernible entertainment “blacklist” or
legislative prohibitions related to cultural expression continued to influence English
Canadian understandings of the domestic threat of communism. The uncertainty and
variability of state-led anti-communism contributed to the perception that Canada’s
approach to the domestic ideological threat was fundamentally different than the United
States. Regardless of its accuracy, this belief was appealing because it reinforced a
distinctive Canadian national identity.
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As part of the broad argument that Canadian anti-communism was more
complex than traditionally acknowledged, this dissertation has established connections
between the domestic ideological threat and national identity. While the previous
chapter stressed the relevance of nationalist institutions and certain cultural depictions
of anti-communism, this analysis concentrates on case studies to explore the attitudes
and assumptions of Canadians. The broad suspicions of McCarthyism and the
persistent hearings of the House Un-American Activities Committee in the United States
ostracized many writers, singers, actors, and performers perceived to be sympathetic to
communism. This American entertainment “blacklist” became a significant feature of
domestic Cold War politics. The experience of several notable artists, writers, and
performers created the impression that a similar blacklist did not exist in Canada.
Asserting the existence of a stark bilateral contrast in these scenarios contributed to the
further development of the perception that state-led anti-communism in Canada was
less punitive than in the United States. As the previous two chapters have argued, there
was a consistent nationalist impulse to differentiate Canada from the United States.
Writer Ted Allan’s experience suggests past communist activity was, at times,
downplayed in Canada. Allan’s own time in the United States informed The
Moneymakers, his play that critiqued American entertainment “witch hunts.” The
immigration cases of singer Paul Robeson and writer Arkady Fiedler indicate a
circumspect and methodical assessment of domestic Cold War risk. The government of
Canada’s muted bureaucratic handling of artists, writers, or performers suspected of
communist sympathies prevented a clearly identifiable institutional anti-communism.
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Robeson’s longstanding engagement with Canadian audiences also illustrates the
difference between public and state interpretations of the public safety threat
communism was understood to represent. Despite being deported from the United
States for alleged communist sympathies, Canadian writer Reuben Ship found an
engaged audience for his scathing radio drama depiction of American Senator Joseph
McCarthy. While Canada lacked a comprehensive entertainment blacklist comparable in
scope and publicity to the United States, chapter five demonstrated that artists, writers,
and performers did not always escape anti-communist scrutiny. A pattern of apparent
tolerance in certain high-profile cases did, however, exaggerate the perception that
Canada was not punitive in its approach to anti-communism.

Ted Allan

Writer Ted Allan, born Alan Herman in Montreal in 1916, is one of several
examples that illustrate how the perception that Canadian anti-communism was not as
punitive as in the United States proliferated in the arts. As a young man, Allan joined the
Communist Party of Canada and traveled to Spain in 1936 as a journalist to cover the
Spanish Civil War for communist publications the Daily Clarion and New Frontier.1 A
significant number of Canadians journeyed to Spain to volunteer with the International
Brigades and fight on behalf of the Republicans, who opposed the Nationalist forces of
General Francisco Franco. The International Brigades were organized by the
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Communist International, while the Nationalist forces received aid from Fascist Italy and
Nazi Germany. The political and economic disruptions of the interwar period propelled
many Canadians to look beyond their borders and towards the cause of anti-fascism.2
Canadians served in the American Abraham Lincoln Battalion before the creation of the
Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion,3 an initiative of Canadian members of the International
Brigades in Spain. The Canadian government maintained an official policy of nonintervention, clarified further with the passage in 1937 of the Foreign Enlistment Act,
which outlawed individual Canadian participation in foreign wars.
In addition to his role as a journalist, Allan also served as Political Commissar for
Dr. Norman Bethune’s Blood Transfusion Unit. Allan’s friendship with Bethune led to his
co-authorship with Sydney Gordon of The Scalpel, the Sword: The Story of Dr. Norman
Bethune (1952), a biography of the Canadian physician. In the study, Allan and Gordon
detail Bethune’s ardent defence of his personal communist ideology, despite assertions
by some that the affiliation might diminish his professional reputation.4 Allan similarly did
not hide his own communist associations. Throughout his career, Allan was open about
his time in Spain, as well as his membership in the Young Communist League.5 It was
Allan’s eight months in Spain that inspired This Time a Better Earth (1937),6 a
fictionalized account of the conflict.
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Immediately following his time in Spain, Allan resumed his journalism career in
New York City. In June 1938, Allan published a piece in New Masses, a leftist journal
that detailed the purported rise of fascism in Canada. The story, “Canada’s Fascists:
Duplessis Lets Them in the Back Door,” provided a critical interpretation of Ontario
Premier Mitchell Hepburn and Québec Premier Maurice Duplessis.7 Following the
Second World War, the anti-communist climate of the United States drove Allan back to
Canada in 1949 and into the employ of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.
Between 1950 and 1954, Allan produced twenty-two original scripts and adaptations for
CBC radio; fourteen were later produced on CBC-TV, between 1952 and 1964.8 One of
Allan’s radio dramas, The Money Makers, tells a fictionalized account of the American
communist witch hunts.
Inspired by the two years Allan spent as a writer in Hollywood, The Money
Makers is a comedic drama about an ambitious Canadian writer. The protagonist,
Michael Bedford, struggles with his conscious as he attempts to sell a script about
William Lyon Mackenzie. Bedford is tricked, through the promise of funding, into
allowing his name to be substituted for another blacklisted writer in a different film’s
credits. The writer becomes caught between his disgust at this necessary deceit and the
need to make money in a dishonourable industry before returning to Canada. Bedford’s
wife is shocked by his corrupted integrity and tries to convince him to return the
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payment and travel back to the morally superior Canada.9 This plot line emphasized an
intentional contrast between Canada and the United States.
In reviewing the initial run of this play in 1952, The Globe and Mail’s Herbert
Whittaker remarked, “the new voice of our national confidence rings out bravely against
corrupting influences rife below the border in The Moneymakers, a new play by a
Canadian playwright, Ted Allan…”10 Whittaker also suggests the play’s deliberate hero
is the blacklisted writer, led off to jail for refusing to answer the questions of an anticommunist congressional committee. It is this stand against the forces of the
entertainment witch-hunt that inspires Bedford to reject the corruption of the Hollywood
system.11 While there is no mention of Allan’s own communist sympathies, it is clear the
play was in part inspired by the writer’s experiences in the United States.
While working at the CBC as a disc jockey in the early 1950s, the RCMP
resurrected Allan’s previous associations with the Communist Party. Allan recounted
confrontations with “fanatical right-wing” members of the RCMP who were determined
to expose him as a communist. In one instance, the RCMP visited Allan with a
representative from the FBI, seeking information on a presumed acquaintance in the
United States.12 Despite Allan’s openness about his participation in the Spanish Civil
War and his membership in the Young Communist League, the RCMP persisted in
pressuring the CBC to fire Allan, arguing the broadcaster would be publicly
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embarrassed by keeping a communist on staff. While the CBC relented and nominally
fired Allan, he was immediately re-hired to run a “freelance” program. The
accommodation was orchestrated by CBC producer and executive Harry Boyle, who in
Allan’s words would not allow himself to be intimidated by the security service.13 Allan,
despite a history of communist associations that attracted the attention of the RCMP,
retained the ability to engage in Canada’s cultural sector and, through his writing
specifically, attempted to interpret the excesses of American McCarthyism for a
Canadian audience.
Harry Boyle routinely challenged the American entertainment blacklist in Canada.
While certain artists were officially banned in the United States, others were equally
shunned at the direction of anti-communists. In Canada, the CBC continued to carry the
music of blacklisted artist Pete Seeger, even when his music was shut out of American
broadcasting for a period. In 1948, the California Committee on Un-American Activities
reported on People’s Songs, an organization co-founded by Seeger in 1946 to create,
promote, and distribute music supporting the labour movement and other identified
progressive causes. The California committee labeled Seeger a favourite entertainer of
the Communist Party and communist front organizations, while People’s Songs was
described as following the mandate of the Communist Party “as assiduously as the
people behind the organisation.”14 Seeger was an admitted member of the Communist
Party until 1949 and was further indicted by HUAC in 1957, resulting in ten counts of
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contempt of Congress. Speaking to the decision to play his music on CBC airwaves,
Boyle remarked it was Seeger’s outstanding reputation as a folk-singer, not his political
opinions, that carried the most influence.15 Regardless of a significant period of
blacklisting in the United States, Seeger’s music remained on the airwaves in Canada.
The seeming absence of an entertainment blacklist in Canada led to misleading
perceptions about anti-communism that did not fully recognize the repercussions faced
by those artists and broadcasters discussed in chapter five.
Herbert Whittaker, the Globe and Mail’s theatre critic, used the phrase “national
confidence” when describing Ted Allan’s cultural critique of the American Cold War
entertainment blacklist.16 This is a clear articulation of the nationalist patterns this
dissertation has identified. Canadian audiences welcomed distinctions between the
Canadian and American approaches to the domestic threat of communism because it
affirmed a desirable national identity. Misunderstanding this bilateral contrast reinforced
an inaccurate perception of Canadian anti-communism. Whether through the theatre, or
music banned in the United States, Canadians were drawn to popular culture
complimentary of Canadian policy. As the previous chapter demonstrated, such positive
assumptions were not always valid as communities of cultural significance endured
stubborn suspicions, police attention, and the lost opportunities of informal blacklists.
The range of consequences faced by cultural producers were just not as publicly
known.
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Border Controls

Despite the often-aggressive action of the RCMP, Canadian immigration policy
with respect to visiting cultural figures was more inconsistent. A vigilance born out of the
Gouzenko affair motivated the creation of watch lists for individuals with questionable
ideological intentions who were attempting entry into Canada. In the early 1950s, one
such list informed by the international membership of the communist-influenced World
Peace Council included Pablo Picasso, Jean-Paul Sartre, novelist Jorge Amado, and
scientist Linus Pauling.17 When confronted with the possibility of a visit by one of these
individuals, the government’s position was less absolute. In March 1950, entry visas to
the United States were refused to members of the World Congress of Partisans for
Peace, a twelve-person delegation led by Pablo Picasso. Pursuant to immigration laws,
the exclusion was ordered because the group included “known communists and fellow
travellers.”18 On March 6, the RCMP informed the Department of External Affairs of the
likelihood Picasso’s group would attempt to come to Canada because of the American
refusal. The secret memo reiterated that Picasso was an admitted member of the
Communist Party of France.19 A subsequent communication from External Affairs
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articulated the government’s position on Picasso’s reported intention to attend the
second National Convention of the Canadian Peace Congress.
External Affairs referenced a March 1948 Cabinet decision on the admission of
“known communists” to Canada to address the threat posed by individuals engaging in
subversive propaganda and those committed to the overthrow of the Government of
Canada by force. Picasso’s potential entry was directly linked to the Canadian Peace
Congress, which External Affairs acknowledged as holding policies stressing the
peaceful settlement of disputes, the prohibition of the atomic bomb, support of Soviet
foreign policy, and opposition to the Marshall Plan. While the Canadian Peace
Congress clearly ascribed to communist principles and philosophy, there was no clear
evidence the organization was “subversive” in the manner understood by the 1948
Cabinet directive.20 In addition, the External Affairs document stressed keeping
communist elements visible, a recurring theme of Canadian anti-communism. If Picasso
did in fact come to Canada, it was argued that his activities would be largely in the
public realm, which was less harmful than a communist actor who entered the country
surreptitiously and remained hidden. External Affairs official George Glazebrook
remarked, “freedom of entry and free exchange of ideas should obviously be permitted
unless there are very strong arguments to the contrary.”21 While it doesn’t appear
Picasso made the trip to Canada, the discussion within government suggests a
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continued internal assessment of communist threats, with less emphasis on outright
prohibitions.
The potential visits of communist affiliated artists and performers to Canada was
not uncommon. In 1951, French cabaret singer, actor, and performer Maurice Chevalier
was denied a visa to enter the United States. The American justification rested on
Chevalier’s connection to several communist front organizations in France and his
signing of the Stockholm Peace Appeal, an initiative of the communist influenced World
Peace Council.22 The visa denial disrupted Chevalier’s planned concert tour and a
studio film shoot. Interestingly, Chevalier maintained strong beliefs about the mixing of
politics and entertainment, advocating cultural figures should not hold any political
affiliations. Chevalier argued he signed the Stockholm peace pledge in solidarity with
many others in France, and the action did not indicate support for any political group.23
While this controversy prevented his trip to the United States, Chevalier was not denied
the opportunity to tour in Canada.
In May 1951, the Canadian government was asked about Chevalier’s visit by a
Canadian citizen living in Arizona. Mary Warren inquired about the rationale for
permitting the entertainer’s entry after the American visa denial, stating outright that this
policy divergence caused her personal embarrassment.24 Under Secretary of State for
External Affairs Arnold Heeney responded on behalf of the government. Heeney
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explained that while the Canadian government was unaware of the circumstances that
led to Chevalier’s denied American visa, newspaper reports indicated a connection to
the entertainer’s signing of the Stockholm Peace Petition. Chevalier was asked about
the petition upon his entry to Canada and reiterated that he had signed without
recognizing the significance of the document. Heeney explained the government
considered the Stockholm Peace Petition to be a “dishonest document” that had
deceived many, including Canadians and Americans.25 With this qualification in mind,
there was determined to be no reason to prevent Chevalier from visiting Canada.
Throughout this period, the government’s interdepartmental decision-making
when dealing with the domestic threat of communism varied. Citizenship contributed
heavily to these discussions, especially when dealing with the recurring interest of
foreign visits to Canada, as the experience of Polish writer, journalist, and adventurer
Arkady Fiedler further reveals. After an initial 1958 request by Fiedler to visit the
Canadian North in 1958 was denied, a second proposal in late 1960 was successful.
Fiedler planned to travel to the Mackenzie Valley in the Northwest Territories to gather
background material for writing related to the Canadian North. The Canadian
government refused the first request because it did not want a citizen from a communist
country to have the ability to travel freely and without supervision.26 The proposed 1960
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Fiedler visit was considered with the same emphasis on security, but the government
reached a different conclusion.
The Canadian government remained concerned with the possibility of Fiedler
stumbling upon sites of national security significance during his explorations. In applying
for his visa in 1960, Fiedler outlined a visit the following summer with stops at Wood
Buffalo National Park in Alberta, in Ontario to study lake fish, and a journey to either
Frobisher Bay, on the southeastern corner of Baffin Island, or the Churchill area of
northeastern Manitoba to study “Eskimo life.” The Department of Defence objected to
both northern locations because of the presence of Canadian and American defence
installations. There were specific concerns Fiedler would collect information of
considerable value to potential enemies. Government officials believed any
unsupervised trip would provide the tacit opportunity for espionage.27 Despite these
significant concerns, extensive discussions between the Departments of External
Affairs, National Defence, and Northern Affairs and National Resources, and with input
from the RCMP, produced a conditional approval for Fiedler’s visit. The Department of
Northern Affairs and National Resources agreed to provide “general supervision” of
Fiedler.28 The Canadian government approached sensitive immigration cases with
caution. Calculated internal decision-making was less about public anti-communist
posturing and more about bureaucratic and interdepartmental processes for determining
risk.
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Certain cultural figures deemed unacceptable by the United States were not
faced with the same restrictions in Canada. As the Picasso and Chevalier cases
indicate, visa issuance or denial were dictated by national borders. However, because
of the increasingly transnational cultural connections of the mid-twentieth century, the
performance and consumption of entertainment came to defy traditional binational
distinctions. In the case of American singer Paul Robeson, Canadian audiences created
the opportunity to listen to his performances despite government action preventing him
from crossing the Canadian-American border.

Paul Robeson

Robeson was a famous, actor, singer, and social justice advocate whose
interaction with Canadians further reveals a tension between public and state
interpretations of anti-communism. Prior to the Second World War, Robeson excelled in
both athletics and academics and was named valedictorian at Rutgers University. After
obtaining a law degree from Columbia, Robeson embraced acting, playing Othello in
productions in London and New York. A powerful concert singer, Robeson also
performed spirituals, musicals, and folk and protest songs. Many of Robeson’s concerts
in the late 1940s were organized by People’s Artists, an endeavour formed out of Pete
Seeger’s People’s Songs.29 By 1945 the Paul Robeson of acting and singing fame
became increasingly known as a political radical advocating for peace, racial equality,
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and labour unionism. The son of a former slave, Robeson grew up surrounded by the
segregation and racial discrimination of the South. As Robeson’s music became an
outlet for his political activism, American security services became increasingly
suspicious of his activities. The FBI commenced surveillance of Robeson as early as
1941. Robeson was clearly sympathetic to communism and, in particular, to the ideal of
a non-racist society advanced by certain leaders in the Soviet Union.30 Robeson’s
activism on the international stage only reinforced this perception.
In April 1949, Robeson attended the World Peace Congress in Paris, France.
The American State Department denounced the conference for its association with the
international communist movement. After singing to the gathering, Robeson shared a
brief statement. Robeson remarked that the wealth of the United States was built at the
expense of the working class and African Americans, who sought peace while others
were “hysterically raving” for war. Even more directly, Robeson remarked, “we shall not
make war on the Soviet Union.”31 This comment proved detrimental to Robeson’s
reputation in the United States after it was mischaracterized by an Associated Press
story. The report purported to quote directly from the speech, but suggested Robeson
had argued for all African Americans to reject any potential war against the Soviet
Union.32 The fallout impacted not only Robeson, but perceptions of African Americans
more generally. Robeson was labeled as “un-American” and suffering from “twisted
thinking,” with HUAC subsequently holding special hearings to give members of the
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African American community the opportunity to repudiate Robeson’s perspective and
pledge their national loyalty.33 The culmination of Robeson’s history of communist
sympathies and the misconstrued Paris speech quickly resulted in a place on the
entertainment blacklist.
The controversy surrounding Robeson’s communist sympathies was not limited
to the United States. Robeson visited Canada on several occasions, often blurring the
lines between music and personal ideology. Early visits included an invitation to be a
guest artist at a June 1942, “Salute to Canada’s Army” held at Maple Leaf Gardens in
Toronto, a relatively non-contentious wartime unity event. In 1945, Robeson appeared
more politically partisan both at a Toronto gathering where he spoke and sang in
support of the Labor-Progressive Party, and at a subsequent benefit event for striking
auto workers at the Capitol theatre in Windsor.34 Robeson was first directly accused of
interfering with Canadian politics during a December 1948 visit.
Appearing at an event organized by the Toronto Peace Conference with noted
Canadian socialist and missionary, Rev. Dr. James Endicott, Robeson attacked the new
leader of the Progressive Conservative Party George Drew, who was in the midst of a
federal by-election campaign. Interspersing his address with protest songs reflective of
his parents’ experience with slavery, Robeson suggested Drew was complicit in the
continuation of racial discrimination. When pressed for details by one audience
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member, Robeson avoided clarification.35 The controversy over these comments placed
additional attention on subsequent events that month. Robeson’s next concert
appearance was at Plateau Hall in Montreal. The chairman of the Catholic School
Commission, who leased the venue to the event’s sponsor, the Jewish Folk Choir,
remarked that Robeson would need to restrict himself exclusively to singing. The hall
would not be rented out for political purposes.36 Despite such attempts to limit the scope
of Robeson’s appearances, the performer continued to articulate his ideological
perspective while in Canada, including during another Montreal performance for some
500 Jewish school children at the Morris Winchevsky Centre. This venue was operated
by the United Jewish People’s Order, believed by certain government officials to be a
communist front. At one point, Robeson praised the Soviet Union and then voiced his
support for the former Québec MP Fred Rose, at that point convicted and serving a sixyear jail sentence for espionage.37 This echoed similar comments made in support of
Rose by Robeson a year earlier. In many respects Robeson was signaling the
ideological beliefs that would by 1949 make him the subject of significant American anticommunist scrutiny.
This background establishes Robeson’s history of performing in Canada and the
broader roots of his controversial career. As a musician, there was a tension between
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his ability to perform and the possibility he may ideologically influence Canadians. It was
challenging to identify the point at which art and politics became definitively connected.
While groups of Canadians remained interested in Robeson’s music, the government
turned to the public safety threat associated with the singer’s possible communist
beliefs.
The pattern of Robeson’s perceived political interference prompted discussion
within External Affairs. Robeson’s comments were deemed “unbecoming to any
foreigner in this country,” and more specifically problematic because he was a
communist attacking the leader of a Canadian political party during a by-election
campaign.38 This confidential memo explained the difficulty with preventing Robeson
from engaging in political critiques while in Canada. Approaching the United States
Embassy or State Department was believed to be futile, and barring Robeson’s entry to
Canada was problematic as it was difficult to separate Robeson’s singing career from
his political activism. It was conceded the only way to effectively prevent visitors to
Canada from engaging in subversive propaganda was to refuse them entry in the first
place. External Affairs recommended Robeson be placed on a no-entry list in the future
or be allowed to visit only under the narrow parameters of concert performances, with
strict limitations imposed to prevent the type of political inference exerted in 1948.39 The
memo was accompanied by a notation indicating the necessity of future coordination
with the RCMP on such cases.
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In addition to his blacklisting within the entertainment industry following his Paris
remarks, Robeson also began to see his international travel restricted. In June 1950,
Robeson spoke at the Civil Rights Congress at Madison Square Gardens in New York
City and was critical of American participation in the Korean War. Robeson argued a war
in Asia distracted from the imperative to fight for full racial equality in the United
States.40 Following this anti-war speech, the FBI attempted to seize Robeson’s
passport. Robeson agreed only to meet with the FBI in the presence of his attorneys
and did not hand over his passport. A month later, in August 1950, the State Department
announced it had used its discretionary powers to cancel Robeson’s passport, providing
only the justification that it was not in the best interests of the United States for Robeson
to travel abroad.41 This concerted effort to prevent Robeson from traveling outside of the
United States reveals a significant tension between the singer’s international advocacy
and American foreign policy
Domestic inequality and racial discrimination persistent in the United States
during the Cold War challenged an American foreign policy strategy focused on
containment. As the European colonial system disintegrated following the Second World
War, American policymakers attempted to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence by
building a coalition of multiracial and anti-communist nations in the developing world.42
American officials were tasked with portraying the institutions of the United States as
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superior to those of the Soviet Union, despite the continued presence of systemic
inequality at home. A key strategy was to limit the perception of racial polarization in the
United States and to stress moderate forms of civil rights reform.43 Paul Robeson’s high
profile and global criticism of American racial policies, compounded by his personal
communist beliefs, were seen to conflict with these priorities.
The imperatives of anti-communism often complicated foreign policy surrounding
decolonization. Historian Thomas Borstelmann argues the American focus on rebuilding
a strong anti-communist alliance in Western Europe contributed to the continued, tacit
support of colonial rule by the governments of France, Belgium, Portugal, and Britain.
Further, the United States maintained support for white control in South Africa, largely
because its firm anti-communist position allowed many Americans to look past the
extreme and entrenched discrimination of the apartheid system.44 As the red scare
eased in the United States, politicians began to recognize the importance of American
domestic policy for broader Cold War goals. Senator Paul Douglas, in 1957, argued that
“each housing riot in Illinois, each school riot in Kentucky, and each bombing of a
pastor’s home or intimidation of a would-be Negro voter in Alabama or Mississippi
becomes not only an affront to human dignity here in this country, but a defeat for
freedom in its tough world struggle for survival.”45 At the time of the passport denial,
Robeson’s international presence as a staunch promoter of civil rights with determined
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communist sympathies challenged both aspects of this paradoxical foreign policy
agenda.
In 1952 Canada became more intricately connected to Robeson’s personal and
political endeavours. The International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers (Mine,
Mill) invited Robeson to perform in Vancouver at their fourth annual conference.
Although Americans were not required to hold a passport to travel to Canada at the
time, American immigration officials prevented Robeson from crossing the border at
Blaine, Washington. District Immigration Director John P. Boyd echoed the earlier
rationale of the State Department by suggesting the decision was made “in the best
interests of the United States.”46 Robeson personally held a different belief. In the
media, the performer argued the American government prevented him from leaving the
country because his speeches were critical of the United States. He characterized his
situation to the Vancouver Sun as a status of “domestic arrest.”47 While he was
physically prevented from attending the Mine, Mill conference, Robeson still managed to
participate by singing to the enthusiastic audience over a long-distance telephone call.
For the audience, this call was symbolic in its defiance of American anti-communism.
Response to Robeson’s travel restrictions in Canada were mixed. The Mine, Mill
union was unsurprisingly concerned about the inability of Robeson to travel to Canada.
Shortly after their conference, Mine, Mill presented Secretary of State for External
Affairs Lester Pearson with a resolution calling on the Canadian government to
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intervene. The unanimously adopted resolution charged the American State Department
with censoring what the Canadian people could hear or see and, even more specifically,
asserted the United States government was “prepared to institute an American-style
system of ‘thought control’ in Canada.”48 This criticism was interestingly framed as a
challenge to Canadian sovereignty, so resisting this American prohibition could be
perceived as a nationalist act.
Several other organizations voiced similar support for Robeson. A representative
from the United Steelworkers of America petitioned Pearson to engage diplomatically
with the United States and at the United Nations to challenge Robeson’s travel
restrictions based on Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
preserves the ability of every individual to leave any country.49 Ross Russell of the
United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America advanced this line of protest
even further in a telegram to Pearson. Russell likened the American government’s
action to Nazi Germany’s prevention of German Liberals from leaving that country.50
The Lithuanian Literary Society took a much less antagonistic tone in their appeal to
Pearson. Its membership protested the travel ban by citing the value of shared culture,
advocating that a global artist like Robeson should not be arbitrarily prevented from
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performing across the world.51 Canadians were not uniform in their support of Robeson.
Ahead of the Mine, Mill conference, Liberal Member of Parliament Tom Goode
“emphatically protest[ed]” the entry of a known communist into Canada and advised
Pearson to refuse his admittance.52 In response to letters of protest, the Canadian
government maintained a consistent position.
Inquiries made on behalf of Robeson were met with deference to the decision of
the American government. Replies by External Affairs to concerned labour unions and
the Lithuanian Literary Society stressed that travel by American nationals out of the
United States was the exclusive concern of American authorities; the Robeson case
was not a matter in which the government of Canada had any standing to interfere.53
This messaging failed to acknowledge the ongoing inter-governmental debates about
Robeson’s right to enter Canada discussed above. This response also differed
significantly from communication with Tom Goode prior to the Mine, Mill Conference. In
this correspondence, which predated the outcry following Robeson’s inability to leave
the United States, the government provided the Member of Parliament with a more
detailed position. Goode was informed that the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
was responsible for any decision regarding a Robeson visit, and the Department had
issued instructions in the event he attempted to enter Canada. In a related memo to
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Pearson, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Arnold Heeney explained how the
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration intended to reject the visit by Robeson, if there
was any indication of planned activity outside of musical performance.54 Robeson’s
recent history of political statements in Canada likely influenced this decision. When
forced to publicly address the Robeson border controversy, the Canadian government
was content to defer the issue to the United States. Internally, government officials more
openly asserted an interest in preventing Robeson from influencing Canadian politics.
Despite Robeson’s continued inability to travel to Canada, he retained an active
Canadian fan base. Robeson’s seventeen-minute over-the-phone performance to a
Vancouver audience of approximately two thousand motivated the Mine, Mill union, led
by communist member Harvey Murphy, to attempt another live concert.55 In spite of the
travel ban, a performance was planned for May 1952 at the Peace Arch, a monument
commemorating the treaty that ended the War of 1812, located on the border between
Blaine, Washington and Surrey, British Columbia. The ensuing Peace Arch Concert was
part of a two-month Robeson tour designed to raise revenue for the United Freedom
Fund. This initiative supported, among other entities, the Freedom newspaper,
developed to provide Robeson and other progressives a space for unimpeded political
analysis, and to have their activities reported on without distortion.56 The Peace Arch
concert proved to be the most successful of the tour, with Robeson performing from a
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temporary platform fixed atop a truck. While approximately 5,000 people attended on
the American side of the border, some 25,000 to 30,000 Canadians enjoyed the concert
from the Canadian side, largely a result of the support of the Mine, Mill union.57
Regardless of the American restrictions placed on Robeson, Canadian audiences
embraced his music. In March 1953, Mine, Mill committed to sponsoring a second
Peace Arch concert.
The Robeson performance in August 1953 garnered attendance from Mine, Mill
locals and the general public, nearly 25,000 people. Mine, Mill’s sponsorship of the
Peace Arch concerts reflected both a tradition of support for cultural activities and a
broader struggle within the labour movement. As a union deemed communistdominated, Mine, Mill had been ousted from the Congress of Industrial Organizations
(CIO) when that federation of unions purged communists pursuant to the requirements
of the Taft-Hartley Act in the United States. Many Mine, Mill members crossed the
border to Canada, increasing tensions with the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL).
Despite the absence in Canada of legislation similar to Taft-Hartley, trade unionists north
of the border attempted to minimize the influence of their own left-wing; the CCL, for
example, had expelled Mine, Mill in 1949.58 Promotion of the Peace Arch concerts
contributed to Mine, Mill’s broader emphasis on the advancement of civil liberties. The
campaign to restore Robeson’s passport was consistent with preserving the right of
Mine, Mill’s leaders to work politically without constraints and, by upholding the values
of free expression and association, to preserve a better climate for advancing their own
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ideological perspectives.59 As such, the Mine, Mill union remained committed to
encouraging the growth of the annual Peace Arch concert.
Robeson’s story is an important case study because it represents an intersection
of anti-communism with immigration status, the labour movement, and the arts. Public
displays of Canadian support are contrasted with the subtleties of government policy.
Robeson’s barriers to performing in Canada were routinely attributed to the American
passport issue. Similar to the brash anti-communism of Senator Joseph McCarthy
occurring at the same time, American policies overshadowed Canadian government
initiatives. The publicity associated with these significant Cold War episodes contributed
to the developing perception that Canadian anti-communism was not punitive, as was
readily considered to be the case in the United States. As with the case of Herbert
Norman, discussed in chapter four and also occurring in the mid-1950s, there was
noticeable public opposition to the actions of the United States.
In 1954, Robeson’s appearance at the border was accompanied by increasing
international calls for his travel ban to be lifted. Charlie Chaplin, the English comedic
actor banned from re-entering the United States because of his own ideological views,
denounced the continued refusal of the American government to issue Robeson a
passport. Chaplin’s message was one of many used by the Planning Committee in
support of the “Cultural Salute to Paul Robeson,” an event held at the Renaissance
Casino in Harlem, New York, in May 1954.60 Other groups, such as the Provisional
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Committee to Restore Paul Robeson’s Passport, also worked tirelessly on behalf of the
performer. By the time of the 1955 Peace Arch concert, Robeson’s repeated legal
challenges and these broader advocacy campaigns culminated in some positive
developments in his passport case.
In May 1955, Robeson’s lawyers resumed their legal challenges after several
passports were returned to individuals with similar cases: Otto Nathan, Albert Einstein’s
executor; and Dr. Martin Kamen, the Manhattan Project physicist and suspected spy
blacklisted after a HUAC appearance, for example.61 An application was made on behalf
of Robeson to the Passport Division of the State Department. Despite renewed
optimism, the application was immediately denied because Robeson refused to sign a
“non-communist” affidavit.62 A further appeal to the State Department was again denied,
though the restriction on travelling to Canada, or any other country that did not require
presentation of a United States passport, was lifted. At the 1955 Peace Arch concert,
Robeson expressed optimism about the changing political climate and argued
Americans were increasingly rejecting McCarthyism.63 Robeson’s longtime Peace Arch
ally, the Mine, Mill union, would soon after invite him to their February 1956 convention
in Sudbury, Ontario.
Robeson’s 1956 trip to Canada was his first opportunity to leave the United
States in six years. At the Mine, Mill convention, Robeson told the crowd his art was a
weapon for the struggles he faced, and he thanked the union for its consistent support
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and friendship. Robeson went on to perform a sold-out concert in Toronto at Massey
Hall, with a diverse mixture of music and dramatic readings.64 Despite this warm public
reception, the government of Canada remained wary of Robeson’s communist
affiliations. Shortly after Robeson’s visit to Sudbury and Toronto, the Department of
Citizenship and Immigration in April 1956 denied the performer entry to perform an
extended concert series. Despite the consistent public support in Canada for Robeson,
his communist beliefs could not be ignored.
Speaking in the House of Commons, Citizenship and Immigration Minister Jack
Pickersgill explained the government’s rationale. The first principle raised was the policy
of the Canadian government to refuse entry, either as immigrants or visitors, of any
known communists. It was acknowledged Robeson’s most recent trip to Canada was
permitted pursuant to an exception for individuals visiting the country for specifically
artistic purposes. What differentiated the concert tour proposed in April 1956 was a
belief the promoter, Jerome Concerts and Artists Ltd., was a communist front.65 The
concert promoter urged the government to reverse its decision. President I. Jerome
Myers argued that Robeson’s February trip suggested no further travel restrictions were
attached to the singer, and all necessary preparations for the future tour had been
planned. Myers further explained that because the only intention of Robeson’s visit was
the concert tour, the refusal to admit him represented arbitrary government
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interference.66 Despite these appeals, the belief that Jerome Concerts and Artists was a
communist front, in addition to Robeson’s own communist affiliations, prevented his
entry into Canada for the proposed tour.
Robeson’s challenges with the Canadian government speak to the ongoing
dichotomy of the country’s anti-communism policies. The popularity of the Peace Arch
concerts, and Robeson’s other limited Canadian appearances, fostered a public
appreciation for the artist. The government of Canada tacitly fostered the perception
that Robeson’s obstacles to visiting Canada resulted from the domestic policies of the
United States. As with the American anti-communist accusations directed at Herbert
Norman, the Peace Arch concerts associated punitive anti-communism with the United
States. Attending a musical performance that straddled national borders to compensate
for American restrictions reinforced negative Canadian perceptions about anticommunism in the United States. There was a desire amongst certain Canadians, most
notably select labour unions, to demonstrate support for Robeson and opposition to the
restrictions imposed by American McCarthyism. Despite this public activity, the
Canadian government remained concerned with Robeson’s communist ties and his
willingness to speak openly about his political beliefs. When the American restrictions
were removed, two different decisions within a three-month period about Robeson’s
suitability to travel to Canada further obfuscated the government’s anti-communist
policies. This inconsistency prevented Canadians from equating their government’s
position with the consistent American passport ban. Subtle distinctions such as this
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contributed to the public perception, explored throughout this dissertation, that Canada’s
domestic anti-communism was not as vindictive as the United States.

Reuben Ship

The experience of Canadian writer Reuben Ship also involved American
immigration restrictions, but more specifically illustrated how the arts were used to
critique anti-communism in the United States and shape a unique Cold War identity in
Canada. Born in 1915 to a working-class family in Montreal, Ship attended McGill
University where he studied literature and served as the Drama Editor for the McGill
Daily. Ship’s early writing stressed an artist’s responsibility to improve society, as well
as an early appreciation for satire.67 Childhood health issues excused Ship from military
service, so in 1941 he travelled to New York City to pursue a professional writing
career. Ship’s work in New York led to the notable role as one of two primary writers for
the radio drama, The Life of Riley. Ship wrote for the series for eight years before it was
adapted for television.
Ship came to the attention of American anti-communists because of his personal
advocacy work. On July 12, 1947, Ship spoke about “thought control” at a rally
sponsored by the Hollywood Council of the Arts, Sciences and Professions. This
organization was featured on several lists compiled by governmental and other
watchdog investigative groups that monitored and published claims related to
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communist infiltration. Ship’s speech, entitled “Radio in a Free Culture,” criticized the
American radio industry for ceding a great deal of content control to financial
sponsors.68 The rhetoric of this speech was deemed concerning by the FBI. However,
scholar Gerry Gross argues that the FBI report oversimplified and, at least partially,
misrepresented Ship’s speech.69 Gross’ 1989 article in Theatre Research in Canada, “A
Palpable Hit,” is one of the few works to substantively investigate Ship’s life experience.
Several other factors contributed to the concerns emerging over Ship’s
ideological perspectives. Additional FBI reports suggested Ship was actively involved in
policy disputes within the Radio Writers Guild, another institution suspected of
communist infiltration. Ship was aligned with a faction of the guild opposed to the
traditional organizational structure of the networks, which gave control over content to
advertisers and network heads. This position was largely related to the failure of
networks to oppose HUAC’s inquests and the insistence of many anti-communist
advocates that all writers should take loyalty oaths or face dismissal.70 As a result of this
public positioning, Ship was called to testify before HUAC at its 1951 hearings in
Hollywood.
At his September appearance Ship further damaged his reputation and standing
in the United States. During questioning, Ship remarked that despite coming to
Hollywood from Canada in 1943, he had suspended his application for American
citizenship because of “shocking changes taking place in this country since the death of
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that great liberal, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”71 Ship refused to answer
questions about his political allegiances and proceeded to quote Thomas Jefferson on
freedom of thought. Furthermore, Ship said that the HUAC hearings reminded him of
Cotton Mather and the New England Puritan Salam witch trials.72 Additional HUAC
proceedings solidified Ship’s blacklisting and jeopardized his immigration status.
At an October 1952 HUAC hearing, writer Owen Vinson and actor Paul Marion
identified Ship as a member of a communist radio workers’ cell in Hollywood. Ship was
subsequently charged with a violation of the National Security Act as a member of a
subversive organization and held for a deportation hearing. Upon arrest, Ship remarked
that he had been blacklisted as a radio and television writer and further described
himself as “the victim of still another arm of a monstrous government octopus that is
attempting to enforce political conformity.”73 Ship was ordered deported from the United
States for belonging to the Communist Party on January 12, 1953. The deportation
order followed the conclusion of an immigration hearing and the denial of a subsequent
appeal.74 Ship’s departure was a very public affair, with the United States Immigration
and Naturalization Service notifying the press of the process. Ship was transported
under guard across the country by both plane and train to Detroit, where he was then
driven across the border to Windsor.75 Ship was returned to Canada a blacklisted writer
seemingly tarnished by specific communist associations.
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Despite these concerning accusations, Ship revived his career in Canada.
Broadcast in May 1954 by the CBC, Ship’s radio drama The Investigator satirized the
anti-communist hysteria of the United States. Capitalizing on the notoriety of Senator
Joseph McCarthy’s broad claims of communist infiltration in the American government,
and the live televised Army-McCarthy Senate hearings, Ship spoofed the accusatory
nature of the inquisitions. The link to McCarthy was clear. The Globe and Mail reported:
John Drainie’s impersonation of McCarthy on Sunday’s Stage 54 was a tour-deforce. All through Reuben Ship’s satirical fantasy based on the present ArmyMcCarthy Investigations, Mr. Drainie maintained the horrible drawl and full-blown
egotism of the American senator to the life. Such a monumental bit of mimicry
transcends the category of mere stunt and becomes a rare example of an actor’s
special talent.76
It is also clear from the plot of this radio drama that Ship was extremely critical of the
American anti-communism movement.
In the radio play,77 “The Investigator” dies in a plane crash, ascends to heaven,
or as Ship writes “up here,” and is informed by the “Gatekeeper” that before he can
proceed, he must face the Permanent Investigating Committee on Permanent Entry.
This investigation is necessary to determine whether the Investigator will stay “up here,”
or be forced to go “down there.” Unbeknownst to the Gatekeeper, several members of
the committee approach the Investigator about ousting the Gatekeeper, who they
charge is responsible for allowing subversives from “down there” to infiltrate “up here.”
The members of the committee who approach the Investigator include Titus Oates, the
architect of the fabricated “Popish Plot” of 1678; Torquemada, Inquisitor-General of the
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Spanish Inquisition; New England Puritan Minister Cotton Mather; and Baron George
Jeffreys, the Hanging Judge of the Bloody Assizes. At his own committee hearing, the
Investigator questions the fitness of the Chairman, suggesting the Gatekeeper be
charged with dereliction of duty.
The Investigator proceeds to re-open several cases to determine the number of
subversives permitted entry to “up here” under the Gatekeeper’s watch. Witnesses
called on suspicion of subversiveness, or who are outright deported from “up here,”
include Socrates, Thomas Jefferson, John Milton, John Stuart Mill, Voltaire, Thomas
Paine, Victor Hugo, Abraham Lincoln, Galileo, and Johan Sebastian Bach. The
Investigator goes as far as to attempt to call “The Chief,” an obvious reference to a
higher power, claiming that “there is no one so high as to be immune from
investigation.”78 The result? The Investigator is rejected from both “up here” and “down
there” and returned to earth as the lone survivor of the plane crash.
Public perception of The Investigator appears to have been largely positive. In
the introduction to the narrative version published in 1956, Ship remarks that when the
play was first broadcast in Canada, the switchboards of CBC stations across the
country were flooded with telephone calls from listeners, most praising the broadcast,
with a few attacking it on either political or religious grounds.79 Reflecting on a Martin
Knelman column in The Globe and Mail in January 1977 concerning the McCarthy era
and The Investigator specifically, Nancy Suits from Waterloo, Ontario, recounted her
memories in a letter to the editor. Suits writes that Knelman:
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Neglected to mention the tremendous joy and even glee that that radio program
provided for those who were living through the whole rotten time. Listening to the
program was a wonderfully satisfying experience for me and for many others
who, at that time, felt the most they could do was to enjoy its pointed
commentary in the privacy of their homes. Reuben Ship’s work certainly touched
many people that May in 1954.80
This anecdotal reflection provides some limited insight into the audience that welcomed
Ship’s satirical work.
The positive reaction to The Investigator in Canada was by no means
unanimous. In the immediate days following the broadcast, debate emerged in the
House of Commons regarding the desirability of such critical material. Progressive
Conservative Member of Parliament Frank Lennard grilled Liberal Revenue Minister
James McCann as to whether the CBC was aware of Ship’s deportation from the United
States. McCann responded that Ship submitted The Investigator as a freelance writer,
and the script was accepted as such.81 The issue remained a point of emphasis for
opposition parties. During a special Commons committee on radio and television in
1955, Social Credit Member of Parliament Ernest Hansell questioned A. Davidson
Dunton, chairman of the CBC board of governors, on the propriety of accepting scripts
from Ship, given his designation as an “undesirable” in the United States. Dunton
responded that manuscripts of plays submitted to the CBC for broadcasting were
considered not based on the private lives of the authors, but strictly on merit.82 In
response to the immediate questions posed in the House of Commons, Ship issued a
statement, remarking that he was:
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Shocked to learn that a member of Parliament would question the desirability of
broadcasting a play of merit and popularity solely because of the alleged
political beliefs of the author, particularly because these allegations were made,
not by a Canadian official, but by the type of American investigating committee
which Canadian opinion has condemned. I’m wondering if McCarthyism has
finally come to Canada.83
Ship’s statement reveals a belief that the Canadian approach to the perceived domestic
ideological threat of communism was and should be different than the United States. By
providing Ship’s satirical drama a broad audience on the CBC, the broadcaster enabled
the further cultivation of the perception of Canadian difference.
Unsurprisingly, Ship’s work also caught the attention of Ron Gostick. As part of a
brief presented to the Royal Commission on Broadcasting in 1956, Gostick used the
airing of The Investigator to substantiate a claim the CBC was an integral part of a
communist conspiracy in Canada. In addition to providing an in-depth summary of
Ship’s blacklisting in the United States, the Canadian Intelligence Service report
criticized the public funding of communist propaganda. Gostick further argued
significant opposition to the radio drama was summarily dismissed by CBC Chairman
Dunton as unsubstantiated and charged the broadcaster was reckless in its acceptance
of the work of “pro-communist” writers.84 As discussed in chapter five, anti-communist
attacks against the CBC were not uncommon but differed significantly depending on the
source of the critique.

“Refuse Responsibility for Script Writers.”
LAC, Department of External Affairs fonds, RG25-G-2, “Communism in Canada - General file,” Volume
8537, File 11357-40, Part 3.3, Ron Gostick, “Brief respecting News-slanting and Communist-line
Propaganda on the CBC,” The Canadian Intelligence Service 6, 7, July 1956.
83
84

279

Chapter 6 – Culture and the Exaggeration of the Canadian Perception of Difference
Ship’s story speaks to several key themes that contributed to the popular belief
that Canadian anti-communism was less punitive than in the United States. First, Ship’s
ability to gain a platform on the CBC after being deported from the United States
reinforced the perception that communities of cultural influence in Canada were not
subject to an anti-communist blacklist. As demonstrated throughout this dissertation,
Canadians embraced opportunities to elevate perceived bilateral differences. The
Investigator played to these feelings by ridiculing American anti-communist witch-hunts
through a satirical depiction of Senator Joseph McCarthy. Unsurprisingly, the public
reaction to this radio drama largely illustrates how Canadians grasped and welcomed
Ship’s critique of McCarthy. In response to questions raised about The Investigator in
the House of Commons, Ship defended his artistic choices with exasperation that
Canada was succumbing to the very McCarthyism his play warned against. These
comments were framed against the implausibility that Canadian anti-communism would
ever resemble the United States. Both Ship’s cultural depiction of anti-communism and
his personal defence of the project reinforced the perception that Canada’s approach to
the domestic ideological threat was less retributive than the United States. Ironically
Ship’s time back in Canada was brief, and as chapter five explained, he left for England
in 1955 to join a community of expat creatives looking for opportunities outside of North
America.

Conclusion

280

Chapter 6 – Culture and the Exaggeration of the Canadian Perception of Difference
The perception that Canadian anti-communism was not as punitive as in the
United States was, in part, amplified by the experiences of certain artists and cultural
producers. The Canadian government’s methodical interdepartmental style of
determining risk, witnessed in the cases of Picasso, Chevalier, and Fiedler, appeared to
deviate from the American approach to anti-communism. Despite these examples,
chapter five established that the arts and culture sector in Canada did not escape the
accusations or consequences that accompanied anti-communist suspicions. When
faced with the entry to Canada of individuals perceived to be sympathetic to
communism, calculated decisions were less publicized. The absence of bombastic
rhetoric contributed to the perception that Canada’s treatment of potential communists
was entirely different than the United States. Within the context of ongoing fears of
cultural and economic assimilation, a Cold War narrative asserting the existence of a
distinct Canadian national identity was appealing.
Canadian perceptions of anti-communism were reinforced by the contrasts that,
regardless of their accuracy, were the most evident. Ship’s very public “escape” from
the American entertainment blacklist suggested the permissibility in Canada of biting
political satire not available in the United States. Pointed narratives from writers like Ted
Allan, and popular support for Paul Robeson, further entrenched the nationalist idea that
the approach of the Canadian government was unique. While American anticommunists were quick to publicly vilify suspected subversives, the Canadian process
was inconspicuous. A lack of public awareness, though, did not mean there was a lack
of punitive action. As this dissertation has continually emphasized, Canadian anti-
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communism was varied and complex. Perceptions were not uniform, but attitudes did
coalesce around broad and varied opposition to American anti-communism, reinforcing
an emergent Canadian nationalism.
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Anti-communism in English Canada between 1945 and 1967 was broad in scope
and complex in application. Ideological concerns over communism were not new, but
the Igor Gouzenko espionage revelations demonstrated the disruptive potential of
subversion. Cold War fears produced broad suspicions of communism and its followers,
and consequently the distinction between ideological curiosity and firm ideological
adherence to a political belief system began to erode. The Canadian government
attempted to mitigate this threat through a series of legislative changes and by
appointing the Kellock-Taschereau Royal Commission to investigate Soviet espionage.
In contrast to state action, several anti-communist activists carried out sensational
information campaigns to warn Canadians about the perils of communism. Marjorie
Lamb, Ron Gostick, and Pat Walsh sought to educate Canadians about the public
safety risk by stressing the subversive threat of immigrant populations, the LaborProgressive Party, and specific cultural institutions including the CBC and the NFB.
There were diverse public interpretations of this ideological threat, including those
developed by politically engaged citizens across the country, communities of cultural
influence who attempted to educate their fellow citizens, and those who lobbied the
government for anti-communist measures.
This dissertation argues that Canadian anti-communism was more complex than
is traditionally acknowledged in the Cold War historiography. In particular, special
emphasis has been placed on the personal experiences of casual observers, engaged
citizens, writers, performers, journalists, civil servants, and politicians. Often included as
elements of other Cold War studies, anti-communism is the central focus of this work.
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Analysis of state action and civic engagement with the communist ideology reveals
three significant patterns. First, public safety concerns associated with the domestic
threat were a steady undercurrent in all anti-communism initiatives and were a main
driver of government action. Second, beyond the bounds of state-led anti-communism
communities of cultural influence played an important role in the interpretation of the
communist threat. In the absence of consistent and recognizable government policy,
cultural depictions of communism and recreational encounters with communist art and
entertainment provided unique opportunities for engagement with an ideology deemed
dangerous. Finally, at the intersection of anti-communism and anti-Americanism was a
nuanced interpretation of Canadian national identity. The fear of American economic,
cultural, and political annexation produced waves of Canadian nationalism in the
postwar era. The recognizable excesses of American anti-communism, with the
bombastic rhetoric of Joseph McCarthy, persistent congressional investigations, and
entertainment “witch hunts,” provoked broad opposition in Canada. The general subtlety
of the Canadian government’s own initiatives contributed to a constructed, popular view
that its anti-communism approach was not punitive, as it clearly appeared to be in the
United States. Nationalist impulses, and the desire to differentiate Canada from the
United States, fueled this singular interpretation of Canadian anti-communism.
Certain landmark Cold War events and people are included in this study to
provide a balanced and thorough analysis of anti-communism. For example, the
Kellock-Taschereau Royal Commission, state-led anti-communism initiatives, and the
Herbert Norman controversy are all covered in various form in other works. What’s
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unique about this dissertation is a renewed contextualization of these seminal issues
alongside diverse cultural interpretations of the communist threat, and an expanded
emphasis on the personal “history from below.” The Canadian Cold War historiography
lacks the needed volume of studies that focus primarily on anti-communism. Revisiting
certain topics alongside new analysis produces a broad perspective that significantly
expands the dominant understanding of how anti-communism impacted the domestic
Cold War.
Chapter one focused on the state’s interpretation of ideological subversion from
the mid 1940s until the early 1950s. The RCMP was intently focused on the foreign
public safety threat and planned for the detainment and internment of suspected
communists. Surveillance of identified “front” groups often led to a concentration on new
Canadians. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent employed a nuanced and calculated
political strategy to address public concerns. The government stressed the individual
responsibility of Canadians to prevent the domestic spread of communism. St. Laurent
rejected proposed anti-communism legislation and initiatives from independent Liberal
Wilfrid Lacroix and Opposition Leader George Drew. By downplaying its own policing
and counter-espionage initiatives, the St. Laurent government diminished the
transparency of state action. The Canadian government’s concealed, but similarly
punitive, anti-communist activities were hidden from public view. This lack of awareness
continually enabled a perception that the excesses of American anti-communism had
been avoided in Canada.
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As part of the broader Cold War security apparatus, the RCMP contributed to
oppressive governmental anti-communist measures that contradicted St. Laurent’s
policy emphasis. As chapter two demonstrated, the experiences of Israel Halperin,
David Shugar, Eric Adams, Agatha Chapman, and others indicate how communist
suspicions often outlived legal acquittals. The confluence of suspicion and guilt
obfuscated the mandate of the Kellock-Taschereau Royal Commission and produced
severe consequences. Scientists, mathematicians, and economists lost their jobs, were
ostracized from their professional communities, and were often forced to leave the
country. While the government transitioned to more subtle anti-communist initiatives,
civil servants continued to face consequential security screening, including measures
designed to reinforce preferred gender and sexual norms. State-led anti-communism
remained a prominent aspect of the Cold War in Canada, with long lasting
consequences not fully recognized by the public.
Anti-communism was not restricted to state actors. Individual Canadians, as well
as public institutions like the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, worked to educate
citizens about the perceived public safety threat associated with domestic communism.
Chapter three examined public interpretations of ideological subversion in Canada
between 1947 and 1970. Appeals for government actions were routinely sent to Prime
Minister Louis St. Laurent by politically engaged Canadians. In a deliberate attempt at
public education, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce published The Communist
Threat to Canada (1947) and How Communists Operate! (1948). The efforts of several
noteworthy activists, including Marjorie Lamb, Ron Gostick, and Pat Walsh illustrate a
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diverse range of Canadian anti-communism perspectives. Gostick and Walsh, in
particular, utilized anti-communism as a vehicle for the proliferation of far-right, bigoted,
and anti-Semitic ideology. In contrast, Lamb’s educational emphasis was more focused
on the public safety threat facing children and youth and benefited from the legitimacy of
her association with the Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire. While committed to
different priorities on the fringes of public anti-communism, all three activists routinely
engaged with the government, organized labour, community-based organizations, and
the media. The contributions of non-state actors and fringe ideologues must be
recognized as part of the complex manifestations of anti-communism in Canada.
Chapter four explored the intersection of anti-communism, anti-Americanism, and
Canadian national identity. Canadians were broadly aware of the aggressive anticommunism of American Senator Joseph McCarthy and the House Un-American
Activities Committee. Opposition to “McCarthyism,” however, increased during
successive investigations by the United States Senate Internal Security Subcommittee
of Canadian diplomat Herbert Norman. A period of intensified anti-Americanism
followed Norman’s death, argued by both the state and public alike to be the result of
congressional anti-communist probes that infringed on Canadian sovereignty. Individual
Canadians, faith community leaders, civil liberties advocates, and government officials
all condemned American action in various forms. The anti-American elements of this
high-profile episode helped to exaggerate the notion that Canada approached the
domestic threat of communism in a fundamentally different way than the United States.
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This perception was consistent with the broader postwar intensification of Canadian
nationalism based on the resistance of American influence.
A central component of this study is the cultural analysis of the perceived threat
of domestic communism. Chapter five focused on how arts and entertainment
communities were valuable interpreters of the fear of communism, both in their
interaction with the multifaceted anti-communist apparatus and their depictions of
suspicion and investigation. Cultural institutions like the NFB and the CBC also served a
specific nationalistic purpose. Publicly funded film, radio, and television combatted the
persistent fears of American cultural annexation. In different ways, CBC radio dramas
Episode in Red (1944) and The Intrigue at Mill Centre (1947) addressed the
identification of communist threats, citizen loyalty, and misplaced suspicion. James
Bannerman’s Red is for Danger (1953) cleverly pushes the reader headlong into the
rapid spiral of mistaken communist suspicion. Broadcasting agreements between the
CBC and the Soviet Union contributed further to the broad range of Canadian Cold War
perspectives. While cultural institutions often faced accusations of communist
sympathies or subversion, they also proved willing to scrutinize their own employees.
Writers, directors, performers, and other technical staff in Canada did not avoid the
consequences of communist suspicions. This study of significant cultural depictions and
engagements with anti-communism introduces important new analysis of how
Canadians were educated about specific Cold War threats.
Deported from the United States after he was identified as having communist
associations, writer Reuben Ship found a platform on the CBC to broadcast a scathing
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satirical depiction of Senator Joseph McCarthy. Chapter six argues that Ship’s radio
drama, and the experiences of Ted Allan, Paul Robeson, and other artists and cultural
producers, amplified the perception that Canadian anti-communism was much less
punitive than the United States. While the American entertainment “blacklist” was
comprehensive and recognizable, similar anti-communist initiatives in the Canadian
cultural sector were much less obvious to the casual observer. Listening to Ship’s radio
drama or attending one of Robeson’s border concerts enabled consumers of culture to
draw their own conclusions and to develop their own assumptions about bilateral
comparisons. Similar to the public outcry after Herbert Norman’s death, certain cultural
interpretations of the domestic ideological threat reinforced the perception that
Canadian anti-communism was less punitive than in the United States.
The perception of Canadian anti-communism discussed in this dissertation
represents just one interpretation within the broader and ongoing efforts to purposefully
shape Canada’s national identity. There is a long tradition in Canada of utilizing cultural
narratives and imagery to promote nationalism. In National Dreams: Myth, Memory, and
Canadian History, Daniel Francis evaluates several critical myths that he argues have
been integral to the teaching of Canadian history. Each core myth carries an important
message or quality that defines a constructed image of Canada, or what it means to be
a “Canadian.” Francis effectively articulates how myths can transcend the factual
realities of important institutions.
A compelling example relevant to this study is the widespread acceptance of the
RCMP as a proud national symbol. The origin of this fundamental Canadian myth is the
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prolific narrative of the Mountie, protecting western settlement and enabling Canada’s
development as an orderly “peaceable kingdom.”1 Amongst many other colonial
offences, this veneration ignores the extreme measures taken by the RCMP to combat
the rise of communism, which culminated in a series of scandals in the 1970s. The
prevailing myth of a righteous RCMP, valiant red-coated Mounties on horseback,
demonstrates how history is often utilized to construct an agreeable and idealized
consensus. Significant power lies in the promotion or exclusion of the prominent
images and stories which define Canadian identity.
The cultural nationalism of the early Cold War period reflects an aspirational
understanding of Canadian anti-communism. An extemporaneous coalition formed out
of popular anti-Americanism and a collective desire to reject an aggressively punitive
approach to the domestic threat of communism. While it’s been argued here that the
measures enacted by the Canadian government were quite consequential, it was public
perception that reinforced national identity through a specific interpretation of anticommunism. The bilateral differences that did exist in dealing with the domestic threat
of communism could be exaggerated because after the hearings of the KellockTaschereau Royal Commission, the Canadian government handled suspected
communists internally and without consistent public acknowledgement or awareness of
its approach. The notorious hearings in the United States drew considerable attention,
and the aggressive and ultimately fatal pursuit of Canadian diplomat E. Herbert Norman
galvanized anti-Americanism in Canada. The perception of a significant divergence
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between the two countries was a welcome contrast to the growing economic, political,
and defence integration brought about by the Cold War.
By focusing on public safety, arts and entertainment, and national identity, this
dissertation examines certain intersections of security, politics, culture, and nationalism.
There are, however, other elements of Canadian anti-communism that fell outside of the
scope of this dissertation. It will be important for future scholarship to extend this
analysis to French-Canada. The more stringent anti-communism of the government of
Québec, for example, represents another level of complexity that may provide insights
into the nature of Canadian federalism. There is also an opportunity to investigate the
degree to which the ideologies of fringe anti-communist activists permeated the civil
service or other civic institutions. While Ron Gostick’s anti-Semitism is well
documented, it is plausible similar prejudices influenced policy-making to a greater
extent than is realized. This dissertation actively worked to weave together political and
cultural histories. There are other interesting encounters with the culture of the Cold
War in Canada that can further enrich our understanding of how citizens engaged with
this perceived domestic ideological threat.
For too long, the study of Canadian history was influenced by polarized
methodological approaches. Practitioners of political and economic histories were often
too reluctant to employ elements of social and cultural analysis. Similarly, the
proponents of the socio-cultural approach mainly concentrated on those understudied
areas long ignored by traditional histories “from above.” The far-reaching consequences
of war and conflict comprehensively impact society. While the social and personal costs
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of the World Wars have received attention, the parameters of the Cold War are harder
to define. With distant and intermittent theatres of military conflict, it was the ideological
battle that remained constant on the home front. Suspicions of a neighbour’s loyalty
complicated the experience of a global period of instability continually threatened by
nuclear war.
Incorporating socio-cultural analysis into the traditional political and diplomatic
contexts of the Cold War allowed for an exploration of the complexity of anticommunism in Canada. Works of fiction allow for a type of criticism not always present
in media accounts or during debate in the House of Commons. Comedy and satire
challenge security imperatives and ideological motivations in a format accessible to a
broader public. Kimbrall Mcllroy’s The Intrigue at Mill Centre suggests the recruitment of
naïve subversives was not as easy as sometimes implied, and Ship’s The Investigator
exposes the often-corrupt justification of anti-communist “witch-hunts. Strategically
analyzing these cultural interpretations alongside several seminal Cold War topics
allows for a more comprehensive survey of anti-communism in Canada. This
dissertation began with a traditional emphasis on the public safety threat, but it is the
subsequent incorporation of these cultural depictions of anti-communism that enabled
observations about the social construction of Canadian national identity.
Canadian nationalism is habitually as elusive as it is aspirational. In a country of
immense territory, displaced Indigenous populations, dueling official languages, and
competing histories, Canadians exist in constant pursuit of an identifiable and cohesive
national identity. For some Canadians, the perception of a unique Canadian approach
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to the domestic threat of communism during the perilous Cold War years was embraced
as a clear distinction. The aspirational image of Canada is best captured by the Ramsay
Cook and J. M. S. Careless notion of “limited identities,” which can be extrapolated to
embrace the government’s policies of bi-lingualism and bi-culturalism and attempts to
rectify a long history of discrimination and oppression. Nationalistic instincts, though,
tend only to reflect the sentiments of those included in the conversation. In the pursuit of
a uniquely Canadian identity, there is a cyclical tendency to avoid seeking out what
make us Canadian, and instead rely on what doesn’t make us American.
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